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The World Health Organization estimates that, by 2020, the number of Americans 
affected by at least one chronic condition requiring medication therapy will grow to 
157 million. Effective medications are a cornerstone of prevention and disease 
treatment, yet only about half of patients take their medications as prescribed, 
resulting in a common and costly public health challenge for the U.S. health care 
system. As with much of health care, drug adherence is primarily about human 
behavior. Therefore, patients who lack motivation to take their medication as 
prescribed cannot be forced or simply educated to take their medication; they must be 
persuaded and motivated to do so. However, existing literature on how persuasion-
based behavioral change can be achieved for non-adherent patients is sparse. To help 
build more evidence on how effective communication can be used to promote drug 
  
adherence for patients who have been diagnosed with chronic illness, this research 
tested the effectiveness of counterfactual thinking as a message design strategy aimed 
at increasing drug adherence among individuals at risk for nonadherence. Findings 
from experiments 1 and 2 showed no effect of counterfactual thinking on medication 
adherence. Findings from experiment 3 showed that, in a sample of 303 patients with 
type 2 diabetes at risk for nonadherence, messages including upward counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., “if only I had taken my medication as prescribed, I would not be in the 
hospital right now!”), compared to messages including downward counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., “it could have been worse and I could have died!”) or no 
counterfactual thinking, increased perceptions of medication adherence self- and 
response efficacy, and behavioral intention to take one’s medications as prescribed. 
Counterfactual thinking-based messages are a promising and easy to use persuasion 
strategy for patients who are at risk for nonadherence. Counterfactual thinking can be 
incorporated in interventions aimed at increasing adherence, and in doctor-patient or 
pharmacist-patient communications. Future studies should replicate these findings 
patients who have other chronic illnesses. Furthermore, measuring actual medication 
adherence behavior as opposed to behavioral intention, would provide a better 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Rationale 
 
It is now recognized that maintaining one’s health and preventing disease or 
managing an illness is a matter of human behavior (Butterworth, 2008; Xu, Chomutare, 
& Yiengar, 2014). Specifically, adopting a balanced diet, exercising regularly, and 
avoiding alcohol and cigarettes, to name a few, are behaviors that individuals are advised 
to perform for maintaining a certain level of health. However, behavior change and 
fostering of healthful behaviors is a major challenge for health scholars and practitioners. 
Despite health promotion and disease prevention efforts, population health 
statistics are far from favorable. Specifically, in 2011, 52% of adults did not meet federal 
guidelines for physical activity. Moreover, 90% of Americans consume too much 
sodium, a cause of high blood pressure, heart disease and stroke. In 2011, 23% of adults 
reported eating vegetables less than once a day. In 2012, one in five adults said they were 
current smokers and about 38 million American adults reported binge drinking about four 
times a month (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016; CDC). 
Health risk behaviors as the ones mentioned above are responsible for developing 
chronic diseases and conditions, “some of the most common, costly, and preventable of 
all health problems” (CDC, 2016). Chronic illnesses are conditions “of long duration and 
generally slow progression. The four main types of noncommunicable [chronic] diseases 
are cardiovascular diseases (like heart attacks and stroke), cancers, chronic respiratory 
diseases (such as chronic obstructed pulmonary disease and asthma) and diabetes” 





million people—had one or more chronic health conditions. One of four adults had two 
or more chronic health conditions. Of the top ten causes of death in 2010, seven were 
chronic conditions, with cancer and heart disease accounting for nearly 48% of all deaths. 
An astonishing 86% of all health care spending in 2010 was for people with one or more 
chronic diseases (CDC, 2016).  
As chronic disease continues to weigh more heavily on public health, adherence 
to treatment becomes a critical component for patient care and disease management. 
Adherence is defined as “the degree to which the person’s behavior corresponds with the 
agreed recommendations from a health care provider.” (World Health Organization, 
2016; WHO). Effective medications are a cornerstone of chronic disease treatment, yet 
only about half of patients take their medications as prescribed, resulting in yet another 
common and costly public health challenge for the US health care system (CDC, 2016). 
For example, only 51% of Americans treated for hypertension are adherent to their long-
term medication treatment. Across conditions, between 20 to 30% of patients never fill 
their prescriptions and about 50% of individuals do not continue their medicated 
treatment as prescribed. Rates of medication adherence drop after the first six months of 
treatment (Brown & Bussell, 2011).  
Reduced medication adherence not only results in poor health outcomes but it also 
has a significant impact on health care costs (National Institutes of Health, 2016; NIH). 
From a public health perspective, nonadherence causes approximately 30% to 50% of 
treatment failures and 125,000 deaths annually and 33% to 69% of medication-related 





with nonadherence is estimated at $100 billion to $289 billion annually, with a cost of 
$2000 per patient in physician visits annually (CDC, 2016).  
 Medication nonadherence, then, represents a public health issue of great 
magnitude. Therefore, scholars and professionals from a variety of disciplines have 
engaged in decades of research investigating predictors and correlates of, and potential 
solutions to medication nonadherence (e.g., Coomes, Lewis, Uhrig, Furberg, Harris, & 
Bann, 2012; Garofalo, Kuhns, Hotton, Johnson, Muldoon & Rice, 2016; Hofer, Choi, 
Mase, Fagerlin, Soencer, & Heisler, 2016; Kreps et al., 2011). Existing research in this 
area spans across multiple chronic conditions, such as hypertension, diabetes, HIV, 
asthma, depression, cancers, to name a few. It also evaluates patients of diverse ages, 
races, ethnicities, and economic status. Age, sex, education, comorbidities, medication 
beliefs, medication side-effects, complexity of the treatment regimen, doctor patient-
communication are some of the many factors that scholars have identified as correlates or 
predictors of medication nonadherence. 
Once these factors have been identified, researchers have tried to develop and 
evaluate complex interventions that may improve drug adherence (e.g., Bobrow et al., 
2014; Coomes, Lewis, Uhrig, Furberg, Harris, & Bann, 2012; Foreman et al., 2012). 
Some of these interventions focus on improving doctor-patient and pharmacist-patient 
communication. Other programs have tried to enhance patients’ understanding of their 
medication regimen through educational materials and their motivation to take their drugs 
through motivational interviewing. Another stream of research has tested the potential of 





as reminders; sending short text messages reminding patients to take their medication 
seems to improve adherence across multiple illnesses and populations.  
However, even though communication is an important component in all of these 
interventions, there remains a gap in understanding how effective communication can 
enhance medication adherence and research and recommendations on how to design 
messages aimed at increasing drug adherence are sparse. For example, studies reporting 
educational programs discuss what information should be communicated to patients and 
some of them provide sample messages in this regard (i.e., the content of the 
communication), however, they do not explore or compare different message designs and 
contents (i.e., the structure or features of the communication) (e.g., Berrien et al., 2004; 
DeVries, McClintock, Morales, Small, & Bogner, 2015). More importantly, they do not 
answer the question of how to motivate patients to take their drugs (motivational 
interviewing-based interventions constitute an exception). This shortcoming becomes a 
problem when understanding that adherence is related to a patient’s intrinsic motivation 
to follow therapy with the goal of improving his/her health (Horne, 2006; Noble, 1998) 
and that quite a few patients are resistant to medication regimens. The reasons given for 
this resistance vary: they do not like taking medication, they do not think that their 
condition is severe enough to warrant behavior modification, or they do not think they 
can. In other words, for some patients, adhering to medication is similar to quitting 
smoking, exercising, or eating healthfully.  
Therefore, patients who are resistant to medication adherence cannot be forced or 
simply educated to take their medication; they must be persuaded and motivated to do so. 





taking their medication and their ability to take their medication as prescribed are likely 
to be much more impactful than education and reminders (Mayer & Pharm, 2007, p.1).  
However, the existing literature is thin on how persuasion-based behavioral 
change can be achieved for non-adherent patients. As O’Keefe (2012) writes, “messages 
do not necessarily map easily or straightforwardly onto psychological processes or states” 
(p. 15). What this means is that an understanding of the psychological factors that affect 
behavior (e.g., medication adherence) is not sufficient basis for effective communication; 
rather, one must test various message designs to understand what constitutes effective 
communication. In other words, if a patient believes that taking their medication as 
prescribed is not important, simply telling them they can die if they do not do it may not 
be the most effective strategy; rather, perhaps providing them with statistics about the 
effectiveness of their particular medication or another patient’s testimonial on how the 
medication saved their lives may be more impactful. However, whereas it is known that 
beliefs about one’s medication affect adherence, it is less known what the most effective 
communication strategy is to change those beliefs. As O’Keefe (2012) puts it, “the best 
evidentiary basis for conclusions about effective message design is direct evidence about 
message effects” (p. 15).  
Therefore, this research attempts to address this gap in the drug adherence 
literature and conceptualize a theory-based model of persuasive communication aimed at 
increasing adherence intentions by positively changing individuals’ self- and response 
efficacy, and outcome expectancy. Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s belief that 
he/she has the ability to carry out a behavior (Bandura, 1994), in this case, to take their 





specific recommendation (i.e., the response) that is being communicated to him/her is 
efficient in avoiding a threat (Witte, 1992). In the present context, high response efficacy 
would occur when an individual believes that the recommendation to take their 
medication as prescribed would be efficient in helping them manage their illness 
appropriately and avoid health complications. In general, when an individual believes 
that 1) a behavior is efficient in avoiding a threat (i.e., taking medication is efficient in 
avoiding medical complications) and 2) that he/she is able to carry out that behavior (i.e., 
he/she has the ability to take their medication as prescribed), the likelihood that the 
individual will engage in that behavior is the highest (McCann, Clark, & Lu, 2008; Witte, 
1992). In the particular context of medication adherence, self- and response efficacy have 
been identified as important predictors of adherence, as well (Bane, Hughe, & McElnay, 
2006; Chao, Nau, Aikens, & Taylor, 2005; Criswell, Weber, Xu, & Carter, 2010; 
McCann, Clark, & Lu, 2008).  
Related to response efficacy is the concept of “outcome expectancy”, or “a 
person's estimate that a given behavior will lead to certain outcomes” (Bandura, 1977, p. 
193). These outcomes include psychological, social, and physical consequences of 
engaging with a specific behavior; when an individual believes a behavior will increase 
the likelihood of said outcomes, he/she is more likely to perform that behavior (Bandura, 
2001). The concept of outcome expectancy and its role in motivating medication 
adherence will, thus, also be explored in this research. It is expected that a persuasive 
message that increases individuals’ self- and response efficacy, and outcome expectancy 






 To achieve these goals, this research proposes the use of counterfactual thinking 
(CFT) as a message design strategy aimed at increasing drug adherence among 
individuals with low motivation to take their drugs through increasing perceptions of self- 
and response efficacy, and outcome expectancy. Counterfactual thinking is a pervasive 
mode of thinking that involves thoughts about how things could have been different if a 
different behavior had been performed (Roese, 1994). For example, one might think that 
their health would be in better shape had they given up smoking ten years ago when their 
doctor advised them to. A vast body of literature documents the impact of counterfactual 
thinking on a variety of cognitive processes, including information processing patterns, 
regulatory focus, perceptions of self-efficacy and control, responses to persuasive 
messages, with consequences for behavioral intentions and subsequent behaviors (e.g., 
Aboulnasr & Sivaraman, 2010; Arora, Haynie, & Laurence, 2011; Baek, Shen, & Reid; 
Gleicher, Boninger, Strathman, Armor, Hetts, & Ahn, 1995; Krishnamurthy & 
Sivaraman, 2002; Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003; Roese, 1994, 1997, 1999; Sanna, 
1996; Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, & Gleicher, 2004).  
The ubiquity of counterfactual thinking and its power on behavior is skillfully 
summarized in an article by Landman and Petty (2000). The article explains how lottery 
advertising often exploits the normal human capacity for counterfactual thinking in 
convincing individuals to repeatedly purchase lottery tickets, despite their losing time 
after time. Specifically, the authors argue that an inherent feature of all lottery purchases, 
i.e., the negative outcome of not winning because of not having purchased a ticket, 
induces counterfactual thinking (i.e., If only I had bought a ticket, I could have been 





invite individuals to generate counterfactual thinking by asking them to imagine what 
they would do if they won the big prize. Landman and Petty conclude that counterfactual 
thinking-based advertising tactics are tremendously effective (as illustrated by lottery 
tickets sale), so effective that they have been banned from being used in other domains, 
such as finances (p. 316).  
Despite the persuasive potential of counterfactual thinking and its impact on 
variables relevant to persuasion (i.e., information processing, self-efficacy beliefs, 
behavioral intentions, and behaviors), the use of counterfactual thinking in persuasive 
communication has received scant research attention. Furthermore, when studied in a 
persuasion context, counterfactual thinking has been manipulated as a factor incidental to 
the message and analyzed as a mechanism or a moderator that enhances or reduces the 
effects of specific persuasive strategies, such as gain and loss frames (Baek, Shen, & 
Reid, 2013) or message regulatory focus (Nan, 2007). Only two studies have explored the 
persuasive potential of counterfactual thinking as a message component, concluding that, 
indeed, messages that include counterfactual thoughts outperform those that do not 
(Gleicher et al., 1995; Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, & Gleicher, 2004). This research will 
continue past work and provide an in-depth examination of the power of counterfactual 
thinking as a persuasion tool.  
The implications for communication theory and research are multiple. First, this 
research is just one possible inquiry into the role of counterfactual thinking in persuasion. 
Future research can build upon these findings and investigate how robust counterfactual 
thinking-based persuasive communication is. Second, counterfactual thinking, due to its 





communication scholars another excellent opportunity to study the intersection of 
cognition and emotion and their joint effect on individuals’ responses to persuasion. 
Third, it is hoped that the present inquiry will serve as a springboard for incorporating 
counterfactual thinking with other well-established persuasion theories. From a practical 
perspective, this work aims to provide concrete advice on how to construct theory-
grounded health messages aimed at increasing drug adherence, a research area that is far 
from well represented in the literature.  
To conclude, this is the first research effort to employ counterfactual thinking as a 
persuasive message design strategy and to explore the underlying mechanisms through 
which it affects behavioral outcomes in the context of increasing individuals’ intentions 
to adhere to medication as prescribed.  
The next chapter of this manuscript defines medication nonadherence and 
provides an inventory of factors that affect medication adherence. The third chapter 
describes prior interventions designed to increase medication adherence. Counterfactual 
thinking and its potential for persuasive communication are introduced in chapter four. 
Chapter five describes the proposed study and hypotheses to be tested. In chapter six, 
findings from a pilot study and two experiments are presented and discussed. Findings 
from a third experiment are introduced and discussed in chapter seven. Finally, chapter 
eight provides a discussion of the findings across all studies, implications and limitations 





Chapter 2: Medication Nonadherence 
 
 
Defining Adherence and Nonadherence 
The World Health Organization defines medication adherence as “the degree to 
which the person’s behavior corresponds with the agreed recommendations from a health 
care provider.” (WHO, 2016). Adherence to medication is measured either directly 
through biological markers (a sensitive but invasive method) or indirectly, through self-
reporting, questionnaires, pill counts, or, more recently, electronic pharmacy records 
(Guillausseau, 2005; Ho, Bryson, & Rumsfeld; 2009). Adherence is usually defined as 
the proportion of patients taking between 80 and 90% of their prescribed medication and 
it has been usually measured in patients continuing medication, rather than in newly 
diagnosed individuals (Caro, Ishak, Huybrechts, Raggio, & Naujoks, 2004; Donnan, 
MacDonald, & Morris, 2002).  
Researchers have distinguished among several types of nonadherence. First, there 
is voluntary and involuntary nonadherence. Voluntary nonadherence refers to patients 
who choose not to take their medication as prescribed and it is related to patients’ beliefs, 
attitudes, and expectations that influence their motivation to begin and persist with their 
medication treatment (Jimmy & Jose, 2011). Some of the most important reasons that 
people choose not to take their medication are: 1) fear or experience of side effects; 2) 
beliefs that the medication is not needed or important in their treatment plan; 3) beliefs 





treatment; 5) beliefs that they are taking too many medications; or 6) negative press about 
the prescribed medication.  
Involuntary nonadherence occurs when a patient wants to take their medication 
and believes that their medication is needed and effective, however, they encounter 
barriers such as 1) forgetting to take their medication; 2) forgetting to refill their 
prescription; 3) financial problems; or 4) a hectic everyday schedule (Gadkari & 
McHorney, 2010; Haynes, McDonald, & Carg, 2002; Osterberf & Blaschke, 2005; 
WHO, 2003). Given that this research attempts to increase motivation to take one’s 
medication through theory-based persuasive communication and that barriers such as 
financial limitations cannot be changed with a persuasion approach, the focus will be on 
voluntary nonadherence.  
Predictors and Correlates of Medication Nonadherence 
Predictors and correlates of chronic illness medication nonadherence are multiple. 
Numerous studies have explored potential predictors and correlates of adherence to 
medication across a variety of conditions. Whereas earlier studies explored largely 
unmodifiable variables such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, income, education, and co-
occurring illnesses, more recent studies have begun to explore more alterable predictors 
of adherence such as provider–patient communication, regimen complexity, medication 
cost, health literacy, and health and medication beliefs (Gazmararian, Kripalani, Miller, 







Demographic variables such as age, race, and gender have been some of the first 
factors studied in the context of medication nonadherence. However, their relationship 
with drug adherence has been inconsistent. For example, in the case of diabetes, some 
survey studies report a higher degree of nonadherence among older patients (e.g., 
Soumerai, Ross-Degnan, Avorn, McLaughlin, & Choodnovskiy, 1991), whereas others 
report the opposite (Ahmad, Ramli, Islahudin, & Paraidathathu, 2013). Other survey 
studies note that older patients become less adherent when they must follow complex 
medication regimens (Khoza & Kortenbout, 1995) or when they cannot afford their 
medication (Col, Fanale, & Kronholm, 1990).  
For chronic health failure, a systematic analysis of 17 studies which provided data 
for 727 patients concluded that older age alone is not related to medication adherence; the 
authors concluded that younger newly diagnosed patients with chronic health failure are 
in fact more at risk for nonadherence and they should be closely monitored (Krueger, 
Botermann, Schorr, Griese-Mammen, Laufs, & Schulz, 2015). Yet another systematic 
analysis found that medication adherence across eight conditions (depression, 
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, diabetes, asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
multiple sclerosis, cancer, and osteoporosis) was higher in older patients (Rolnick, 
Pawloski, Hedblom, Asche, & Bruzek, 2013). Finally, Granger and his colleagues (2009) 
found no association between age and drug adherence for patients with heart failure when 
adjusting for other variables.  
Mixed results were also found for gender. Whereas Granger et al. (2009) and 





found the relationship between gender and medication adherence to be insignificant 
(Horne & Weinman, 1999). 
Regarding race and education, survey studies have been inconsistent, as well; it is 
uncertain whether more or less educated patients or whether White versus non-White 
individuals are more adherent (Osterberg & Blaschke, 2005; Misra, & Lager, 2009; 
Ramli, Ahmad, & Paraidathathu, 2012). In a randomized controlled trial in which 
participants were assigned to one of two models of community health worker-led diabetes 
medication decision support, Hofer and her colleagues (2016) tested whether gender, 
race/ethnicity (only Latinos and African Americans were included in their study), age, 
and education moderated the relationship between medication knowledge, satisfaction 
with medication information, and decisional conflict (i.e., the confidence that the patient 
felt about key aspects of decision making regarding their medication) and medication 
adherence, however, none of these variables emerged as moderators. 
Comorbidities (co-occurring illnesses) 
Whereas the presence of comorbidities has been initially found to decrease 
adherence due to the complexity of treatment regimens necessary to treat multiple 
conditions (Mateo, Gil-Guillen, Mateo, Orozco, Carbayo, & Merino, 2005; survey study), 
other survey studies and systematic reviews did not find a relationship between the 
complexity of medication treatment measured in terms of number of drugs that a person 
must take on a daily basis and adherence (Ahmad et al., 2013; Cramer, 2004). The only 
comorbid illness that has been consistently found to be related to adherence is depression. 
Specifically, patients diagnosed with depression and another chronic illness are less likely 





conditions but who do not have depression (Sirey, Greenfield, Weinberger, & Bruce, 
2013; survey study). 
Health literacy 
Health literacy is “the degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, 
process, and understand the health information needed to make appropriate health 
decisions” (Ingram & Ivanov, 2013, p.  22). Most studies have found that patients with 
low health literacy are less likely to follow their medication regimen. In a survey of HIV 
positive men and women (60% ethnic minorities), education and health literacy were 
significant and independent predictors of adherence, even after controlling for age, 
ethnicity, income, HIV symptoms, social support, substance abuse, emotional distress, 
and attitudes toward health care providers. Patients with low health literacy had lower 
adherence rates due to confusion about the medication or forgetfulness (Kalichman, 
Ramachandran, & Catz, 1999). Similar findings were observed in surveys of patients 
with diabetes, glaucoma, or heart failure: individuals with inadequate health literacy were 
less likely to take their medication as prescribed (Bauer et al., 2013; Muir et al., 2006; 
Noureldin, Plake, Morrow, Tu, Wu, & Murray, 2012).  
Ingram and Ivanov (2013), however, found no association between adherence and 
health literacy in a survey of hypertensive African American older adults: though most 
patients had inadequate health literacy, their adherence levels were not affected by it. Age 
and health status, however, did predict adherence, such that younger adults with poorer 
health status reported lower adherence levels. Similarly, in another survey, Mosher, 
Lund, Kripalani, and Kaboli (2012) noticed that, even though patients with low health 





their level of adherence was not different from that of patients with higher health literacy. 
Finally, systematic reviews of the literature in this area concluded that evidence on the 
association between health literacy and therapy adherence is weak (Geboers et al., 2015; 
Loke, Hinz, Wang, & Salter, 2012; Zhang, Terry, & McHorney, 2014). 
Treatment-related factors 
Medication side effects. The stronger the side effects associated with a 
medication regimen, the less likely patients are to adhere to treatment (Garcia-Perez, 
Alvarez, Dilla, Gil-Guillen, & Beltran, 2013; narrative review). For instance, patients 
with type 2 diabetes are often overweight or obese when diagnosed and some of the 
treatments available are associated with further weight gain; therefore, some of these 
patients may decide to discontinue treatment if their weight situation worsens (Dilla et 
al., 2008; survey study; Mannucci, Monami, Lamanna, Gori, & Marchionni, 2009; meta-
analysis). Other less serious side effects such as gastrointestinal issues, headaches, or 
nausea may also affect treatment adherence (Donnelly, Morris, & Pearson, 2009; survey 
study).  
To better understand the relationship magnitude between side effects and 
nonadherence, Pollack and colleagues (2010) conducted a survey of 2,074 patients with 
type 2 diabetes, between 2006 and 2008. They found that the association between side 
effects and nonadherence was significant (Pearson’s r = .20, p < .01), with each 
additional side effect being associated with a 28% increase in likelihood for 
nonadherence. 
Medication perceptions. In addition to experienced side effects, perceived side-





believe that their medication would cause unpleasant side effects report less adherence 
(Farmer, Kinmonth, & Sutton, 2006; survey study). Kreps and colleagues (2011) also 
found in their survey and focus groups that, across a variety of medical conditions (i.e., 
high blood pressure, multiple sclerosis, hypertension, diabetes, depression, HIV, and 
asthma), patients who expected side effects were less likely to be adherent.  
Similarly, if a patient believes that their medication is not helping them manage 
their disease or that taking their medication is not making a difference, nonadherence is 
likely (Kreps et al., 2011). In a survey of 49 patients with type 1 diabetes and 108 patients 
with type 2 diabetes, patients’ perceptions of control over their glycemic levels and of 
prevention of cardiovascular complications were associated with higher medication, 
exercise, and diet adherence (Broadbent, Donkin, & Stroh, 2011). Kreps and colleagues 
(2011) found that lack of commitment about the need for and importance of the 
medication was the number one reason for nonadherence in a sample of 30 interview 
participants with various chronic illnesses.  
Perceived stigma associated with certain medications, such as antidepressants, 
may also lower adherence (Chai, Anderson, Wong, & Hussein, 2014; survey study). 
Some patients also believe that medication is not necessary if they are feeling well and, as 
such, might stop taking their drugs when disease symptoms are absent. In support of this 
idea, Mann, Ponieman, Leventhal, and Halm (2009) found that surveyed individuals with 
type 2 diabetes believed they should take their medication only when their sugar was 
high. 
 Patient-provider communication. Not surprisingly, the quality of the 





for adherence (Chiecanowski, Katon, Russo, & Walker, 2001; survey study; Rubin, 
Peyrot, & Simnerio, 2006; survey study). Providers are in the unique position of 
correcting patient misperceptions, explaining how a medication is to be taken, providing 
information about side effects probability and duration, and addressing any fears and 
concerns a patient might have. More importantly, providers are also among the few that 
can identify patient nonadherence. Though health care professionals have reported 
difficulty with predicting nonadherence in their patients, clear communication with their 
patients and regular follow-ups can improve medication adherence (CDC, 2013; 
Chiecanowski, Katon, Russo, & Walker, 2001; Rubin, Peyrot, & Simnerio, 2006). 
Perceived self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy. More 
recent studies have begun to examine drug adherence from the perspective of behavioral 
change models (e.g., health belief model, self-regulation model, theory of planned 
behavior, social cognitive theory). Whereas some of the variables analyzed in this body 
of literature overlap with the ones summarized in previous sections (e.g., financial costs, 
low health literacy, regimen complexity), other factors are unique to this research. 
Specifically, research notes that medication adherence is affected by one’s self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, and outcome expectancy.  
Self-efficacy refers to one’s belief that they have the ability to perform a behavior, 
for example, that they are able to take their medication as prescribed. Self-efficacy is 
different from perceived behavioral control (the perception that performance of behavior 
is within one’s control, for example, that one is in control of taking their medication; 
Azjen, 1991), although the two variables can be correlated. For example, one may believe 





fishing is not under their control, perhaps because of lack of a fishing permit. 
Empirically, studies using factor analytic techniques have concluded that perceived 
behavioral control can be separated from self-efficacy (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 1999a; 
Povey, Conner, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, 2000). Moreover, self-efficacy has been 
shown to predict behavioral intentions above and beyond perceived behavioral control 
(Norman & Hoyle, 2004). Finally, in experimental studies, manipulations of self-efficacy 
did not affect perceptions of perceived control (Trafimov, Sheeran, Conner, & Finlay, 
2002). Together, these findings show that self-efficacy is different from perceived 
behavioral control.   
The role of self-efficacy in medication adherence has been studied rather widely 
and results show a pretty consistent pattern: increased self-efficacy is associated with 
better adherence. These results have been observed for patients with type 2 diabetes 
(Chao, Nau, Aikens, & Taylor, 2005; survey study); patients with hypertension (Bane, 
Hughe, & McElnay, 2006; Criswell, Weber, Xu, & Carter, 2010; survey studies); patients 
with HIV (Colbert, Sereika, & Erlen, 2013; survey study); patients with chronic kidney 
disease (Wierdsma, van Zuilen, & van der Bijl, 2011; intervention study in which 
participants in the treatment group discussed medication adherence self-efficacy). In most 
studies, self-efficacy has been tested as a mediator between various background variables 
(e.g., depressive symptoms, health literacy, provider-patient interactions) and adherence.  
The importance of self-efficacy for medication adherence is also stressed by 
McCann, Clark, and Lu (2008) in their self-efficacy model of medication adherence in 
chronic mental illness. Developed from insights from researchers’ own practice and a 





adherence, the model describes self-efficacy as a central concept, influenced by four 
interrelated factors: perceived medication efficacy, access to, and relationship with, 
health professionals; significant other support and supported living circumstances. 
McCann, Clark, and Lu describe self-efficacy as the cornerstone of medication adherence 
and note its strong relationship with coping abilities, health beliefs, and behavior 
(Bandura, 1994; Glanz & Rimmer, 1995). Specifically, individuals with a strong belief in 
their abilities to perform a behavior (in this case, drug taking) cope better with complex 
medication treatments, make better decisions about medication taking, and regard 
medication taking more positively.  
The conceptualization and measurement of self-efficacy, however, has been rather 
confusing across studies. Specifically, some research defined self-efficacy as “medication 
taking self-efficacy” or one’s belief in one’s ability to take their medication as prescribed 
(e.g., Colbert, Sereika, & Erlen, 2013; Nokes et al., 2012). Other research, however, 
seemed to have conflated the concepts of self-efficacy and response efficacy (i.e., one’s 
belief that a specific recommendation is effective in avoiding a threat; for example, heart 
disease medication adherence response efficacy is one’s belief that the advice to take 
their medication is an effective strategy to avoid a stroke).  
For example, Bane and colleagues (2006) and Criswell and colleagues (2010) 
defined self-efficacy as a person’s perception that he or she is able to successfully 
perform a given behavior (i.e., drug taking), however, they measured this variable with 
items such as “I am confident that I could take my blood pressure medication as 
prescribed, even if I didn’t think that my medicine was useful”. Such items combine self-





response efficacy beliefs (I think that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor 
is/is not useful). Whereas such items better describe real situations that patients face on a 
day to day basis (i.e., a person is likely to assess his/her ability to take medication in the 
face of barriers such as beliefs that the medication is not helping), it is important to 
separately measure these two constructs and understand if and how they separately 
impact adherence.  
Such separation is even more important for interventions aimed at increasing 
adherence: increasing both confidence in ability to take medication and confidence in the 
benefits of taking medication are likely to be associated with higher and stronger 
adherence. Going back to the literature looking at how medication perceptions influence 
adherence, one can observe that beliefs that a medication is/is not useful in managing a 
disease affect adherence (e.g., Kreps et al., 2011). Although those studies did not label 
such beliefs “response efficacy”, the similarity is apparent. Furthermore, in the self-
efficacy model of medication adherence, McCann and colleagues (2008) emphasize that 
individuals are more likely to carry out behaviors if both self-efficacy and response 
efficacy are high. In fact, studies have consistently found that patients’ perceptions of 
how much a medication is helping them achieve recovery or manage their illness are the 
most important factors affecting adherence (Kikkert et al., 2006; Kreps et al., 2011; 
Loffler, Kilian, Toumi, & Angermeyer, 2003). In conclusion, future research should 
simultaneously consider the effects of self-efficacy and response efficacy on adherence.  
The relationship between outcomes expectancy (a concept related to response 
efficacy, though not identical) and medication adherence has also been studied. In a 





outcome expectancy (conceptualized and operationalized as beliefs that a medication was 
helping patients with their illness) was positively related to medication adherence.  
Outcome expectancy is “a person's estimate that a given behavior will lead to 
certain outcomes” (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). These outcomes include psychological, 
social, and physical consequences of engaging with a specific behavior (Bandura, 2001). 
For example, an individual’s outcome expectancy of wearing a condom may include 
beliefs about protection against sexually transmitted illness (physical outcome), being 
perceived as an “uncool person” (social outcomes) or fear that their partner would 
perceive them as distrustful (psychological outcome). Response efficacy perceptions, on 
the other hand, encompasses a person’s belief about whether a prescribed remedy or 
course of action can protect against a health threat. For example, response efficacy refers 
to one’s belief that wearing a condom can help protect against sexually transmitted 
infections. To conclude, though similar, the concepts of outcome expectancy and 
response efficacy are different; outcome expectancy is a broader concept, whereas 
response efficacy is more specific and included in outcome expectancy (i.e., physical 
outcomes are similar to response efficacy).  
Given that both response efficacy and outcome expectancy have an effect on 
medication adherence (McCann et al., 2008; Sleath et al., 2014), it would be useful to 
study these factors in conjunction with self-efficacy. Given the overlap between response 
efficacy and outcome expectancy, in the context of this research, outcome expectancy is 
defined as expectations about social and psychological outcomes of taking one’s 
medication as prescribed, whereas response efficacy is defined as expectations about 





Chapter 3: Interventions to Improve Medication Adherence 
 
Scholars have tried to develop and evaluate complex interventions that may 
improve drug adherence. These interventions often involve multiple components, such as 
programs focusing on improving doctor-patient and pharmacist-patient communication; 
educational materials aimed at enhancing patients’ understanding of their medication 
regimen and motivational interviewing aimed at increasing patients’ motivation to take 
their drugs. Other interventions have tested the potential of text messages or mHealth in 
reducing drug nonadherence. Finally, a few studies have looked into effective 
communication strategies to increase medication adherence. Exemplars for each 
intervention category are reviewed below. Of note, all interventions include 
communication as an important component, however, only few use communication and 
persuasion theory to develop their medication adherence messages. Thus, the studies 
presented below are segmented based on this criterion (i.e., interventions that do/do not 
use communication and persuasion theory). 
Interventions that Do Not Use Communication/Persuasion Theory 
Multifaceted interventions 
Decades of research have shown that adherence entails a complex interaction of 
patient characteristics, the social environment, and health care professionals (Lin & 
Chiecanowski, 2008). As a result, the public health literature is ripe with descriptions of 





suggest that the use of multiple interventions is more effective than the use of just one 
intervention; education alone is unlikely to produce significant change; successful 
interventions are tailored to the individual and include teaching self-determination to 
patients, discussing barriers with patients, simplifying the dose regimens, practicing joint 
patient-doctor decision making, addressing social and family support, following up with 
calls by health care professionals, and sending reminders for taking medication (Haynes 
et al., 2008; Mundt et al., 2001; Schroeder, Fahey, & Ebrahim, 2008). Motivational 
interviewing is a frequently used technique in these interventions (e.g., Duff & Latchford, 
2010). Motivational interviewing is “a clinical patient-centered interview that helps to 
investigate and resolve ambivalence in unhealthy behaviors and/or habits to promote 
changes toward healthier lifestyles and it is more likely to be successful when the patient 
already has a positive attitude toward change” (Leiva et al., 2010, p. 46).  
Pakpour and associates (2015) conducted a multimodal behavioral intervention 
trial for improving antiepileptic drug adherence. The intervention included three sessions 
of face-to-face motivational interviewing in which patients were encouraged to express 
their experiences, struggles, readiness, and confidence for behavior change. The health 
psychologist conducting these sessions employed open-ended questions, affirmations, 
reflective statements and drug taking planning to address the barriers expressed by 
patients and to encourage drug adherence. Patients enrolled in the study were also 
provided with calendars to self-monitor their medication taking behavior. Moreover, 
family members and health care professionals were also invited to take part in one of the 
motivational interviewing sessions with the goal of improving collaboration and 





in the intervention group, compared to those in the control group, reported significantly 
higher medication adherence and perceptions of control for taking medication regularly. 
Levy et al. (2004) sampled a group of HIV positive adults and worked with them 
to identify patient-specific barriers to adherence and strategies to overcome such barriers. 
Medication dossette boxes, electronic alarms, and an online medication planner 
(www.aidsmap.com) were also distributed. In addition, pharmacists and/or nurses 
educated patients about HIV infection and the importance of adherence to successful 
medication therapy. Compared to the control group, there was a significant decrease in 
the number of missed doses at four, seven, and 28 days follow-up in the intervention 
group, indicating an improvement in medication taking behavior.  
Berrien and colleagues (2004) worked with a sample of HIV positive pediatric 
patients over the course of three months. The intervention consisted of eight structured 
home visits aimed at improving knowledge and understanding of HIV infection and at 
identifying and resolving barriers to medication adherence. The visits were conducted by 
experienced nurses and included role playing and comic books as educational materials. 
Patients and caretakers were asked to keep a written diary of the progress made toward 
overcoming specific barriers. Patients were rewarded for each completed medication dose 
and overcome barrier with medication boxes, pill cutters, and other age appropriate toys. 
The knowledge score and medication refill history improved significantly in the 
intervention versus control group; although the adherence self-report score improved in 
the intervention group compared to the control group, the difference was not significant.  
De Vries, McClintock, Morales, Small, and Bogner (2015) developed an 





assigned to the intervention condition were paired with trained integrated care managers 
who offered education, treatment recommendations, and medication taking monitoring. 
The patient-care manager interactions addressed the influence of factors such as 
depression, chronic medical conditions, side effects, and lack of social support. The 
intervention took place over a three-month period and resulted in improved medication 
adherence and understanding of the importance of medication therapy for diabetes 
management.  
A similar intervention was used with asthma patients (Park et al., 2010). Using 
motivational interviewing principles, trained care managers discussed barriers to 
medication adherence with patients over the phone, twice. The phone interviews were 
followed with three educational mailings. Participants in the intervention reported fewer 
adherence barriers and better asthma control.   
Text message-based interventions 
Text messages are cheap, personal, easy to send to patients individually, have the 
potential to be tailored to ensure relevancy, and are accessible to almost everyone, 
regardless of social economic status or location. According to Pew Internet Project, 91% 
of American adults own and use a cell phone device as of May 2013. Moreover, 67% of 
cell owners admitted checking their phone for message, alerts, or calls without the device 
even ringing or vibrating. These percentages hold even when ethnicity, education, 
urbanity, household income, and age are factored in.  
As a result, text messages have been explored as a potential tool for increasing 
medication adherence, as a stand-alone intervention or as part of more comprehensive 





contraceptive pill adherence) (Arora, Peters, Burner, Lam, & Menchine, 2014; Bubrow et 
al., 2014; Coomes, Lewis, Uhrig, Furberg, Harris, & Bann, 2012; Garofalo, Kuhns, 
Hotton, Johnson, Muldoom, & Rice, 2016; Hou, Hurwitz, Kavanagh, Fortin, & Goldberg, 
2010; Suffoletto, Calabria, Ross, Callaway, & Yealy, 2012). A systematic review of text 
message interventions to promote adherence to antiretroviral therapy concluded that 
larger effects are observed when texts were sent less frequently than daily; invited doctor-
patient interaction; and included personalized content (Finitsis, Pellowski, & Johnson, 
2014). Similarly, Park, Howie-Esquivel, and Dracup (2014) noted that successful SMS 
interventions deliver tailored educational and motivational content, whereas unsuccessful 
interventions tended to include a simple medication reminder.  
Text message interventions have been used to target different adherence issues. 
Some text message-based interventions fulfill the primary function of “reminders” for 
those who might forget taking their medication: each day, patients would receive a short 
text reminding them to take their medication (e.g., “Please remember to take your birth 
control pill”; Hou et al., 2010; Foreman et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014) and/or ask 
patients to confirm having taken their medication (Hardy et al., 2011; Harris et al., 2010, 
Suffoletto et al., 2012).  
Other interventions, in addition to addressing forgetfulness, also target patient 
concerns and medication knowledge. For example, Petrie and colleagues (2012) used text 
messages to change illness and medication beliefs in a sample of asthma patients (e.g., 
fact sheet-type of messages: “Your asthma is always there even when you don't have 
symptoms”; “Take your preventer every day and control your asthma before it controls 





will reduce the inflammation that causes asthma”) and Mao, Zhang, and Zhai (2008) 
encouraged their patients to ask medication questions to pharmacists. Bobrow et al. 
(2014) interspersed reminder messages (reminders to take one’s medication, to pick-up 
one’s prescription) with medication adherence support and hypertension-related 
education messages (e.g., goals and planning, “A pill box can help you to remember 
when to take you high blood pills. We encourage you to get one. For more info ask 
PHARMACY.”; social support, “Ask someone you trust to help you remember to take 
your medicine as directed.”; nonadherence consequences, “Pls remember your high blood 
can’t be cured. To keep healthy pls keep on with your pills, come on your clinic dates, 
exercise&eat healthy food.”; self-efficacy support, “You’re doing very well. Pls keep on 
with your pills, come on your clinic dates, exercise&eat healthy food.”).  
Suffoletto et al. (2012) included warning messages: if in response to a text 
message about dosing, a participant replied with a wrong amount, he/she would receive a 
warning message: “We are concerned you have taken too many doses of [Antibiotic], 
which may be dangerous to your health. Remember to take only [X] doses per 24-hour 
period and to separate doses as recommended”. 
Results regarding the efficacy of text messages for improving adherence have 
been mixed. On the one hand, some researchers have found that text messaging has been 
associated with short-term significant reductions in missed doses (Fairley et al., 2003), 
clinical improvements over time (Benhamou et al., 2011; Simoni et al., 2009), and 
increases in self-reported adherence (Hardy et al., 2011). On the other hand, other 
researchers found no differences between intervention and control groups (Hou et al., 





across chronic conditions concluded that 65% of the 20 studies analyzed reported 
beneficial effects, however, due to the variety of study designs, no definite conclusions 
could be made (Park, Howie-Esquivel, & Dracup, 2014).  
More importantly, text message interventions have been criticized for their lack of 
theory. In a quantitative systematic review of the efficacy of mobile phone interventions 
to improve medication adherence for both acute and chronic conditions, Park, Howie-
Esquivel, and Dracup (2014) concluded that “While the majority of investigators found 
improvement in medication adherence, long-term studies characterized by rigorous 
research methodologies, appropriate statistical and economic analyses and the test of 
theory-based interventions are needed to determine the efficacy of mobile phones to 
influence medication adherence.” (p. 1932). Finally, Hall, Cole-Lewis, and Bernhardt 
(2015), in their systematic review of reviews on mobile text messaging for health, advise 
that future research identify recommended text messaging intervention characteristics 
that are most effective and that could then be applied in practice.  
Communication/Persuasion Theory-Grounded Interventions 
One way, among others, to theoretically ground interventions and understand 
what message elements successfully increase adherence is to use persuasive health and 
risk message design theories and principles from the field of health communication. Yet, 
very few studies specifically focused on how to communicate about drug adherence or on 
how to design communications aimed at increasing adherence based on a theoretical 
understanding of communication processes. These studies are critical in light of a vast 
and complex literature on health communication emphasizing that certain words, foci, 





behavioral change and in correcting perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs (Dillard & Pfau, 
2002).  
In a study conducted by Kreps et al. (2011), participants who self-identified as 
low, medium, and high risk for nonadherence were randomly assigned to three message 
conditions – no message (control), positively framed, and negatively framed messages. A 
positive frame emphasized the advantages and benefits individuals might gain by 
following message recommendations, and a negative framed emphasized the 
disadvantages and losses of failing to follow such recommendations. Both positively and 
negatively framed messages addressed medication commitment issues, medication 
concerns, or costs of prescription medication. Both positively and negatively framed 
messages increased adherence intention compared to control, however, they had no 
advantage over no message on attitudes, subjective norms, and self-efficacy. 
Zhao et al. (2012) investigated the interaction between message framing and time 
perspective (operationalized as an individual’s consideration of future consequences) in 
adherence-promoting persuasive messages. Consideration of future consequences is a 
measure of individual difference in the extent to which people consider the immediate 
versus the long-term consequences of their current behaviors. People who score high on 
consideration of future consequences tend to focus on the future and are concerned with 
the implications that present behaviors and outcomes may have on their future goals. 
People who score low on consideration of future consequences focus on the present and 
are less concerned with the implications that present behaviors and outcomes may have 





Participants in Zhao et al.’s study were individuals who indicated low need for 
their medication, high perceived concerns about their medication, or both. Participants 
were assigned to matched message topics based on their suboptimal medications beliefs: 
need, concern, or both. Results showed that message exposure did not make a difference 
in intention or attitude for low- and medium-consideration of future consequences 
participants. For high- consideration of future consequences participants, however, both 
gain- and loss-framed messages enhanced intention and attitude relative to the no-
message control. The concern message resulted in greater intentions than the need and 
combined messages. The need and concern messages generated more favorable attitudes 
than the combined message, but the interactions between topic and time perspective were 
not significant. Framing had no effect on perceived message strength, message 
derogation, message liking, or message engagement among participants low and medium 
in consideration of future consequences. However, for participants high in consideration 
of future consequences, a consistent pattern emerged: the gain-framed messages 
generated more favorable responses than the loss-framed messages on all message 
perception variables.  
A third study focused on a smoking cessation drug and investigated individuals’ 
preferences for messages aimed at increasing their adherence to that drug. Across a series 
of focus groups, participants indicated that they preferred simple and encouraging 
messages that emphasized tobacco cessation and not drug adherence, and that served as a 






Drug nonadherence constitutes a major public health issue, one that is incredibly 
complex and that likely necessitates a combination of strategies and interventions for 
addressing it. There are multiple factors associated with nonadherence and past literature 
has done a good job inventorying them. Interventional studies, however, have had mixed 
success at addressing some of these factors and increasing adherence.  
One way of improving the impact of drug adherence interventions is more focus 
on the communicative aspect of these programs. Although all these interventions include 
communication as an important component, recommendations on how to design 
communications/messages aimed at increasing drug adherence are sparse. For example, 
studies reporting educational programs discuss what information should be 
communicated to patients and some of them provide sample messages in this regard, 
however, they do not explore or compare different message designs and contents and no 
theory guides their message design. An exception are motivational interviewing studies 
which mention the importance of acknowledging patients’ concerns and barriers when 
discussing drug adherence with them, as many behavioral change theories suggest (e.g., 
Health Belief Model; Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1994).  
Whereas reminders and information are without a doubt useful, as with much of 
health care, drug adherence is a matter of human behavior. There is a subset of patients 
who do embrace the medication plan that is necessary to manage their conditions. In 
these cases, education and follow-up are adequate. However, many more patients are 
resistant to medication regimens. The reasons given for this resistance vary: they don’t 





behavior modification, or they don’t think they can. For this group of patients, persuasive 
messages that convince them of the importance of taking their medication and their 
ability to take their medication as prescribed are likely to be much more impactful than 
education and reminders. However, advice on how to design effective persuasive 
communications aimed at increasing drug adherence are severely lacking. Only three 
studies on this matter were identified for this review. In the intervention studies literature, 
only one study that attempted to change medication beliefs and motivate patients was 
identified (Petrie et al., 2012), however, their message design choices were not grounded 
in theory. 
It follows that research in this area is critically needed. This research ought to 
focus on communication strategies that positively change motivational factors, such as 
self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy, given that these factors are 
most likely to lead to behavior change among low motivated patients (e.g., Chao, Nau, 
Aikens, & Taylor, 2005; Criswell, Weber, Xu, & Carter, 2010; Kreps et al., 2011; Sleath 
et al., 2014; Wierdsma, van Zuilen, & van der Bijl, 2011). Prior studies have provided a 
thorough inventory of individuals’ perceptions, motivations, and barriers that influence 
medication adherence. An in-depth understanding of how effective communication can 
influence individuals’ intentions to take or reject taking their medication as prescribed 
would be a valuable addition to the literature. This understanding requires an assessment 
of the relative importance and influence of multiple factors, including message 
properties, in the decision-making process.  
With this aim in mind, this research will put forth a model of communication 





design strategy to increase medication adherence intentions. This research will also 
explain the mechanisms through which CFT operates on intentions to adhere to 
medication as prescribed, mainly self- and response efficacy, and outcome expectancy, 
given their importance in individuals’ decision to adhere to their medication as 
prescribed. Finally, this research will test the role of emotion in limiting or amplifying 
CFT’s effectiveness as a persuasive message design strategy in a drug adherence context. 
Specifically, the effect of regret, an emotion that precedes counterfactual thinking, on the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking, self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome 
expectancy, and behavioral intentions will be considered. The following chapter outlines 
the concept of counterfactual thinking, how counterfactual thinking is generated, and its 









Chapter 4: Counterfactual Thinking 
 
Counterfactual Thinking Defined 
Counterfactual thoughts are thoughts contrary to the facts. The process of 
counterfactual thinking (CFT) involves thoughts about what might have been, provided 
that a different decision had been made or a different behavior had been performed 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008). For example, one might think “if only I had taken my pills, I 
would not be in the emergency room right now”. The ability to imagine alternative or 
counterfactual versions of actual occurrences appears to be a pervasive, perhaps even 
essential feature of our mental lives (Roese & Olson, 1995) and it is present across 
nations and cultures (Sanna, Stocker, & Clarke, 2003). Individuals develop the capacity 
for CFT as early as the age of two (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Perner, 
Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004).  
Counterfactual thoughts have long fascinated psychologists, behavioral 
economists, and consumer research scholars. Research in this area has found 
counterfactuals to influence an array of cognitive processes, including information 
processing patterns, regulatory focus, perceptions of self-efficacy and control, with 
consequences for behavioral intentions and subsequent behaviors (e.g., Aboulnasr & 
Sivaraman, 2010; Arora, Haynie, & Laurence, 2011; Baek, Shen, & Reid; Gleicher, 
Boninger, Strathman, Armor, Hetts, & Ahn, 1995; Krishnamurthy & Sivaraman, 2002; 
Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003; Roese, 1994, 1997, 1999; Sanna, 1996; Tal-Or, 





Though a heavily studied matter in some domains of the social sciences (e.g., 
psychology, political sciences, decision making), counterfactual thinking has received 
less attention in the communication discipline. Given counterfactuals’ influence on a 
variety of processes and factors of relevance to persuasion (e.g., information processing, 
perceptions, behaviors and intentions), research in this area represents an opportunity to 
expand our knowledge. The following sections provide an overview of CFT, including 
types of counterfactual thoughts, how CFT are generated, and consequences of CFT for 
the individual. 
Counterfactual Thinking Types 
Previous research has classified counterfactual thoughts according to four criteria: 
direction of comparison, structure, person of reference, and valence (Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Nan, 2008; Roese, 1997, 1999). Along the dimension of direction, counterfactual 
thinking can be either upward or downward (Roese, 1994, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1993b). 
Upward counterfactuals compare a present outcome to a better alternative (e.g., I didn’t 
take my medication and I am now sick -> I should have taken my medication). 
Downward counterfactuals, on the other hand, compare the present outcome with a worse 
alternative (e.g., I didn’t take my medication and I am now sick -> At least I didn’t have 
to deal with medication side effects!).  
The dimension of structure refers to the addition or subtraction of an antecedent 
(action) from the present state (Roese, 1994, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1993b). Additive 
counterfactuals, then, add antecedents to reconstruct reality (e.g., If I had taken my 





counterfactuals remove antecedents (e.g., If I had not taken my medication, I wouldn’t 
feel so nauseous right now).  
Counterfactuals are also categorized based on the person they are referring to. 
Counterfactuals may focus on the actions or features of oneself (e.g., I should have taken 
my medication) or of other people (e.g., My colleague should have taken his medication) 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008). Finally, counterfactuals can be categorized based on valence 
(Nan, 2008). Positive counterfactuals undo previous absence of positive outcomes (e.g., 
If I had taken my medication, I would be able to travel across the country now); whereas 
negative counterfactuals undo previous presence of negative outcomes (e.g., If I had 
taken my medication, I would not be in the hospital now).  
Antecedents of Counterfactual Thinking 
 Several factors have been identified to determine the generation of counterfactual 
thinking. Each of them are discussed in turn. 
Affect and/or negative emotions 
In general, affect and/or negative emotions are the main determinant of CFT 
generation (Roese, 1994, 1997; Roese & Hur, 1997). Of note, although the focus in this 
research is on emotions rather than mood or affect, research on counterfactual thinking 
and both emotions and affect is reviewed. This is because research looking at specific 
emotions and counterfactuals is sparse.  
It is important to first distinguish between the concepts of affect, emotion, and 
mood. According to the Dictionary of Psychology (Cardwell, 1996), affect is “a loose 





define affect as “unspecified feelings” and as an umbrella term for emotions, moods, and 
emotion-related traits (p. 801). Affect is an undifferentiated emotional state; affect can be 
interpreted as a specific emotion once an individual appraises the meaning of an event to 
oneself and to one’s goals and makes attributions about the causes of that event (Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus, 1991; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Roseman, 1984; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Specifically, individuals assess whether a negative event impedes or 
facilitates their goals, whether that event is controllable, whether they or someone else is 
responsible for the event, and whether the event can be dealt with or not (Niedenthal, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006). Friedrickson and Cohn (2008) describe moods as diffuse 
feelings that are not experienced in relation to a particular object; that persist in time; and 
that “occupy the background of consciousness” (p. 778).  
Regarding emotions, the dictionary notes the difficulty to define these concepts 
(Cardwell, 1996). Despite such difficulties, there seems to be consensus regarding the 
multifaceted nature of emotional reactions. Emotions may give rise to: 1) affective 
experiences that can be pleasurable or unpleasurable; they can be caused by an external 
(e.g., when seeing a dangerous animal) or an internal object (e.g., as a result of a 
particular thought or image); 2) cognitive processes in which we label our affective 
experience and appraise our reaction to it (e.g., seeing a tiger at the zoo will be different 
from seeing it in front of our house); 3) physiological adjustments to the source of arousal 
(e.g., increased heart rate, sweat); and/or 4) goal-directed, adaptive behavior (i.e., 
distancing ourselves from the source of displeasure or prolonging whatever is causing us 
pleasure). As compared to moods, emotions are acute and momentary; they are intense, 





however, due to their evolutionary roots, they will soon enact adaptive behaviors 
(Cardwell, 1996; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Nabi, 2003). Typically, 
emotions are experienced in relation to an object and occur after the assessment of an 
object’s meaning, whereas moods are objectless (Rosenberg, 1998).  
Research on counterfactual thinking and affect or specific emotions has concluded 
that negative affect and negative emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, disappointment, regret) 
precede counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997; Niedenthal et al., 1994). That negative 
affect or negative emotions are an antecedent of CFT is related to the fact that CFTs are 
generated much more frequently following negative rather than positive outcomes (e.g., 
Davis et al., 1995; Sanna & Turley, 1996). Negative affect or emotions usually 
accompany such negative outcomes and, in line with evolutionary explanations, they 
signal to the individual that something is not right and that resources should be allocated 
for addressing the issue (Roese, 1994, 1997). Counterfactual thinking, among other 
cognitive responses, helps identify the source of negative affect or negative emotion and, 
even though it cannot change the present situation, it offers suggestions about future 
corrective behaviors to avoid the unfortunate situation from happening again.  
The majority of past research has examined negative affect as a preceding factor 
of CFT generation (see McMullen, Markman, & Gavanski, 1995 for a review), however, 
a few studies provide evidence that specific emotions can also function as antecedents. 
Specifically, Niedenthal and his colleagues (1994) asked their participants to either read 
about or describe situations that elicited shame and guilt. Participants were then 
instructed to generate counterfactual alternatives to undo the distressing outcomes. The 





individuals feeling shame generated counterfactuals focused on altering qualities of the 
self (e.g., if only I was more attentive…), whereas individuals experiencing guilt 
generated counterfactuals focused on altering actions (e.g., if only I did X…). In a similar 
study, Zeelenberg and colleagues found that regret experienced due to an unfavorable 
outcome led to counterfactual thoughts about one’s actions; disappointment, however, 
resulted in counterfactual statements that undid aspects of the situation in which the 
negative outcome occurred. 
Outcome closeness 
 Outcome closeness has also been found to lead to CFT generation (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Roese, 1997). Outcome closeness is defined 
as the perceived proximity to reaching a goal. This proximity can be temporal (e.g., 
missing your flight by 10 vs. 30 minutes), physical (e.g. missing the golf hole by 200 
centimeters versus 1 meter), or numerical (e.g., having marked ‘38’ on your lottery ticket 
when ‘39’ was the lucky number). In research studies, having nearly avoided a negative 
outcome (i.e., forgetting to submit an insurance policy three days versus six months 
before a fire) was associated with increased counterfactual thought generation (Meyers-
Levy & Maheswaran, 1992).  
Abnormal events and actions 
Deviations from normality or abnormal events, compared to normal ones, are also 
more likely to result in CFT (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Through counterfactual 
thinking, the deviation will be shifted back to its normal state. For example, if an accident 





generated will likely undo the outcome (the accident) by stating that the outcome would 
have been different if the normal/usual route to work was chosen. Numerous studies 
provide support to the idea that counterfactual content is determined by normality (e.g., 
Buck & Miller, 1994; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Miller, 
Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990; Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 
1987).  
 Counterfactuals are also more likely to follow actions than inactions (Kahneman 
& Miller, 1986). Whereas inactions are perceived as normal (because they preserve the 
status quo), actions are seen as abnormal, as deviations from the norm (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986). Put differently, people assume that outcomes are the result of actions (and 
not of inactions) (Gavanski & Wells, 1989). The importance of action versus inaction in 
the generation of counterfactual thought has received some empirical support (Gleicher, 
Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman, & Sherman, 1990; Landman, 1987; Miller et al., 1990; 
Turley, Sanna, & Reiter, 1995). However, the findings of such studies have been 
criticized on grounds of methodology (see N’gbala & Branscombe, 1994 for a review) 
and the idea that counterfactual thinking is more likely to follow actions as opposed to 
inactions has been considered an oversimplification (Roese, 1997). 
Event controllability 
Another factor that stimulates CFT generation is the perceived controllability of 
the event; specifically, controllable events are more easily undone that uncontrollable 
events (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; Miller et al., 1990; N'gbala & Branscombe, 
1995). For example, one can cogitate on how outcomes would have been different if 





Therefore, counterfactuals tend to follow actions that could have been manipulated or 
avoided by the individual to circumvent the outcome. Several study findings provide 
support for this idea (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & 
Ellard, 1996; Mandel & Lehman, 1996). 
Consequences of Counterfactual Thinking 
Research has documented a wide range of psychological consequences that can be 
attributed to counterfactual thinking (Gleicher et al., 1995; Landman, 1993; Miller, 
Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989; Miller & Taylor, 1995; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996; 
Roese & Olson, 1993a). Specifically, counterfactuals can influence affect and emotion, 
behavior, information processing, and perceptions.  
Note that the theoretical argument regarding the effects of counterfactual thinking 
is framed in terms of actual behaviors; however, studies on counterfactual thinking have 
looked at both behaviors and behavioral intentions. Behaviors are more often measured in 
psychology studies in which participants engage in laboratory-type of tasks in which 
behavior can be directly observed; however, in studies looking at health behaviors, 
researchers have usually measured behavioral intentions (O’Keefe, 2002). Nonetheless, 
the effect of counterfactuals on both behaviors and behavioral intentions is apparent. In 
the review below, for each study it is specified whether the authors measured behavioral 
intentions as proxies for behavior or actual behaviors.  
CFT, behavioral intentions, and behavior 
CFT has been consistently found to affect behavior and behavioral intentions. The 





to explain the influence of counterfactuals on behavior. Causal inference effects occur 
when a counterfactual, through its content, emphasizes the causal link between an 
antecedent behavior and a desired outcome (Eepstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). For 
example, to say that if I had taken my medication, I would not be in the hospital now is to 
underscore the causal impact of medication on my being in the hospital. Causal inference 
effects underlie the preparative function of counterfactuals, meaning that the 
identification of an antecedent as responsible for a particular outcome suggests that its 
removal in future similar situations would lead to a different outcome (Wells & 
Gavanski, 1989).  
The content-specific pathway explains how counterfactuals influence behaviors 
through a transfer of information from the counterfactual inference to behavioral 
intentions and ultimately to behaviors (Epstude & Roese, 2008). For example, if one is 
unsatisfied with being in the hospital, one might reason that “If only I had taken my 
medication, I wouldn’t be in the hospital now.” This counterfactual indicates the behavior 
that should be performed in the future for achieving the desired outcome (taking one’s 
medication). Thus, the content of the counterfactual (I should have taken my medication) 
is used for changing future behaviors (I will take my medication) through a transfer of 
information from the counterfactual thought to future behavioral intentions and actual 
behavior (Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
Previous findings suggest that certain types of counterfactual thoughts are more 
likely to have an impact on subsequent behavior and/or behavioral intentions (Roese, 
1994; Roese & Olson, 1995). In terms of direction, upward counterfactuals (thoughts of 





been found to have a significant influence on future behaviors due to their focus on 
corrective actions that may facilitate future success (Roese, 1994). Downward 
counterfactuals, on the other hand, are less likely to significantly influence behavior, 
given that they do not focus on what needs to be changed to achieve future success 
(Roese, 1994). Supporting this idea, Roese (1994) found that individuals who generated 
upward CFT in response to failure, as opposed to those who generated downward CFT or 
no CFT, reported higher behavioral intentions to perform behaviors that would increase 
the chance for future success; moreover, these participants performed better on a similar 
subsequent task (i.e., an impact on actual behaviors was also observed). Similarly, 
Gleicher et al. (1995) and Hetts et al. (2000) found that imagining outcomes to decisions 
yet to be made (a process called “upward prefactuals”) influenced behavioral intentions 
and actual behaviors across multiple contexts.  
In terms of structure, both theory and research suggest that additive 
counterfactuals are more efficient in changing behavior and behavioral intentions than 
subtractive counterfactuals (e.g., Page & Colby, 2003). Additive counterfactuals, through 
their focus on ways to avoid the recurrence of a negative outcome, help establish paths to 
future success. Moreover, as argued by Roese (1994), additive counterfactuals allow 
individuals to think of behavioral alternatives outside of the original event and thus, 
encourage individuals to be more creative and to generate solutions for future similar 
scenarios that are more meaningful to oneself. Subtractive counterfactuals, on the other 
hand, contain no suggestion for future action, given that they merely remove an 





Few studies have investigated the impact of CFT on behavior and behavioral 
intentions in a health persuasion-related context. These studies primarily considered the 
effect of self-generated CFT on behavioral intentions and attitudes. The CFTs in these 
studies were either incidental or integral to the health matter of interest. An integral CFT 
is one that is relevant to the topic considered; for example, if the message describes 
negative outcomes related to not taking one’s medication, the integral CFT undoes those 
negative outcomes, such as “If only I had taken my medication, I wouldn’t be at the 
hospital now”. An incidental CFT is one that is irrelevant to the topic considered.  
Page and Colby (2003) asked their participants to generate various types of 
counterfactual thoughts in response to a detrimental smoking scenario (i.e., integral 
CFTs). They found that additive, as opposed to subtractive CFT, had a significant and 
positive effect on individuals’ behavioral intentions to schedule a lung capacity test. 
Baek, Shen, and Reid (2013) tested the interaction between self-generated CFTs and 
message framing on binge drinking behavioral intentions. Participants in their study 
generated either additive or subtractive CFTs about a specific life event (i.e., incidental 
CFTs); participants then read either a gain-framed or a loss-framed anti-drinking 
message. Findings showed that participants in the additive CFT X gain-framed message 
reported lower binge drinking intentions than those in the additive CFT X loss-framed 
message. The interaction was not significant for the subtractive CFT condition.  
Two studies tested the impact of CFT as part of a persuasive message on 
behavioral intentions. In the first study, participants listened to a presentation by an HIV-
positive speaker. In the control condition, the speaker ended his presentation with facts 





imagine that they themselves had engaged in unsafe sex and contracted HIV as a result. 
Participants were also directed to think about an alternative behavior that would have 
resulted in a different outcome (i.e., that they had used a condom and had not contracted 
HIV; an integral CFT generation exercise). Following this simulation, participants in the 
experimental condition, as opposed to those in the control condition, reported more 
positive attitudes toward condom use; behavioral intentions to use a condom, however, 
although higher in the experimental condition, were not significantly different between 
the two groups (Gleicher et al., 1995). The findings, however, were likely contaminated 
by differences between the two study conditions, other than the CFT simulation. 
Specifically, whereas the experimental condition consisted of a narrative, the control 
condition included facts about HIV and AIDS. Therefore, further research was needed to 
disentangle the effect of the narrative itself from that of the CFT (Tal-Or, Boninger, 
Poran, & Gleicher, 2004).  
Tal-Or and colleagues (2004) conducted an experiment in which they compared 
the persuasive effects of a narrative that either included or did not include a self- vs. 
other-focused CFT (i.e., integral CFT). The narrative described the story of a woman who 
became paralyzed after a traffic accident. In the CFT condition, the narrative began and 
ended with either a self- or other-focused CFT (i.e., “if only I had yielded, I could have 
avoided the accident” versus “if only the other driver had yielded, the accident would 
have been avoided”). As hypothesized, participants exposed to the narrative with CFT 
reported more positive attitudes toward traffic safety rules than those exposed to the 
narrative only (no CFT); the results were stronger in the self- versus other-focused CFT 





findings are still relevant, given that attitudes are usually precursors of intentions and 
behaviors (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
 To conclude, CFT are a potentially powerful persuasion strategy in influencing a 
variety of behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. Both incidental and integral CFT 
appear to have a positive effect on behavior and behavioral intentions, although their 
relative effects are unclear. Also, upward CFT seem to have a persuasive advantage over 
downward CFT or no CFT (control). However, more research is needed to understand the 
persuasive effect of CFT when used as a persuasive message design strategy. 
CFT and self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy refers to one’s belief that one has the necessary abilities to 
successfully engage in and accomplish a task (Bandura, 1986). Self-efficacy is an 
important antecedent of behavior and a strong predictor of performance (Bandura, 1989). 
As such, counterfactual thinking, given its enhancing effect on both intentions to perform 
success-facilitating behaviors and actual performance (Roese, 1997, 1999), is likely to 
influence perceptions of self-efficacy, as well.  
The positive effect of counterfactuals on self-efficacy has been explained using 
the causal-inference and content-specific mechanisms described earlier. Specifically, 
upward counterfactuals provide explicit information about what behaviors ought to be 
performed in the future for achieving success; this explicit information should increase 
individuals’ confidence in their abilities and likelihood of successfully reaching a goal. 
That is, any threat to self-efficacy that an unsatisfactory outcome may pose is likely to be 
neutralized by the information provided by the counterfactual and the concurrent 





2004). In Roese’s (1997) review of the counterfactual literature, he speculates along these 
exact lines: “To the extent that counterfactually mediated causal inferences suggest future 
efficacious action, they extend to generalized expectancies of personal efficacy” (Roese, 
1997, p. 143).  
Prior research has only investigated the effect of self-generated CFT on self-
efficacy. In a study investigating the relationship between counterfactuals and self-
efficacy, Tal-Or and his colleagues (2004) found that generation of integral upward 
counterfactuals enhanced self-efficacy; whereas integral downward counterfactuals 
decreased self-efficacy. Downward counterfactuals, rather than providing assurances of 
success, highlight how easily things could have been worse. Thus, the information 
provided by the downward counterfactual may undermine one’s confidence and decrease 
feelings of self-efficacy in the context of a similar, future event. 
Two studies have looked at how perceptions of control, a variable related to self-
efficacy, are influenced by counterfactual thinking. Participants in McMullen, Markman, 
and Gavanski’s studies (1995) who imagined upward counterfactuals perceived 
themselves as having more control over the target situation than did participants who 
imagined downward counterfactuals. Similarly, Nasco and Marsh (1999) found upward 
counterfactual generation to be positively correlated with perceived changes in one’s 
circumstances and to increased perceptions of control.  
The impact of CFT as part of a persuasive message, rather than self-generated, on 
self-efficacy awaits testing. The same mechanism is expected to operate: a CFT included 





to obtain a certain outcome; thus, such CFT should still increase individuals’ confidence 
that they can successfully reach a future goal by engaging in that behavior. 
CFT, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy 
 Response efficacy refers to an individual’s beliefs that a recommended behavior 
effectively deters or alleviates a threat (Witte, 1992). For example, if an individual 
believes that the recommendation to take her/his medication will help with managing 
disease, then that individual’s response efficacy regarding medication adherence is high. 
Outcome expectancy is “a person's estimate that a given behavior will lead to certain 
outcomes” (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). These outcomes include psychological, social, and 
physical consequences of engaging with a specific behavior (Bandura, 2001). In the 
context of this research, outcome expectancy is defined as expectations about social and 
psychological outcomes of taking one’s medication as prescribed, whereas response 
efficacy is defined as expectations about physical outcomes.  
When self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy are high, 
behavioral change is more likely to occur. In other words, when an individual believes 
that he/she can perform a behavior, that the behavior will help him/her avoid a negative 
outcome and will result in positive psychological and social effects, then that individual 
is most likely to engage in said behavior. Concretely, if Tom believes that medication 
will help him avoid illness (response efficacy), that he is capable of taking the medication 
as prescribed (self-efficacy), that taking his medication will help him enjoy life and that 
his family and friends will like him more for adhering to treatment (outcome expectancy), 





 The question is whether counterfactual thinking has an effect on response efficacy 
and outcome expectancy. If Tom reads the following CFT (or he engages in the following 
CFT): “If only I had taken my medication, I wouldn’t be in the hospital now”, will he 
also believe that taking medication (adopting the response in the message) will be 
effective in reducing the threat of hospitalization, in fostering life enjoyment and in 
increasing others’ liking and trusting of Tom (relative to when Tom does not read such a 
CFT)? Although not previously hypothesized or tested, an effect of CFT on response 
efficacy can be derived from the causal and content-specific mechanisms underlying the 
psychological consequences of CFT.  
Consider an upward-additive CFT (If only I would have done X, Y wouldn’t have 
happened). When an individual engages in upward-additive counterfactual thinking, the 
resulting thought provides two types of information. First, it identifies a causally potent 
antecedent action, X, and a consequent of that action, Y: If I had done X, Y wouldn’t 
have happened. The revelation of this causal link between X and Y triggers an 
expectancy of the consequences of that action in the future (Roese & Olson, 1995, p. 
171). That expectancy may be translated as “If I do X in the future, Y can be avoided”, 
which is a response efficacy statement. The second type of information that a CFT as the 
one above provides is specific content for X and Y:  If I had taken my medication (= X), I 
wouldn’t be in the hospital now (= Y). Consequently, an individual engaging in upward 
counterfactual thinking not only knows that behavior X can help avoid outcome Y, but 
also what specific X can help avoid a specific Y. Therefore, an effect of upward-additive 
CFT on response efficacy should be present. Because downward-additive CFT do not 





 Two additional explanations for the presence of an effect of CFT and response 
efficacy can be gleaned from prior research unrelated to CFT. The first explanation draws 
from the regulatory fit literature and argues that a message that aligns with an 
individual’s regulatory focus will result in higher response efficacy appraisals than one 
that does not. In a study by Bosone, Martinez, and Kalampalikis (2015), participants were 
exposed to a message narrated by either a positive (an individual who has achieved 
desirable outcomes) or a negative role model (an individual who experiences undesirable 
outcomes). The negative/positive role models were hypothesized to activate a 
prevention/promotion focus. Therefore, when the message narrated by the role model fit 
this focus, persuasion was stronger. Specifically, when the negative role model message 
described preventative actions that an individual could take to avoid a threat, response 
efficacy was the highest. Similarly, when the positive role model message described 
promotion actions that an individual could engage in to achieve a positive outcome, 
appraisals of response efficacy were the highest.  
Past research has shown that negative CFT (a CFT that undoes the previous 
presence of negative outcomes) induce a prevention orientation (Nan, 2007). At the same 
time, negative CFT contain information about how to avoid a threat (if X is done, Y will 
not happen). Thus, in light of Bosone and colleagues’ findings, it is possible that negative 
CFT have a positive impact on response efficacy. Of note, a negative CFT is essentially 
an upward-additive CFT, as it combines direction with structure (for comparison, see 
Roese & Olson, 1995, p. 180). The counterpart of an upward-additive CFT is a 





medication, it could have been worse). This type of CFT clearly does not tell you how to 
avoid a threat so its impact on response efficacy should be null.     
 The second explanation comes from research on message repetition. Shi and 
Smith (2015) found that after repeated exposure to a fear appeal message about 
preventing melanoma, participants’ appraisals of response efficacy regarding various 
actions (e.g., refraining from tanning beds, using sunscreen, checking skin regularly) 
significantly increased. In a way, when an upward CFT is added at the end of a message 
(versus not added) it functions as a repetition of the information in that message. Thus, it 
is possible that similar effects to those in Shi and Smith’s study could be observed. A 
downward CFT, on the other hand, does not summarize the message, but it adds new 
information (it could have been worse). Therefore, an impact of downward CFT in terms 
of repetition should not occur.  
 An effect of counterfactual thinking on outcome expectancy defined as 
expectations about social and psychological outcomes is hard to predict. If the content of 
a counterfactual thought reflected such expectations (e.g., if only I had taken my 
medication as prescribed, my family would not be upset), as with response efficacy, the 
causal and the content-specific mechanisms would predict a positive effect of that 
counterfactual on social expectations. However, if the content of a counterfactual thought 
focuses on health consequences of medication nonadherence (e.g., if only I had taken my 
medication as prescribed, I would not be in the hospital right now), it is unclear if any 






CFT, affect, and emotion 
Counterfactuals also cause negative affect and negative emotions or, more 
precisely, they can amplify the negative effect/emotions experienced prior to 
counterfactual thinking (i.e., make people feel worse, relative to how they felt prior to 
engaging in CFT; Roese, 1995). The affect/emotion amplification consequence of 
counterfactual thinking is often explained in terms of contrast effects (Roese, 1997). 
Contrast effects occur when a judgment is made more extreme through its comparison 
with an anchor or standard (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In the case of counterfactuals, an 
actual outcome will seem worse when a better, alternative outcome is salient; conversely, 
an outcome will appear better when a worse alternative outcome is salient (Medvec & 
Savitsky, 1997; Roese, 2000; Roese & Olson, 1995). Upward counterfactuals, by 
showing how things could have been better, amplify negative affect (Sherman & 
McConnell, 1995). Downward counterfactuals, on the other hand, by showing how things 
might have been worse, are typically, but not always, associated with increase in positive 
affect (Mandel, 2003; Roese, 1997).  
Niedenthal and colleagues (1994) asked participants to imagine themselves in a 
situation that evoked either guilt or shame. Participants were then instructed to undo the 
situation by mutating aspects of either the self (in the shame scenario) or the situation (in 
the guilt scenario). Mutation manipulations amplified feelings of shame or guilt. Similar 
results were obtained in the Zeelenberg et al. (1998) study: participants who were 
induced to experience regret or disappointment and were then led to undo the negative 
emotion-causing event by altering one’s actions or aspects of the situation, reported 





The moderating role of affect and/or emotions. Of more relevance to the 
present research is the possibility that the emotions and affect associated with CFT may 
change the effect that CFT has on self- and response efficacy appraisals, however, 
research in this area is scarce. Two studies provide some evidence in this regard. In a first 
study, Sanna (1997) examined the role of self-efficacy as a moderator of reactions to 
downward and upward counterfactuals. Participants in his study performed in an anagram 
test and their level of self-efficacy was manipulated by giving them high or low 
performance feedback. After receiving feedback, participants were asked to engage in 
counterfactual thinking and their emotional reactions were then measured. Sanna 
observed a self-efficacy by CFT type interaction, such that, at high levels of self-efficacy, 
the negative affect typically associated with upward counterfactuals was attenuated and 
people reported feeling better prepared for the future. At low levels of self-efficacy, the 
reverse was true: negative affect remained high and participants reported feeling 
unprepared in the aftermath of upward counterfactuals. What these findings suggest is 
that, when negative affect is an antecedent of counterfactual thinking, it may reduce the 
positive effect of upward CFT on self-efficacy. 
In a second study, in an entrepreneurial context, Arora and associates (2013) 
found that, as the intensity, frequency, and unpleasantness of counterfactual thinking 
increased, entrepreneurs’ self-efficacy decreased. The authors operationalized the 
intensity and unpleasantness of counterfactuals as the intensity and unpleasantness of the 
regret that accompanies upward counterfactuals (Roese, 1997) and found that more regret 





between counterfactuals, regret, and self-efficacy, but, rather, used regret as a proxy for 
counterfactual thinking. Nonetheless, regret was negatively associated with self-efficacy.  
However, it is not clear in what capacity negative emotions/affect have an impact 
of the effect of CFT on self- and response efficacy, and outcome expectancy. Do negative 
emotions/affect function as a mediator between CFT and efficacy perceptions/outcome 
expectancy or do they moderate the relationship between CFT and such perceptions? If 
negative emotions/affect are considered a consequence of CFT, then the mediation 
hypothesis makes sense; counterfactual thinking leads to emotion/negative affect 
generation, which then affects behavioral intentions. The Arora et al’s (2013) study 
seems to suggest the mediation hypothesis: counterfactuals are associated with feelings of 
regret which then reduce perceptions of self-efficacy.  
However, if negative emotions/affect are considered an antecedent of CFT, then 
the moderation hypothesis is plausible, as suggested by Myers, McCrea, and Tyser 
(2014). Their argument builds upon the content-neutral pathway put forth by Epstude and 
Roese (2008) to explain the psychological consequences of CFT. The content-neutral 
mechanism explains how different types of counterfactual thoughts influence attention, 
cognition, and motivation (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Motivation effects result from the 
negative affect that accompanies upward counterfactual thinking and that motivates 
behavior change in order to alleviate the uncomfortable feeling (Markman & McMullen, 
2003; Markman, McMullen, Elizaga, & Mizoguchi, 2006; McMullen & Markman, 2000). 
Myers et al. (2014) argue that, when individuals engage in upward CFT, the negative 
affect that led to CFT generation is amplified. The resulting affect is used as input into 





enhance willingness to pursue the goals that were not attained. Therefore, upward CFT 
should lead to intentions to correct behaviors in the future only to the extent that negative 
affect is experienced: “in other words, resultant affect should moderate the consequences 
of upward counterfactual thinking.” (Myers et al., 2014, p. 168). The authors tested this 
hypothesis by manipulating the ability of affect to serve as a cue to judgments of goal 
progress. They found that, as long as negative affect could not be attributed to an 
intervening task, upward CFT improved performance on an anagram test as a function of 
negative affect; however, when negative affect was attributed to a different event, the 
effects of CFT on anagram test performance were eliminated. It seems, then, that 
negative affect/emotions may moderate the relationship between CFT and behavior and 
self- and response efficacy perceptions, and outcome expectancy, as long as the negative 
affect or emotion is experienced prior to CFT generation. 
In light of the research reviewed in this chapter, the following chapter describes 
















Chapter 5:  Present Research 
 
Research Purpose and Overview 
The main goal of the present research is to propose and test a model of 
communication that uses counterfactual thinking (CFT) as a persuasive message 
component aimed at increasing medication adherence intentions. This research also 
attempts to explain the mechanisms through which CFT-based persuasive messages 
operate on intentions to adhere to medication as prescribed; specifically, perceptions of 
self-efficacy and appraisals of response efficacy (i.e., physical outcomes) and outcome 
expectancy (i.e., social and psychological outcomes) are evaluated as mediators between 
the message with an embedded CFT component and the corresponding behavioral 
intentions.  
The focus on self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy is a 
reflection of prior drug adherence research which has found these variables to play an 
important role in patients’ decisions to take medication as prescribed (e.g., Chao, Nau, 
Aikens, & Taylor, 2005; Kreps et al., 2011; Sleath et al., 2014). Therefore, a persuasive 
message that enhances adherence intentions through increased self-efficacy, response 
efficacy, and outcome expectancy constitutes a promising solution to be incorporated in 





CFT as a persuasive message component 
Given that much of the previous literature has investigated upward (If only I had 
taken my medication, I wouldn’t be in the emergency room now!) and downward CFT (I 
could have died! [but I am in the emergency room instead]), these two types of CFT are 
chosen for this research, as well. Downward and upward CFT should ideally be added at 
the end of a message that describes a medication nonadherence negative outcome. The 
reason for adding a CFT at the end of a message rather than using CFT as a stand-alone 
message is that individuals naturally engage in CFT after a negative outcome occurs. 
Thus, providing context for the counterfactual thought in the message will likely make 
more sense to individuals receiving the message.  
Additionally, both incidental and integral CFT are examined. An integral CFT is 
one that is relevant to the topic considered; for example, if the message describes 
negative outcomes related to not taking one’s medication, the integral CFT undoes those 
negative outcomes, such as “If only I had taken my medication, I wouldn’t be at the 
hospital now”. An incidental CFT is one that is irrelevant to the topic considered; for 
example, if the message describes negative outcomes related to not taking one’s 
medication, the incidental CFT following the message undoes a different outcome, such 
as “If only I had my dog with me at the hospital, then I wouldn’t be so bored”.  
The inclusion of both incidental and integral CFT is also derived from prior 
literature suggesting that both have an impact on a variety of dependent variables. 
However, their relative strength in influencing such variables has yet to be tested. If 
integral CFT are a more powerful persuasion strategy, then their usage is recommended. 





perhaps it is the process of thinking counterfactually that matters, rather than the content 
of such thinking. Such a finding would open a host of new possibilities for incorporating 
CFT in health communication.  
The role of regret 
In light of studies suggesting that negative emotions may moderate the effect of 
CFT on perceptions and behavior (Arora et al., 2013; Myers, McCrea, & Tyser , 2014; 
Sanna, 1997), this research also explores the effect of regret, a negative emotion, on the 
persuasiveness of CFT-based messages.  
Regret is a negative emotion experienced in response to outcomes that could have 
been more positive if a different choice had been made (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
Specifically, “regret arises from comparing an obtained outcome with a better outcome 
that might have occurred if a different choice had been made; that is, regret stems from 
bad decisions” (Zeelenberg et al., 1988, p. 222). Although several negative emotions 
have been found to accompany CFT (e.g., regret, guilt, shame, disappointment; 
McMullen, Markman, & Gavanski, 1995; Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1998), regret is 
of particular interest in a drug adherence context for several reasons.  
When experiencing regret, an individual makes several appraisals that are specific 
to this emotion, among all negative emotions (Roseman et al., 1994). First, the individual 
feels responsible for the less-than-optimal outcome (e.g., I am responsible for being sick 
and not someone else, such as my doctor or the weather) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
Second, regret is associated with believing that the outcome can be changed through 
one’s actions as opposed to someone else’s actions or to feeling hopeless and/or helpless 





versus “My doctor will make me healthy” or “I can’t do anything about my sickness, I 
feel so helpless”; Roseman et al., 1994). Thus, regret fosters counterfactual thoughts 
focused on modifying one’s actions (as opposed to someone else’s actions) in an attempt 
to undo a negative event (e.g., “I could have taken my medication as prescribed and I 
wouldn’t be sick now” versus “My doctor could have suggested a different therapy and 
then I wouldn’t be sick now”). Shame and disappointment, on the other hand, foster 
thoughts that attempt modify one’s traits (e.g., “If only I was more responsible…”) or 
other’s actions, respectively (e.g., “If only my doctor had warned me about the dangers of 
not taking my medication…”) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Niedenthal et al., 1994).  
Third, regret motivates behaviors that change the negative outcome and the 
behaviors altered are typically the ones that caused the outcome (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
Shame and disappointment are associated with inaction or behaviors that have little to do 
with correcting one’s past mistakes and dysfunctional behaviors (i.e., correcting not 
taking one’s medication). When experiencing shame, an individual’s tendency is to hide 
(Lazarus, 1991). When experiencing disappointment, individuals engage in complaining 
behavior because they attribute the negative outcome to others rather than the self 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998). None of these behaviors are desirable when the goal is to 
change individuals’ medication taking behaviors.  
Guilt, another emotion that has been studied in a counterfactual thinking context, 
may also encourage correcting behaviors that are considered to be the cause of the 
negative outcome (Niedenthal et al., 1994; Lazarus, 1991). However, guilt is experienced 
in response to moral transgressions that often affect a person different from the self 





(e.g., I didn’t take my medication, I became sick, and my wife is now upset), the focus in 
this study is on actions that affect the self. Also, guilt is an emotion that can backfire 
when experienced by individuals with depressive symptoms. Specifically, these 
individuals experience increased feelings of guilt about past behaviors than in the absence 
such symptoms (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, 
2013; DSM-5).  
Moreover, in the presence of depression or depressive symptoms, guilt co-occurs 
with feelings of helplessness and despair (DSM-5, 2013). Helplessness likely leads to 
maladaptive behavior (i.e., physical inactivity) (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). 
In other words, individuals with high levels of depressive symptoms might experience 
overwhelming feelings of guilt and, thus, choose to give up treatment altogether rather 
than work on their medication adherence. These predictions have been supported in a 
study on guilt, depressive symptoms, and physical activity (Iles & Nan, manuscript in 
preparation). Finally, justifying one’s actions is a frequent regulation process associated 
with guilt, whereas resolving is the most frequent strategy used in regret situations 
(Banninger-Huber, Juen, Exenberger, & Ganzer, 2001). The latter is preferable in the 
present context. It seems, then, that regret is an important and appropriate negative 
emotion to study in the context of counterfactual thinking.  
In a persuasive communication situation, regret as a moderator (rather than a 
mediator) is a more favorable scenario. If regret is experienced prior to a counterfactual 
thought, the individual is already feeling responsible for the negative outcome that the 
counterfactual thought undoes (cf. Roseman et al., 1994). This attribution of 





acceptable or more natural. For example, if I feel responsible for my sickness, I am more 
amenable to reading about how I could have done something differently to protect my 
health (i.e., if I only I had taken my medication). Therefore, the moderation hypothesis is 
of interest in the present study.  
Regret is a moderator of the effects of CFT on efficacy perceptions and 
behavioral intention to the extent that it can be experienced prior to CFT. In a persuasive 
message context, then, if the information in the message provided before the 
counterfactual thought included in the message allows for regret to be experienced, then 
regret is an antecedent of CFT. Regret is experienced in response to a negative event that 
is controllable, that can be attributed to one self’s actions, and that can be dealt with or 
changed through the performance of a corrective action (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & 
Ric, 2006). If these appraisals can be made prior to exposure to CFT, regret may be 
considered an antecedent of CFT that then moderates the relationships between CFT and 
behavior and between CFT and efficacy perceptions (cf. Myers, McCrea, & Tyser, 2014).  
Such appraisals are possible if the message that precedes the CFT provides 
information regarding controllability, responsibility, and solvability of the event that 
caused the negative emotion (Niedenthal et al., 1994; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). A message 
that depicts a person experiencing a negative health outcome as a result of medication 
nonadherence could elicit regret, particularly if that message clearly suggests that 1) the 
protagonist was responsible for what happened; 2) the protagonist could have avoided the 
outcome; 3) the protagonist strongly feels that he/she should and can correct their mistake 





How, then, does regret moderate the relationship between counterfactual thinking, 
self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral intentions? Studies 
on regret have found that experiencing this emotion motivates behavior that corrects or 
alleviates the negative outcome that caused the feeling of regret (Roseman et al., 1994); 
thus, regret should amplify the positive effect of CFT on behavioral intention/behavior. In 
light of Arora et al.’s (2013) and Sanna’s (1997) findings, regret should reduce the 
positive effect of CFT on self-efficacy. Given lack of prior research, the effect of regret 
on the relationship between CFT and response efficacy, and CFT and outcome 
expectancy, is hard to predict and it should be posed as a research question.  
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
For the purpose of clarity, hypotheses and research questions are formulated for 
integral CFT only, with the understanding that the same hypotheses and research 
questions will be tested for incidental CFT, as well, and that comparisons between 
messages including incidental versus integral CFT will be undertaken. The following 
hypotheses and research questions are advanced. 
Direct effects 
Considering findings from previous studies in which upward counterfactuals 
(thoughts of “if only”), as opposed to downward counterfactuals (thoughts of “well, at 
least”), have been found to have a significant influence on future behaviors and 
behavioral intentions due to their focus on corrective actions that may facilitate future 





H1. There is a positive direct effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention, such that individuals exposed to a health message that includes an integral 
upward CFT (compared to a health message that includes an integral downward CFT or 
no CFT [control]) will report higher intentions to adhere to medication as prescribed. 
Upward counterfactuals, as opposed to downward counterfactuals, provide 
explicit information about what behaviors ought to be performed in the future for 
achieving success; this explicit information should increase individuals’ confidence in 
their abilities and likelihood of successfully reaching a goal. This idea has also received 
empirical support (e.g., Tal-or et al., 2004). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2. There is a positive direct effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy, 
such that individuals exposed to a health message that includes an integral upward CFT 
(compared to a health message that includes an integral downward CFT or no CFT 
[control]) will report higher self-efficacy to adhere to medication as prescribed.  
Upward counterfactuals, as opposed to downward counterfactuals, highlight a 
causal link between a past behavior and a present outcome. Moreover, upward 
counterfactuals activate a prevention orientation, while also providing information about 
how to avoid a threat. In light of past research that has found that individuals in which a 
prevention regulatory focus has been activated report higher response efficacy when 
exposed to messages that contained preventative actions for avoiding a threat, the 
following hypothesis is advanced: 
H3. There is a positive direct effect of the experimental condition on response 
efficacy, such that individuals exposed to a persuasive health message that includes an 





CFT or no CFT [control]) will report higher response efficacy about the recommendation 
to adhere to medication as prescribed. 
Due to lack of prior research on CFT and outcome expectancy, a research 
question is asked: 
RQ1. Is there a direct effect of the experimental condition on outcome 
expectancy? If there is, how do individuals exposed to a persuasive health message that 
includes an integral upward CFT differ from individuals exposed to a health message that 
includes an integral downward CFT or no CFT (control) in terms of outcome 
expectancy? 
Indirect effects 
Considering past research that has identified self-efficacy, response efficacy, and 
outcome expectancy as intervening variables between independent variables, including 
persuasive messages, and behavioral intentions (e.g., Bosone, Martinez, & Kalampalikis, 
2015), the following indirect effects hypotheses and research questions follow:  
H4. There is a positive indirect effect of messages including an integral upward 
CFT (compared to messages including an integral downward CFT or no CFT [control]) 
on intention to adhere to medication treatment, through self-efficacy.  
H5. There is a positive indirect effect of messages including an integral upward 
CFT (compared to messages including an integral downward CFT or no CFT [control]) 
on intention to adhere to medication treatment, through response efficacy.  
RQ2. Is there an indirect effect of messages including an integral upward CFT 





intention to adhere to medication treatment, through outcome expectancy? If there is, 
what is the nature of that effect? 
It is important to note that Hayes’ view (2009) on using the terms “mediation” 
and “indirect effects” is adopted here. Specifically, Hayes argues that the independent 
variable need not be associated with the dependent variable in order for an indirect effect 
to exist. When such an association is not present, some argue that the term “indirect 
effect” rather than “mediation” or “mediator” is more appropriate (e.g., Mathieu & 
Taylor, 2006), however, Hayes (2009) maintains that such distinctions are not relevant. 
Thus, the terms “indirect effect” and “mediation” will be used interchangeably in this 
manuscript.  
Interaction effects 
Previous studies on counterfactual thinking suggest that regret, an emotion that 
often precedes counterfactual thinking, may modify the effect of counterfactual thoughts 
on self-efficacy, such that, at higher levels of negative affect or regret, the effect of CFT 
on self-efficacy is reduced (Arora et al., 2013; Sanna, 1997):   
H6. There is an interaction between messages including an integral upward CFT 
versus an integral downward CFT or no CFT and feelings of regret, such that greater 
feelings of regret reduce the positive effect of messages including an integral upward 
versus downward CFT or no CFT on self-efficacy. 
Given the lack of previous research on counterfactual thinking, emotional 
reactions, and response efficacy, and outcome expectancy, two research questions are 





RQ3.  Is there an interaction effect between messages containing an integral 
upward CFT versus an integral downward CFT or no CFT and feelings of regret on 
response efficacy? If there is, what is the nature of that interaction? 
RQ4. Is there an interaction effect between messages containing an integral 
upward CFT versus an integral downward CFT or no CFT and feelings of regret on 
outcome expectancy? If there is, what is the nature of that interaction? 
Drawing from cognitive theories of emotion, the experience of regret motivates 
the individual to correct behaviors that have caused this distressing emotion (Lazarus, 
1991). Therefore, it is expected that regret will amplify the positive effect of 
counterfactual thinking on behavioral intentions:  
H7. There is an interaction between messages containing an integral upward CFT 
versus a downward CFT or no CFT and feelings of regret, such that greater feelings of 
regret amplify the effect messages including an integral upward versus downward CFT or 
no CFT on intention to adhere to medication treatment. 
Moderated (conditional) indirect effects (moderated mediation) 
From the hypotheses stated above, the following conditional indirect effect 
hypothesis follows: 
H8. There is a conditional indirect effect of messages including an integral CFT 
(upward versus downward CFT or no CFT) on intentions to adhere to medication as 
prescribed through self-efficacy, such that the positive indirect effect through self-





RQ5: Is there a conditional indirect effect of messages including an integral CFT 
(upward versus downward CFT or no CFT) on intentions to adhere to medication as 
prescribed through response efficacy?  
RQ6: Is there a conditional indirect effect of messages including an integral CFT 
(upward versus downward CFT or no CFT) on intentions to adhere to medication as 
prescribed through outcome expectancy? 

















Chapter 6:  Pilot Study, Experiment 1, and Experiment 2 
 
This chapter presents the research design and findings from one pilot study and 
two experiments. The purpose of the pilot study was to obtain participant feedback on the 
messages that were designed to be tested in the experiments. The purpose of experiments 
1 and 2 was to test the proposed model with two chronic illnesses, type 2 diabetes 
(experiment 1) and hypertension (experiment 2).  
Method 
Study design and procedures, participant recruitment strategy, and experimental 
conditions were identical for both the pilot study and the two experiments.  
Study design and procedures 
The pilot study and the two experiments followed a 2 (counterfactual type: 
integral versus incidental) X 2 (counterfactual direction: downward versus upward) + 1 
(control: no counterfactual) experimental design (a description of each experimental 
condition follows below). Both the pilot study and the two experiments included 
individuals who self-identified with one of two chronic illnesses: hypertension or type 2 
diabetes. 
The proposed model was tested with two different chronic illnesses to verify the 
generalizability of the effects observed. In choosing the two chronic illnesses, several 
factors were considered. First, the prevalence of two chronic illnesses and the associated 





justified. Second, the two illnesses should affect people with a diverse demographic 
background rather than be gender or age-specific in order to provide a broad assessment 
of the persuasive effect of counterfactual thinking.  
Hypertension and type 2 diabetes affect a significant amount of people in the 
United States, are associated with high healthcare costs, and affect people of both 
genders, various ages and races (American Heart Association, 2014; American Diabetes 
Association, 2016; CDC, 2012, 2016). According to the American Diabetes Association, 
type 2 diabetes was the seventh leading cause of death in the United States in 2010. In 
2015, almost 29 million Americans had type 2 diabetes. The total healthcare costs 
associated with this illness top $200 billion annually. Medication treatment and lifestyle 
changes are critical for preventing or delaying onset of health complications, yet, 
medication adherence among diabetes patients is low (American Diabetes Association, 
2016; CDC, 2016). Hypertension affects approximately 75 million American adults and it 
was a primary or contributing cause of death for more than 400,000 Americans in 2014 
(CDC, 2016). High blood pressure costs the nation $48.6 billion each year. Yet, only 
about half of individuals diagnosed with hypertension take their medication as prescribed 
(CDC, 2016). Therefore, hypertension and type 2 diabetes were appropriate choices for 
testing a model of communication purported to persuade patients to adhere to their 
medication treatment.  
Participants  
 Recruitment. Participants for the pilot study and experiments 1 and 2 were 
recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor system run by 





are considered to be more representative samples of the U.S. population than traditional 
student samples (Parker & Fischoff, 2005) and even more diverse than some community 
samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Moreover, prior research has found that MTurk 
workers have similar income levels and ages compared to the U.S. population (Ipeirotis, 
2010) and that they exhibit similar judgment and decision biases (e.g., framing effects) as 
traditional college students do (Paolacci et al., 2010). For the model of moderated 
mediation tested, a sample of 500 participants ensures .991 power for detecting small 
conditional indirect effects (i.e., coefficients of approximately .14 magnitude; Preacher, 
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Table 7). 
Screening. A screener was used to select participants for each of the studies. 
First, individuals were required to be least 18 years of age and to self-identify as having 
been clinically diagnosed with either hypertension or type 2 diabetes at least six months 
prior to the date of the study. The six-month cutoff was chosen because prior studies on 
drug adherence have consistently shown that individuals are most likely to stop taking 
their medication as prescribed approximately six months after diagnosis (Gadkari & 
McHorney, 2010; Haynes, McDonald, & Carg, 2002; Osterberf & Blaschke, 2005; 
WHO, 2003). Second, eligible participants were required to be currently taking blood 
pressure lowering or diabetes medication, respectively. Third, participants must not have 
been pregnant or within three months postpartum because pregnancy might be related to 
specific reasons for medication nonadherence, such as concern of harming the fetus or the 
baby through breastfeeding.  
Fourth, individuals were screened for risk for nonadherence. For patients with 





that the medication is not necessary; 2) beliefs that the medication is not effective; 3) lack 
of symptoms; 4) low perceived severity of the illness; and 5) concerns over side effects 
(Miller, 1997; Ross et al., 2004; Stevenson, Kjellgren, Ahlner, & Saljo, 2000). Patients 
with type 2 diabetes are non-adherent due to 1) low perceived severity of the illness; 2) 
weight gain concerns associated with the medication; 3) perceptions of increased 
cardiovascular risk associated with the medication; 4) beliefs that the medication is not 
effective; and 5) beliefs that the medication is not necessary (Broadbent, Donkin, & 
Stroh, 2011; Farmer, Kinmonth, & Sutton, 2006; Garcia-Perez et al., 2013; Hauber, 
Mohamed, Johnson, & Falvey, 2009).  
To summarize, individuals who had been diagnosed with either type 2 diabetes or 
hypertension at least six months prior to the study; who were currently taking medication 
to treat hypertension or type 2 diabetes; who were not pregnant or within three months 
postpartum; and who answered ‘yes’ to at least one of the nonadherence risk items 
identified for each illness were eligible to participate in the studies. An affirmative 
answer to at least one of the risk factor items rather than to all of these items was 
preferred because previous studies did not conclude that all factors must be met in order 
for a patient to be at risk for nonadherence (e.g., Garcia-Perez et al., 2013; Ross et al., 
2004). For example, some patients decide not to take their medication because of their 
belief that the medication is not helping them, whereas others might be nonadherent 
because of side effects and medication effectiveness concerns. A similar less conservative 





After screening, eligible individuals were redirected to the study website, hosted by the 
Qualtrics survey software and assigned to either the diabetes or the hypertension group, 
depending on their respective answers. 
Random assignment. Qualtrics allows for the random assignment of study 
participants to experimental conditions. Thus, after being redirected to Qualtrics, 
participants in both the pilot study and in the two experiments were randomly assigned to 
one of the five experimental conditions and read a corresponding vignette (described 
below). After reading the vignettes, participants responded to a battery of questions 
including demographic characteristics, other covariates, and the dependent variables of 
interest. 
Experimental conditions 
Participants in the pilot study and in experiments 1 and 2 were exposed to a short 
vignette describing negative outcomes of drug nonadherence. Participants were instructed 
to imagine that they were the protagonist of the story in the vignette. The story used first-
person language to facilitate perspective taking among participants and it depicted a 
situation in which an individual decided to stop taking his/her medication as prescribed 
because he/she did not believe the medication was helping him/her manage his/her 
condition (either diabetes or hypertension, depending on participants’ self-reported 
medical condition). As a result, the individual ended up in an emergency room where 
doctors notified him/her that the symptoms of his/her condition had aggravated 
significantly.  
The story ended with a CFT corresponding to each experimental condition (or no 





appeared as black text on a white background. Each vignette remained on the screen for 
20 seconds and participants were not allowed to advance to the subsequent survey before 
this amount of time had passed. This measure was taken to ensure that participants read 
the vignettes carefully rather than just scroll through the text.  
There are several reasons for which short vignettes in the form of black text on 
white background as opposed to other message formats were chosen. First, the use of 
counterfactual thinking as a persuasive message design strategy is a novel idea and only 
one prior study has tested its potential in a health context (Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, & 
Gleicher, 2004). A vignette represents one of the simplest message formats available to 
test the persuasive effects of counterfactual thinking. More complex message elements 
such as sound and video can be added in future research. Second, short vignettes can be 
easily incorporated into mHealth interventions or doctor-patient conversations, if the 
findings show that counterfactual thinking is a promising persuasive strategy for patients 
who are nonadherent.  
Pilot Study 
The vignettes in Appendix A were tested prior to including them in the main 
study. This pilot testing ensured that the messages developed were comprehensible, 
relevant, interesting to target individuals, provided reasonable information, and that 
participants could identify with the story.  
Participants 
A total of 103 individuals participated in the pilot study (42 in the type 2 diabetes 





days, from December 8th to December 10th, 2016. All individuals were compensated with 
50 U.S. cents for their participation.  
Participants in the type 2 diabetes group were, on average, 38.20 years old (Min = 
19; Max = 71; SD = 12.87); 36.6% were female (63.4% were male and 2.4% declined to 
answer); 69% were White (9.5% African American; 14.3% Hispanic/Latino; 4.8% 
Asian/Pacific Islander; and 2.4% declined to answer). Participants in the hypertension 
group were, on average, 41.05 years old (Min = 22; Max = 74; SD = 13.41); 49.2% were 
female (49.2% were male and 1.6% declined to answer); 78.7% were White (6.6% 
African American; 4.9% Hispanic/Latino; 4.9% Asian/Pacific Islander; 3.3% were 
mixed; and 1.6% declined to answer).  
Measures 
 The following measures were used for both the diabetes and hypertension groups. 
Results for each medical condition are reported below. 
Relevance. Participants rated the relevance of the messages on a scale from 1 – 
strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree: The story I just read said something highly 
relevant to me. 
 Believability. Participants rated the relevance of the messages on a scale from 1 – 
strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree: The story I just read was believable. 
 Comprehension. Whether the message was easy to understand was gauged by the 
following items, rated on a scale from 1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree: 1) The 
story I just read was easy to understand; 2) I had no difficulty in understanding the story I 





 Interest in the message. If the story was interesting to participants or not was 
measured using the following item (1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree): The story 
I just read grasped my attention immediately.  
 Message derogation. Participants were also asked whether the messages were 
reasonable as opposed to exaggerated using the following items: To what extent do you 
think the story you just read was 1) exaggerated; 2) distorted; 3) overblown? Responses 
will be rated on a scale from 1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree. 
 Identification with the message. Participants reported how much they identified 
with the story in the message by rating the following items on a scale from 1 – strongly 
disagree to 7 – strongly agree: 1) I could easily relate to what happened in the story; 2) I 
think that the events I just read could happen to me in real life.  
Qualitative feedback. Finally, participants were encouraged to write down any 
thoughts they had about the stories they just read: In the space provided below, please 
mention any thoughts you might have about the story you just read. Please focus on what 
aspects (words, ideas) in the story should be changed to make it more relevant and easier 
to understand by people like you. 
Results 
Diabetes. The two items used to measure comprehension were significantly and 
highly correlated with one another (Pearson’s r = .77, p < .001); the items were averaged. 
Similarly, the two items measuring identification were significantly and positively 
correlated (Pearson’s r = .86, p < .001) and they were averaged. Finally, the three items 
used to measure message derogation formed an internally consistent measure 





Overall, participants in the diabetes condition perceived the vignettes as highly 
relevant (M = 5.20; SD = 1.76 on a scale from 1 to 7); believable (M = 5.17; SD = 1.87 on 
a scale from 1 to 7); interesting (M = 5.24; SD = 1.88 on a scale from 1 to 7); easy to 
understand (M = 5.84; SD = 1.38); and easy to identify with (M = 5.16; SD = 1.64). 
Comparatively, message derogation was below the mid-point of the scale (M = 3.22; SD 
= 1.87). The vignettes in the integral CFT, incidental downward CFT, and control 
conditions were rated similarly on relevance, believability, interest, comprehension, and 
identification; whereas the same ratings for the vignette in the incidental upward CFT 
condition were around two points lower (on a scale from 1 to 7). All messages were rated 
on average, at around three for message derogation, with the exception of the incidental 
downward CFT condition, which was rated at 4.42. Please see Table 1 for a summary. 
 The qualitative feedback echoed participants’ ratings. In their comments, 
participants noted that the story was easy to read, credible, and that what happened to the 
character resonated with them (e.g., “it made sense as written and it sounds like 
something that could be experienced in real life”; “This story is rather sad, and makes me 
scared to stop taking my medication. It is very relevant and a possible outcome if I 
followed the same steps.”).  
Participants also had suggestions for improvement. Specifically, participants 
recommended to include information on why the character stopped taking the medication 
(e.g., “It might help if you mention, why the medication was discontinued.”); for how 
long the character had stopped taking the medication before feeling ill (e.g., “I feel like it 
should mention how long they have been not taking the medication. That would help me 





were out of place and comments such as “The beginning of the story was believable. But 
then when it brought up the dog and not being bored it just went off the rails and didn't 
make too much sense. That needs to be removed.” were common. 
Hypertension. Results were similar in the hypertension condition. First, the two 
items used to measure comprehension were significantly and highly correlated with one 
another (Pearson’s r = .59, p < .001); the items were averaged. Similarly, the two items 
measuring identification were significantly and positively correlated (Pearson’s r = .70, p 
< .001) and they were averaged. Finally, the three items used to measure message 
derogation formed an internally consistent measure (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) and they 
were averaged.  
Overall, participants in the hypertension condition perceived the vignettes as 
highly relevant (M = 5.21; SD = 1.28 on a scale from 1 to 7); believable (M = 5.67; SD = 
1.27 on a scale from 1 to 7); interesting (M = 5.49; SD = 1.15 on a scale from 1 to 7); 
easy to understand (M = 6.13; SD = 1.15); and easy to identify with (M = 5.19; SD = 
1.31). Comparatively, message derogation was below the mid-point of the scale (M = 
2.78; SD = 1.29). The vignettes in the integral CFT and control conditions were rated 
similarly on relevance, believability, interest, comprehension, and identification; whereas 
the same ratings for the vignettes in the incidental upward and downward CFT conditions 
were around one point lower (on a scale from 1 to 7). All messages were rated on 
average, at around three for message derogation. Please see Table 2 for a summary. 
Regarding qualitative feedback for improving the messages, as with the diabetes 
vignettes, participants suggested that the stories include the symptoms the patient 





you CAN feel dizzy if you are not on medication. I would include in the story a symptom 
or two experienced by the patient.”) and explain why the patient stopped taking the 
medication (e.g., “The story is easy to understand but the persons actions are difficult to 
comprehend. Why quit taking medicine?”). Participants also suggested that the writing be 
made more conversational (“I thought it could be written more conversationally (i.e., 
using ‘I've’ instead of ‘I have’) - it would make it seem more realistic and personal”) and 
reconsider the incidental counterfactuals (e.g., “Who thinks about their dog while they're 
lying in the hospital bed because they did something that made their own health 
worse?”).  
Pilot study conclusions 
Overall, the initial vignettes were perceived as relevant, believable, interesting, 
relatable, and reasonable. Therefore, the basic content of the vignettes was preserved and 
several small changes proposed by participants were implemented. Specifically, the 
language was made more conversational (e.g., “I have” was replaced with “I’ve”) and 
information on why the character stopped taking the medication (i.e., it was causing 
uncomfortable side effects), on symptoms experienced prior to hospitalization (i.e., I felt 
really dizzy, I could barely walk or talk), and on how long the character did not take the 
medication (i.e., about a week) was added.  
Finally, given the overall negative sentiment toward the two incidental 
counterfactuals which were seen as inappropriate, the afferent conditions were changed 
such that the incidental counterfactual thinking would be presented in relation to an 
unrelated story introduced prior to the medication adherence vignette. This unrelated 





underperforming laptop; the reflection ends with either an upward counterfactual thought 
(i.e., if only I had bought a more expensive laptop, I wouldn’t have these issues now!) or 
a downward counterfactual thought (i.e., Oh well, at least I have a laptop now!), 
respectively. After this story, the medication adherence vignette is introduced (followed 
by no counterfactual). A similar approach was used by Nan (2008) and this method is 
frequently employed in the emotions literature when inducing incidental emotions (e.g., 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The new stimuli can be found in Appendix B. To facilitate an 
organic transition between the laptop and the medication adherence stories, the following 
question was introduced: Do you think buying a cheaper laptop is a good or a bad idea? 
(1 – very bad idea to 7 – very good idea). After this question, an introduction to the 
medication adherence story appeared on the screen. 
Experiments 1 and 2  
Participants 
Data collection for experiments 1 and 2 took place between December 15th and 
December 27th, 2016. A total of 6113 individuals accessed the screener survey. Out of 
those, 947 were eligible for participation in either the type 2 diabetes experiment (N = 
461) or the hypertension experiment (N = 486). Of note, individuals who participated in 
the pilot study were not eligible for the two experiments. All 947 individuals were 
compensated with $1 for their participation.  
A total of 188 participants were deleted from the dataset (i.e., 100 from the 
diabetes sample and 88 from the hypertension sample) prior to analyses for one or more 





(reading through the survey items only should have taken around seven to eight minutes); 
they took more than two hours to finish the study (which suggested that they did not 
finish the study in one sitting, allowing for confounding factors to intervene); they were 
“straight liners” (i.e., they answered all questions by marking ‘1’, ‘7’ or ‘4’ throughout); 
they missed the attention check (described below). This deletion brought the total sample 
down to 759 participants (Ndiabetes = 361; Nhypertension = 398). The average study completion 
time was 10.56 minutes (SD = 16.22 min; Min = 7.02 minutes; Max = 93.38 minutes). 
Demographic characteristics. Findings regarding the relationship between 
demographics and drug nonadherence have been mixed, yet, differences between men 
and women, younger and older people, the more and the less educated, white and non-
white patients might still exist. Thus, these variables were measured and controlled for in 
the analyses.  
Among participants with type 2 diabetes, individuals were, on average, 36.65 
years old (SD = 12.09; Min = 18; Max = 79); 57.8% were women (41.1% were men and 
1.1% identified as gender fluid); 69.3 % were White (12.0% Black/African American; 
6.1% Latino/Hispanic; 6.4% Asian/Pacific Islander; 2.8% Native American; 3.4% 
Mixed); 37.8% were college graduates (1.7% had some high school; 12.9% were high 
school graduates; 37.8% had some college; and 9.8% had post-college education). A total 
of 8.7% reported their household yearly income below $15,000 (12.3% between $15,000 
and $25,000; 27.1% between $25,001 and $45,000; 27.4% between $45,001 and $65,000; 
17.9% between $65,001 and $100,000; 5.9% more than $100,000 and 0.8% did not 
know). Finally, 28.8% of participants with type 2 diabetes reported having been 





ago; 14.2% three years ago; 4.7% four years ago; 5.3% five years ago; 1.7% six years 
ago; and 9.5% more than six years ago. Please see Table 3 for a summary of type 2 
diabetes sample characteristics. 
Among participants with hypertension, individuals were, on average, 42.39 years 
old (SD = 13.07; Min = 19; Max = 80); 61.0% were women (38.2% were men and 0.8% 
identified as gender fluid); 73.8 % were White (11.3% Black/African American; 7.9% 
Latino/Hispanic; 4.1% Asian/Pacific Islander; 1.8% Native American; 1.0% Mixed); 
39.2% were college graduates (0.8% had some high school; 11.8% were high school 
graduates; 31.5% had some college; and 16.7% had post-college education). A total of 
8.2% reported their household yearly income below $15,000 (13.3% between $15,000 
and $25,000; 29.0% between $25,001 and $45,000; 20.8% between $45,001 and $65,000; 
18.2% between $65,001 and $100,000; 9.2% more than $100,000 and 1.3% did not 
know). A total of 25.6% of participants with hypertension reported having been 
diagnosed with their illness less than a year ago; 11.3% one year ago; 14.9% two years 
ago; 14.4% three years ago; 8.2% four years ago; 7.4% five years ago; 1.3 six years ago; 




Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was measured with seven items adapted from 
Ogedegbe, Mancuso, Allegrante, & Charlson (2005) and Erlen, Cha, Kim, Caruthers, & 
Sereika (2010). The items were rated on a scale from 1- not confident at all to 7 – very 





treatment that your doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition?; How confident 
are you that you can make taking medication part of your routine?.  
In the type 2 diabetes group, principal components analysis showed that, based on 
the 60/40 criterion, the items formed a unidimensional scale and they all loaded on one 
component that explained 68.11% of variance in the construct. The items were also 
internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). The items were, thus, averaged to form an 
overall index of type 2 diabetes medication adherence self-efficacy (M = 5.31; SD = 1.28; 
Min = 1; Max = 7).  
Similarly, in the hypertension group, items all loaded on one component that 
explained 66.35% of the variance and were internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.91). The items were averaged to form an overall index of hypertension medication 
adherence self-efficacy (M = 5.45; SD = 1.26; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Response efficacy and outcome expectancy. Response efficacy was measured with 
seven items rated on a scale from 1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree (adapted from 
Erlen et al., 2010). Sample items include: I believe that taking my medication as 
prescribed by my doctor will help me stay healthy; I believe that taking my medication as 
prescribed by my doctor will improve the quality of my life. Outcome expectancy was 
measured with seven items also rated on a scale from 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly 
agree, including: I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will 
make my family and friends happy; I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by 
my doctor will allow me to enjoy life; I believe that taking my medication as prescribed 





Given the conceptual overlap between response and outcome expectancy, a 
principal components analysis was ran including all 14 items (for each group separately). 
For both the type 2 diabetes and hypertension groups, results showed that the ten items 
tapping into expectations about medication adherence effects on one’s health and quality 
of life loaded on one component and the four items tapping into expectation about 
medication adherence effects on one’s family and friends loaded on a second component. 
The ten items and four items, respectively, were also internally consistent as gauged by 
Cronbach alphas. As a result, for both the diabetes group and the hypertension group, the 
ten items were averaged into overall indices of medication adherence response efficacy 
(type 2 diabetes: items explained 72.92 % of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha 
= .96; M = 5.51; SD = 1.20; Min = 1; Max = 7; hypertension: items explained 75.60% of 
variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .96; M = 5.61; SD = 1.24; Min = 1; Max = 
7); and the four items were averaged into overall indices of medication adherence family 
and friends outcome expectancy (type 2 diabetes: items explained 55.95 % of variance in 
the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .74; M = 4.76; SD = 1.31; Min = 1; Max = 7; 
hypertension: items explained 60.99% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = 
.79; M = 4.55; SD = 1.41; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Behavioral intention. Intentions to adhere to medication were measured with the 
following items, rated on a scale from 1 – not strong at all to 7 – very strong: 1) Think 
about this moment. How strong is your intention to take your medication as advised by 
your doctor right now?; 2) Think about tomorrow. How strong do you think your 





about one week from today. How strong do you think your intention to take your 
medication as advised by your doctor will be one week from today?.  
For both the diabetes and the hypertension groups, the items formed a 
unidimensional scale and were internally consistent; therefore, they were averaged into 
overall indices of medication adherence behavioral intention (type 2 diabetes: items 
explained 88.06% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .93; M = 5.87; SD = 
1.28; Min = 1; Max = 7; hypertension: items explained 90.22% of variance in the 
construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .94; M = 5.99; SD = 1.32; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Moderator 
Regret. Regret was measured with three items rated on a scale from 1 – not at all 
to 7 – very much: Think about the story you just read and rate how much 1) regret; 2) 
remorse; 3) repentance you are experiencing right now (adapted from Zeelenberg et al., 
1998). For both the diabetes and the hypertension groups, the items formed a 
unidimensional scale and were internally consistent; therefore, they were averaged into 
overall indices of regret experienced (type 2 diabetes: items explained 81.54% of 
variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .89; M = 3.84; SD = 1.81; Min = 1; Max = 
7; hypertension: items explained 77.99% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = 
.86; M = 3.46; SD = 1.69; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Covariates  
The literature on drug nonadherence has identified a variety of factors that impact 
an individuals’ medication-related perceptions and behaviors. These variables were 





analyses in order to ensure that the effects observed could be attributed to the 
experimental manipulation as opposed to other confounders.  
Doctor-patient communication. The quality and content of the communication 
between a doctor and a patient can influence an individual’s willingness to take their 
medication, their beliefs in the effectiveness of medication to manage their illness and 
avoid complications, and their perceptions of how able they are to follow the treatment. 
Thus, participants’ assessment of their communication with their doctor was measured 
and entered as a covariate in the analyses.  
Doctor-patient communication was measured with items adapted from Bieber, 
Muller, Nicolai, Hartmann, and Eich’s (2010) quality of physician-patient interaction 
scale. The items selected from the original scale were the ones that addressed doctor-
patient communication specifically. A total of eight items were rated on a scale from 1- 
strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree, including: The physician gave me detailed 
information about the available treatment options; The physician and I made all treatment 
decisions together; The physician’s explanations were easy to understand.  
For both the diabetes and the hypertension groups, the items formed a 
unidimensional scale and were internally consistent; therefore, they were averaged into 
overall indices of doctor-patient communication (type 2 diabetes: items explained 
68.18% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .93; M = 5.06; SD = 1.41; Min = 
1; Max = 7; hypertension: items explained 66.66% of variance in the construct; 
Cronbach’s alpha = .93; M = 4.93; SD = 1.51; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
History of medical complications. Whether an individual has experienced health 





response efficacy and behavioral intention items. For example, an individual who refused 
to take their medication and then had to go to the emergency room might respond 
positively to these items, independent of exposure to a persuasive message. Therefore, 
this variable was measured and included in the model as a covariate. Individuals were 
asked the following questions: 1) Have you ever experienced health complications, such 
as chronic illness symptom aggravation, due to not taking your medications? (yes, one 
time; yes, more than once; no, never); 2) Have you ever been hospitalized because you 
did not take your medications? (yes, one time; yes, more than once; no, never).  
In the diabetes group, 39.1% of participants reported having experienced health 
complications due to nonadherence once; 26.3% more than once; and 34.6% never. A 
total of 22.9% reported having hospitalized due to nonadherence once; 7.5% more than 
once; and 69.6% never. In the hypertension group, 28.4% of participants reported having 
experienced health complications due to nonadherence once; 26.6% more than once; and 
45.0% never. A total of 13.3% reported having hospitalized due to nonadherence once; 
6.4% more than once; and 80.3% never. For both groups, the two items were dummy 
coded (1 for yes and 0 for no) to be used in subsequent analyses. 
Experience of medication side effects. Whether an individual has experienced 
medication side effects or not may also influence their responses. Most patients fear side 
effects, however, not all of them have actually experienced them. It is not clear, however, 
if patients who fear versus experience side effects are less likely to take their medication 
as prescribed. Therefore, participants were asked whether: 1) they fear that their chronic 





experienced side effects caused by their chronic illness medication (1 – not at all to 7- 
very much).  
The two items correlated significantly (diabetes: Pearson’s r = .56, p < .001; 
hypertension: Pearson’s r = .63, p < .001) and they were averaged (diabetes: M = 4.69; 
SD = 1.50; Min = 1; Max = 7; hypertension: M = 4.21; SD = 1.65; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Depressive symptoms. Among a variety of comorbidities, depression is the only 
illness that has been consistently found to interfere with medication adherence (Sirey, 
Greenfield, Weinberger, & Bruce, 2013). Given the nature of the study (an online 
experimental survey), only a measure of depressive symptoms could be incorporated. 
Symptoms of depression were measured using a four-item psychological distress scale 
adapted from the National Health Interview Survey, 1997, Adult Core Questionnaire 
(item ACN.471). Respondents rated the following symptoms as experienced during the 
past two weeks (1 – not at all to 7 – very much): (1) little interest or pleasure in doing 
things; (2) feeling down, depressed, or hopeless; (3) feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge; 
and (4) not being able to stop or control worrying.  
The four items formed a unidimensional and internally consistent scale in both the 
diabetes and the hypertension groups and the items were averaged to form an index of 
depressive symptoms (type 2 diabetes: items explained 79.70% of variance in the 
construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .92; M = 3.55; SD = 1.70; Min = 1; Max = 7; hypertension: 
items explained 79.52% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .91; M = 3.56; 
SD = 1.86; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Attention check. The following attention check appeared in the survey as a 





measurement: “For this question, please select option ‘5’, this is an attention check”. A 
total of 56 people missed this attention check and their data were deleted prior to running 
analyses.  
Following O’Keefe’s (2003) argument that when the research claim refers to the 
effect of a specific message variation on the outcome (such as in the present case), a 
manipulation check can actually be omitted, participants were not asked whether the 
message they read included a counterfactual thought or not.  
For a summary of measures please see Table 5. Bivariate correlations between 
variables are presented in Table 6. 
Hypothesis testing 
Analysis of covariance. ANCOVA analyses were ran first to assess group 
differences and the effect of the covariates on each of the dependent variables (i.e., self-
efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention). Prior to 
running the ANCOVAs, the data were analyzed for skewness and kurtosis. Behavioral 
intention measures in both the diabetes and hypertension group were negatively skewed; 
and the response efficacy measure in the hypertension group only was also negatively 
skewed. Following the ladder of powers (Fink, 2009), the three variables were squared.  
Self-efficacy. Levels of self-efficacy did not differ based on experimental 
condition in the diabetes group (F (4, 353) = 1.12, p = .35). Among covariates, doctor-
patient communication and age had a significant effect on self-efficacy. Regression 
analyses showed that the more positive the communication between the participant and 
their doctor was evaluated, the higher the medication adherence self-efficacy reported (b 





of age on self-efficacy in regression analyses included zero; therefore, an effect of age on 
self-efficacy was not supported (b = .01, p = .05, 95% CI = [0.00; 0.02]).  
Levels of self-efficacy did not differ based on experimental condition in the 
hypertension group either (F (4, 387) = 0.64, p = .64). Among covariates, depressive 
symptoms, doctor-patient communication, gender, and age were significant. According to 
regression analyses, the higher the levels of depression symptoms reported, the lower the 
levels of medication adherence self-efficacy reported (b = -.13, p = .01, 95% CI = [-0.15; 
-0.02]); the more positive the communication between the participant and their doctor 
was evaluated, the higher the medication adherence self-efficacy reported (b = .38, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.24; 0.39]); the older the participant, the higher their self-efficacy (b = 
.10, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.01; 0.02]). Finally, women reported higher self-efficacy than 
men (b = .10, p = .03, 95% CI = [0.03; 0.49]). 
Response-efficacy. In the diabetes group, response efficacy did not differ 
depending on experimental condition (F (4, 353) = 0.86, p = .49). Among covariates, 
doctor-patient communication and age had a significant effect on response efficacy. 
Follow-up regression analyses showed that, as with self-efficacy, the more positive 
doctor-patient communication was evaluated, the higher the levels of response efficacy 
reported (b = .58, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.42; 0.56]); and the older the participant, the 
higher their response efficacy (b = .01, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.001; 0.02]). 
In the hypertension group, participants’ response efficacy did not differ based on 
the experimental condition they were assigned to either (F (4, 386) = 1.56, p = 18). 
Depressive symptoms, doctor-patient communication, and gender were significant 





higher depressive symptoms (b = -.13, p = .007, 95% CI = [-0.15; -0.02]); it increased 
with more positive doctor-patient communication evaluations (b = .40, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [0.26; 0.40]); and it was higher among women compared to men (b = .11, p = .01, 95% 
CI = [0.07; 0.50]).   
Outcome expectancy. In the diabetes group, levels of outcome expectancy did not 
differ among experimental conditions (F (3, 353) = 1.36, p = .25) and none of the 
covariates were significant for this variable. 
Experimental condition did not result in different levels of outcome expectancy in 
the hypertension group either (F (4, 386) = 1.14, p = .34). Only doctor-patient 
communication and age emerged as significant covariates such that outcome expectancy 
increased with more positive doctor-patient communication evaluations (b = .34, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.23; 0.41]) and decreased with age (b = -.11, p = .03, 95% CI = [-0.02; -
0.001]). 
Behavioral intention. In the diabetes group, behavioral intention to adhere to 
medication as prescribed did not differ based on experimental condition (F (4, 353) = 
1.22, p = .30). Among covariates, doctor patient communication, race, and age were 
significant. Regression analyses showed that the more positive doctor-patient 
communication was evaluated, the higher the intention reported (b = .48, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [0.35; 0.51]); the older the participant, the higher their intention to adhere to 
medication (b = .20, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.01; 0.03]); and that white participants had 
higher intention to adhere to medication as prescribed than non-white participants (b = 





Finally, participants’ intention to adhere to their medication did not differ based 
on experimental condition in the hypertension group either (F (4, 386) = 0.85, p = .50). 
Depressive symptoms, doctor-patient communication, and age were significant covariates 
such that the higher the levels of depressive symptoms, the lower the medication 
adherence intention reported (b = -.13, p = .01, 95% CI = [0.35; 0.51]); the older the 
participant, the higher their response efficacy (b = .20, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.02; 0.16]); 
the more positive the doctor-patient communication evaluation, the higher the intention to 
adhere (b = .40, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.27; 0.43]); and the older the participant, the higher 
their intention to take their medication as prescribed (b = .14, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.04; 
0.02]). 
Mediation and moderation analyses. The mediation and moderated mediation 
analyses using SPSS Indirect Macro mirrored the ANCOVA findings and they were by 
and large non-significant. Specifically, there was no difference between participants in 
the integral/incidental upward CFT condition and participants in the integral/incidental 
downward CFT condition in terms of self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome 
expectancy, and behavioral intention (all ps > .20). It follows that the indirect effects of 
the integral/incidental upward CFT (compared to the integral/incidental downward CFT 
condition) through self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy on behavioral 
intention were not significant either (all ps > .20). Finally, regret did not moderate the 
effects of any of the conditions on self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, 





Experiments 1 and 2 discussion  
The purpose of experiments 1 and 2 was to test the persuasive effects of 
counterfactual-thinking-based messages on individuals’ intention to take their medication 
as prescribed by their doctor. The study also aimed to explore potential underlying 
mechanisms of the effects of counterfactual thinking on intention. Specifically, the roles 
of self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy as mediators of the effect of 
counterfactual thinking on medication adherence were considered. The proposed 
counterfactual thinking model of communication was examined in two health contexts: 
type 2 diabetes and hypertension, two illnesses that affect an overwhelming number of 
U.S. adults and that are associated with high healthcare costs and low medication 
adherence rates (American Heart Association, 2014; American Diabetes Association, 
2016; CDC, 2012, 2016).  
Despite the body of literature documenting the positive effects of upward 
counterfactual thinking, as opposed to downward counterfactual thinking, on behavioral 
intentions and self-efficacy, no such effects were observed in the present study. 
Participants who read a vignette that ended with an upward counterfactual thought did 
not report higher levels of self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectations, or 
behavioral intentions than participants who read a vignette that ended in a downward 
counterfactual thought or no counterfactual thought (i.e., control condition).  
Similar non-significant results were found for the incidental counterfactual 
conditions such that participants exposed to an incidental story that ended in an upward 
counterfactual thought and who then read the medication adherence vignette were no 





counterfactual thought/no counterfactual thought (control) and who then read the 
medication adherence vignette. The non-significant results held across both participants 
who self-identified as having type 2 diabetes and those who self-identified as having 
hypertension.  
Why results were largely non-significant requires a complex and nuanced 
discussion. The most readily available answer is that counterfactual thinking-based 
messages have no effect on medication adherence intentions, nor do they have an effect 
on medication adherence self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy. Other 
potential explanations have to do with the stimuli used; the sample; and how participants 
processed the messages they read.  
Health context-related factors. First, it is possible that counterfactual thinking is 
not an efficient persuasive message design strategy in the context of medication 
adherence. Indeed, that findings were non-significant across two health contexts seems to 
give credence to this interpretation. Only a handful of studies have researched the 
persuasive effects of counterfactual thinking in health contexts. These studies have 
looked at smoking-related behaviors (Page & Colby, 2003), binge drinking (Baek et al., 
2013), physical activity (Nan, 2008, Experiment 3), and traffic safety (Tal-Or et al., 
2004) and have found a positive effect of counterfactual thinking on the investigated 
behaviors/behavioral intentions and attitudes.  
However, these studies differed from the present study in that they used primarily 
incidental self-generated counterfactual thinking (i.e., CFTs generated by participants 
themselves and that were irrelevant to the judgment task; Baek et al., 2013; Nan, 2008), 





themselves and that were related to the judgment task; Page & Colby, 2003) or a 
combination of integral stated and self-generated counterfactual thinking (i.e., CFTs 
generated by participants themselves and CFTs that were given to participants, and that 
were related to the judgment task; Tal-Or et al., 2004). These distinct strategies of 
studying counterfactual thinking and the different health contexts may account for why 
findings in prior research were significant. 
Additionally, although research suggests that adhering to medication is a behavior 
similar to, for example, adhering to a healthy diet and, thus, convincing people to take 
their medication as prescribed should follow principles similar to those used for changing 
eating behaviors (Mayer & Pharm, 2007), research also notes that barriers such as 
medication cost, lack of access to healthcare, and forgetfulness are factors that 
significantly hinder adherence (Gazmararian, Kripalani, Miller, Echt, Ren, & Rask, 2006; 
Mann, Ponieman, Leventhal, & Halm, 2007; Rieckmann et al. 2006). It is possible, then, 
that addressing these types of barriers (i.e., cost, forgetfulness, access to healthcare) takes 
precedence over using persuasive messages to reduce nonadherence. Of course, 
medication cost and access to healthcare cannot be easily addressed and necessitate 
governmental intervention. Although access to healthcare was not measured, participants’ 
evaluation of their communication with their doctor did emerge as a significant predictor 
of self-efficacy, response efficacy, and intention to adhere to medication, suggesting that 
having a healthcare provider who clearly explains the treatment plan, includes the patient 
in the decision-making process, and who listens to patient concerns can positively impact 
medication adherence. This finding is in line with prior research (Chiecanowski, Katon, 





Yet, this is not to say that persuasion attempts are futile. In fact, they are an 
integral part of the numerous interventions that aim to increase medication adherence. 
For instance, interventions have used motivational interviewing (Pakpour et al., 2015) 
and therapy (De Vries et al., 2015), both of which include persuasive elements. 
Moreover, text messaging-based interventions have included belief changing statements 
such as “Your asthma is always there even when you don't have symptoms; Take your 
preventer every day and control your asthma before it controls you” (Petrie et al., 2012); 
such statements are persuasive messages. Finally, Zhao et al. (2012) found that message 
framing, a popular persuasive message design strategy, had a persuasive effect. To 
conclude, then, the lack of significant findings in this study should not be interpreted as 
an indication that effective persuasive message design for medication adherence should 
not be given as much importance as interventions addressing cost issues or knowledge 
gaps that patients might have.   
Stimuli-related factors. Insight into why the analyses yielded non-significant 
results can also be gathered from looking at the stimuli used. The vignettes were designed 
and refined using patient feedback. Moreover, even the vignettes that did not include 
such feedback (i.e., the ones tested in the pilot study) were rated as relevant, believable, 
and interesting. It is possible, however, that although the stories overall were 
satisfactorily written, the counterfactual thinking statements were lacking.  
Specifically, only one counterfactual thinking statement per vignette was used and 
perhaps participants failed to notice and/or process that statement. If that were indeed the 
case, it is not surprising that the means for the dependent variables measured were similar 





statement was used. It was not possible, however, to check for this issue, given that a 
manipulation check was not included in either of the two experiments (following 
O’Keefe, 2003).  
Tal-Or et al.’s (2004) study on the effect of counterfactual thinking on attitudes 
related to traffic safety support this argument. In their study, the authors included a 
counterfactual thought statement at the beginning of the narrative stimulus and also as a 
question in which participants were asked to write down how they thought things could 
have been different for the protagonist in the narrative. As Tal-Or and colleagues 
explained, “this question served as both an additional check on the counterfactual 
manipulation and as a reinforcement of the manipulation.” (p. 311).  
Another potential indication that the counterfactual thinking manipulation used in 
this study was likely weak is the low partial etas squared (a measure of effect size) and 
post-hoc observed power estimations in the ANCOVA output. Specifically, partial etas 
squared all hovered around .01 (or 1%) and observed power estimations varied from as 
low as .27 to a highest value of .49. These numbers barely changed when the data for 
diabetes and hypertension groups were collapsed to increase sample size (and, thus, 
statistical power).  
It is unclear what the effect size of counterfactual thinking on variables such as 
intention and efficacy perceptions should be as the majority of studies in the literature do 
not report effect size measures. Only one study in which counterfactual thinking was 
applied to a public health-related context (traffic accidents) reported effect sizes (Tal-Or 
et al., 2004). In this study, the partial etas squared associated with upward counterfactual 





present research. Yet, the counterfactual thinking in Tal-Or and colleagues’ study was 
generated by participants, rather than given to them as part of a message, so the effect 
size to be expected in a study like the present one is still unclear. 
Participant-related factors. Finally, the sample recruited for the study may have 
influenced the significance of the results. It is possible that participants in the study were 
not actually at risk for nonadherence. Indeed, participants reported high levels of self-
efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention, with means 
for all of these variables above five on a 7-point scale. However, these participants did 
pass the study screener, meaning that they expressed concerns about their medication 
and/or their illness. These concerns have been found to be significant predictors of 
nonadherence and are considered risk factors for future nonadherence (e.g., Kreps et al., 
2011; Zhao et al., 2012). Perhaps participants were dishonest in their answers to the 
screener questions, but it is unlikely that so many of them did so to threaten the 
effectiveness of the messages across the board.  
It is also possible that participants did not pay attention to the messages and the 
survey questions and they hurried to finish without too much thought. Regarding the 
messages, they were scheduled to remain on the screen for 20 seconds before participants 
could move forward specifically for the purpose of increasing the likelihood that 
individuals would actually read the messages versus mindlessly scrolling through them. 
However, this precaution might not have been sufficient (i.e., one can still choose to stare 
at a screen for 20 seconds without reading and processing the information on that screen). 
Regarding the survey questions, “straight liner” participants were deleted from the dataset 





seven minutes were also excluded, lessening the concern that individuals who rushed to 
finish the survey might have affected the results.  
It is more likely that participants did not engage with the messages. Maybe the 
format of the messages (i.e., black text on a white screen) was not conducive to cognitive 
engagement and information processing, particularly given that the study was conducted 
as an online experiment. Also, as stated previously, it is possible that participants failed 
to notice the one counterfactual statement at the end of their respective message.  
To further probe the impact of counterfactual thinking on medication adherence (or lack 
of), experiment 3 was designed in which several changes were implemented to address 
















Chapter 7:  Experiment 3 
 
The purpose of experiment 3 was to try to address the stimuli- and sample-related 
issues identified at the conclusion of the first two experiments. If after addressing these 
issues to the best extent differences between experimental conditions are not observed, 
one could more strongly conclude that counterfactual thinking is not an effective 
persuasive strategy in a medication adherence health context.  
Overview of Implemented Changes 
Changes were implemented to strengthen the experimental manipulation; to 
facilitate participant engagement; and to include self-generated counterfactual thinking 
conditions, in light of past research that has found persuasive effects of self-generated 
CFT. 
Two changes were undertaken to strengthen the counterfactual thinking 
manipulation in experiment 3. First, to ensure that participants notice the counterfactual 
thinking statements, the vignettes used in experiment 3 included two such statements 
instead of just one (also see Tal-Or et al., 2004). Second, a manipulation check was added 
to verify that participants’ perceptions of the upward versus downward counterfactual 
thinking statements were distinct (the manipulation checks are further detailed when 
describing the study measures below).  
To facilitate participant engagement, the new vignettes were created in audio 
format, as there is research to suggest that formats other than text are more effective in 





verbal channels, such as audio, are believed to reduce the cognitive effort needed to 
process the information and, thus, lead to better understanding and more in-depth 
processing of information (Stanczyk et al., 2016). Relatedly, in a meta-analysis of 
effectiveness of internet-based procedures for inducing affect, Ferrer, Grenen, and Taber 
(2015) found that video inductions (i.e., having participants watch a clip), compared to 
text or writing-based inductions, were most effective at inducing affect.  
Whereas video and audio experimental manipulations are not the same, they are 
more similar to one another than they are to text-based manipulations. Specifically, both 
video and audio stimuli contain sound, whereas text-based stimuli do not. Because the 
goal was for participants to engage with the information in the message (i.e., the 
counterfactual thinking included in the story) rather than the character delivering it 
(through identification with the character, for example) or with other characteristics 
present in a video versus an audio message (e.g., character appearance, colors, 
environment), an audio as opposed to a video message was preferred. In support of this 
argument, a study comparing video with audio messages on the topic of amniocentesis 
found that audio messages were more effective at increasing perceptions of miscarriage 
likelihood; the authors reasoned that, compared to video messages, the audio messages 
did not offer visual alternatives for counteracting the information delivered (Muller & 
Cameron, 2014). 
 To further ensure participant engagement throughout the survey, several strategic 
attention checks were added to separate participants who carefully considered the survey 





timed to ensure that participants spent a minimum amount of time reading and answering 
the survey items.  
Finally, drawing insight from prior studies, the two incidental counterfactual 
thinking conditions from experiment 1 and 2 were replaced with three integral self-
generated counterfactual thinking conditions. As already mentioned, prior research that 
found strong effects of counterfactual thinking on behavior and other perceptions in 
health contexts primarily looked at participant-generated counterfactual thinking (as 
opposed to stated or “spoon-fed” counterfactual thinking) or a combination of both self-
generated and stated counterfactual thinking. Including these conditions has several 
advantages. First, if effects are not observed for self-generated counterfactual thinking 
either, the conclusion that counterfactual thinking may not work as a persuasive strategy 
for medication adherence is strengthened. Second, any effects (or lack of) observed will 
be comparable to prior studies that used a similar design. Finally, strictly from a 
communication perspective, integral counterfactual thinking, as opposed to incidental 
counterfactual thinking, is more useful because the goal is to understand what elements 
within the message (as opposed to elements outside the message as it is the case with 
incidental cognitions) are effective in eliciting change.   
Regarding the relative persuasiveness of the stated versus self-generated 
counterfactual thinking conditions, only one prior study has compared the two. In this 
study, Tal-Or and colleagues (2004; Experiment 2) asked participants to watch a video 
depicting the story of a person severely injured in a car accident. Then, some participants 
were asked to generate their own upward counterfactuals, whereas other participants were 





Participants’ attitudes toward traffic safety regulations did not differ depending on 
whether the upward counterfactual thinking statements were stated in the story or were 
generated by participants; and, although attitudes in the stated upward counterfactual 
condition decayed slightly more than those in the self-generated upward counterfactual 
condition at a one-week follow-up, this difference was not significant. It appears, then, 
that the stated and self-generated upward counterfactual conditions should not be 
significantly different. However, because the dependent variables explored in experiment 
3 (i.e., self-efficacy, response efficacy, and behavioral intentions) are different from those 
explored by Tal-Or and colleagues (i.e., attitudes), the self-generated and stated 
counterfactual thinking conditions will be compared with one another.  
 The following section details these changes and the design of experiment 3. 
Method 
Sample and procedures 
The experimental conditions in experiment 3 varied based on whether the 
counterfactual thinking statements were stated or self-generated and on whether the 
counterfactual thoughts in those statements were upward or downward. A control 
condition in which no counterfactual thinking was present was also included. Experiment 
3 was conducted in the context of type 2 diabetes. 
The same recruitment method was used as in experiments 1 and 2. Participants 
were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were similarly screened for 
type 2 diabetes medication nonadherence risk. In the recruitment ad, participants were 





information and answering questions regarding that information throughout their 
participation in the study. Individuals who participated in experiment 1 and the pilot 
study were not eligible for participation in experiment 3.  
Qualified participants were redirected to experiment 3 hosted by Qualtrics. Here, 
participants first answered a few questions about their medication-related behavior and 
perceptions (detailed in the Measures section). They were then instructed to turn on their 
audio system. After that, they took part in a brief trial to ensure they could properly hear 
the audio messages. In this trial, participants listened to a character named Robert 
introducing himself. At the end of this introduction, participants answered a multiple-
choice question about Robert’s favorite animal. Participants who correctly answered this 
question were instructed to proceed to the main study. Participants who incorrectly 
answered this question were instructed to double check their audio system and to make 
sure they paid attention to subsequent information presented in the study; then, they were 
instructed to proceed to the main study.  
 After this exercise, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental conditions and listened to the corresponding vignette. All participants then 
answered questions similar to the ones in experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
The story preceding counterfactual thinking remained the same as in experiment 
1. Specifically, participants were exposed to the story of an individual who had been 
diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. The character then confessed that the type 2 diabetes 
medication that his doctor had prescribed was causing uncomfortable side effects, so he 





the medication, the character started feeling dizzy, so he went to the emergency room, 
where the doctors told him his diabetes worsened.  
In the two stated counterfactual thinking conditions, this story ended with the 
character reflecting on his situation using two upward/downward counterfactual thinking 
statements. Specifically, in the stated upward counterfactual thinking condition the 
following statements were used: “I couldn’t help but think that if only I had taken my 
medication as prescribed, I would have been fine! If only I had taken my medication as 
prescribed, my condition wouldn’t have worsened and I would not be in the hospital right 
now!”. In the downward counterfactual thinking condition, the following statements were 
used: “I couldn’t help but think that it could have been worse! I could have died!”.  
 In the self-generated counterfactual thinking conditions, participants were 
instructed to generate their own counterfactual thinking statements. In research using this 
method, participants are usually instructed to fill in sentences with actions that undo the 
negative outcome, meaning that the negative outcome is stated and participants are asked 
to fill in the statements with alternative actions that could change that outcome (e.g., 
Baek, Shen, & Reid, 2013; Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003). For instance, if the outcome 
is a car accident, participants are asked to fill in sentences such as this one: “If only I had 
_______, I wouldn’t have gotten in a car accident!”. Translating this method to this 
experiment, participants would be asked to fill in sentences such as this one: “If only the 
character had _________, his illness wouldn’t have gotten worse!”.  
Yet, the key behavior that the messages in this study are trying to promote is 
taking one’s medication. If participants are asked to think about actions that would undo 





character had taken his medication, his illness wouldn’t have worsened” (unlikely given 
the story preceding the counterfactual thinking generation, but still possible).  
It is not clear if and how this issue would affect the results. In one scenario, none 
of the participants would fill in such statements with the key behavior of taking one’s 
medication, in which case, the effect of this experimental condition on medication 
adherence-related factors would likely not be significant. In another scenario, all 
participants would fill in these statements with the key behavior of taking one’s 
medication. In a more probable scenario, participants would be somewhere in between, 
thinking about a mix of actions, some of which would be taking one’s medication.  
Given the uncertainty, experiment 3 included two different self-generated upward 
counterfactual thinking conditions. In one of the conditions, in line with prior research, 
participants were instructed to think what the character in the story could have done 
differently to prevent his illness from getting worse; they were then asked to fill in two 
sentences with alternative behaviors that would undo the outcome. In the other condition, 
participants were instructed to think about how things could have been better if the 
character had taken their medication as prescribed; they were then asked to generate two 
alternative outcomes, given a different behavior than the one performed in the vignette: 
“If only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have ________”. No 
predictions were made about potential differences between these two conditions. 
 Participants in the self-generated downward counterfactual condition were 
instructed to think about how the character’s situation could have been worse than it is 





control condition did not include any type of counterfactual thinking at the end of the 
story. 
 In all conditions, the vignettes were in audio format. Participants listened to the 
story as being verbally narrated by a man. Please see Appendix D for the stimuli. 
Results 
Participants 
Data collection occurred between July 18th and August 1st, 2017. A total of 1,631 
participants accessed the screening survey. Out of those, 341 qualified for participation in 
the study. All 341 individuals were compensated with $1 for their participation. Out of 
the 341, 38 missed attention checks and their data were not saved. Thus, the total sample 
included 303 individuals. The average study completion time was 15.44 minutes (SD = 
12.25; Min = 8.34 minutes; Max = 103.02).  
Participants were, on average, 37.43 years old (SD = 12.38; Min = 18; Max = 80; 
2 participants did not report their age); 52.5% were women (47.5% were men; no one 
self-identified as gender fluid); 68.0 % were White (13.5% Black/African American; 
7.9% Latino/Hispanic; 5.6% Asian/Pacific Islander; 3.0% Native American; 1.7% Mixed; 
1 participant declined to answer this question); 41.9% were college graduates (3.0% had 
some high school; 11.6% were high school graduates; 33.0% had some college; and 
10.6% had post-college education). A total of 7.6% reported their household yearly 
income below $15,000 (12.2% between $15,000 and $25,000; 22.4% between $25,001 
and $45,000; 27.7% between $45,001 and $65,000; 19.5% between $65,001 and 





participants reported having been diagnosed with their illness for less than one year; 
16.2% for two years; 8.9% for 3 years; 6.3% for 4 years; 4.3% for 5 years; 0.7% for 6 
years; and 5.9% for more than 6 years. Table 7 provides a summary of these 
characteristics. 
Measures  
Manipulation checks. To ensure that participants in the stated counterfactual 
thinking conditions perceived the counterfactual thinking statements as intended, a 
manipulation check was used. Participants in the stated counterfactual thinking 
conditions and those in the control conditions were asked to rate the following items on a 
scale from 1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree: The character in the story 
mentioned what he could have done to avoid the negative situation he is now in; The 
character in the story mentioned how his situation could have been worse. The 
manipulation check items appeared later in the survey so that they would not affect 
participants’ answers to the items measuring the dependent variables in the study.  
A manipulation check was not used for the self-generated counterfactual thinking 
conditions because in these conditions participants provided their own counterfactual 
thoughts following a prompt that explicitly instructed to frame their statements as 
counterfactual thoughts (of note, prior studies in which participants generated their own 
counterfactual thinking statements did not use a manipulation check either). 
 Dependent variables. For measuring dependent variables, the same items as the 
ones in experiment 1 were used in experiment 3, as well, unless otherwise noted. 
Self-efficacy. The seven items used to measure this construct formed a 





variance in the construct. The items were also internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.93). The items were averaged to form an overall index of medication adherence self-
efficacy (M = 4.91; SD = 0.98; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
 Response efficacy and outcome expectations. Similar to experiment 1, there was 
overlap between the seven items used to measure response efficacy and the seven items 
used to measure outcome expectations, respectively. Specifically, the ten items tapping 
into expectations about medication adherence effects on one’s health and quality of life 
loaded on one component that explained 50.33 % of the variance in the construct; the 
items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .94) and they were averaged into an 
overall index of medication adherence response efficacy (M = 4.91; SD = 1.00; Min = 2; 
Max = 7).  
Out of the remaining four items, only two of them loaded on the same factor (i.e., 
“I believe that if I take my medication as prescribed by my doctor, my family and friends 
will like me more.”; and “I believe that if I take my medication as prescribed by my 
doctor, my family and friends will trust me more.”), with the other two items cross-
loading on two factors (i.e., “I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my 
doctor will make my family and friends happy”; “I believe that if I take my medication as 
prescribed by my doctor, my family and friends will support me.”). The first two items 
were averaged into an overall index of outcome expectations (Pearson’s r = .87, p < 
.001; M = 4.32; SD = 1.86; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
 Behavioral intentions. The items used to measure this construct loaded on one 





consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .92) and were averaged into an overall index of 
medication adherence behavioral intention (M = 4.68; SD = 1.01; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
 Moderator 
 Regret. The three items used to measure regret were also unidimensional (the 
component explained 83.99% of the variance in the construct) and internally consistent 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .90). They were, thus, averaged together (M = 3.30; SD = 1.28; Min 
= 1; Max = 7). 
 Covariates 
 Doctor-patient communication. The eight items formed a unidimensional scale 
and were internally consistent; therefore, they were averaged into an overall index of 
doctor-patient communication (items explained 69.27% of variance in the construct; 
Cronbach’s alpha = .97; M = 5.16; SD = 1.38; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
History of medical complications. A total of 29.0% of participants reported 
having experienced health complications due to nonadherence once; 20.5% more than 
once; and 50.5% never. A total of 10.6% reported having hospitalized due to 
nonadherence once; 5.3% more than once; and 84.2% never. The two items were dummy 
coded (1 for yes and 0 for no) to be used in subsequent analyses. 
Experience of medication side effects. The two items, fear of medication side 
effects and having experienced side effects, correlated significantly and were averaged 
together (Pearson’s r = .52, p < .001; M = 3.95; SD = 1.54; Min = 1; Max = 7). 
Depressive symptoms. The four items formed a unidimensional and internally 





(items explained 80.05% of variance in the construct; Cronbach’s alpha = .92; M = 3.12; 
SD = 1.76; Min = 1; Max = 7).  
 Prior medication adherence behavior. Participants in experiment 3 were also 
asked about their medication adherence prior to exposure to the study stimuli. 
Participants answered the following question: Are you currently taking your diabetes 
medication consistently as prescribed by your doctor?; which they answered by choosing 
one of the following options: No, I stopped taking my medication; I take my medication 
inconsistently, most of the days I don’t take it; I take my medication inconsistently, but I 
do take it most days; yes, I take my medication as prescribed every day. Only 1% of 
participants reported that they had stopped taking their medication altogether; 8.3% 
reported not taking their medication most of the days; 20.1% reported taking their 
medication most days; and 70.6% reported taking their medication as prescribed every 
day.  
Medication nonadherence risk. Also prior to message exposure, participants rated 
six items that tapped into their risk for nonadherence on a scale from 1 - strongly disagree 
to 7 – strongly agree: 1) I think the severity of my diabetes is low. 2) I am concerned that 
I will gain weight if I take my diabetes medication. 3) I am concerned that my risk for 
cardiovascular illness will increase if I take my diabetes medication. 4) I think my 
diabetes medication is not effective. 5) I think that my diabetes medication is not 
necessary; 6) I don’t think it’s such a big deal if I don’t take my diabetes medication 
every day. The first three items cross-loaded on two components, whereas the last three 
loaded on the same component and explained 40.95% of the variance in the underlying 





therefore, they were averaged together into an overall index of risk for medication 
nonadherence (M = 3.06; SD = 1.32; Min = 1; Max = 7).  
For a summary of measures please see Table 8. Bivariate correlations between 
variables are presented in Table 9. 
 Attention checks. Three attention checks were used in experiment 3. The first 
attention check was included in the trial exercise (described above in the Stimuli section) 
and its purpose was twofold: 1) to ensure participants can hear the audio messages 
properly; and 2) to remind participants of the importance of paying attention to the 
information and questions in the study. Therefore, if participants incorrectly answered 
this attention check, they were not terminated from the study.  
The second attention check appeared after exposure to the study stimuli and asked 
participants when the character in the story started feeling sick after deciding not to take 
their medication anymore (correct answer: after about one week). Given that carefully 
listening to the main message in the study was critical, participants who provided an 
incorrect answer to this question were terminated from the survey immediately and the 
data they provided up to that point were deleted.  
Finally, a third attention check or “clicker trap” was included among the self-
efficacy measures to filter out participants who might mindlessly go through the survey 
items and rate them all as a “1” or a “7” on the 7-point scales used. This clicker trap read 
as follows: “How confident are you that you are paying attention? Please select option 
‘5’, this is an attention check.” If participants selected an option other than 5, they were, 





informed about these attention checks and about their termination from the study if they 
provided incorrect answers in the consent form. 
Hypothesis testing 
 Manipulation checks. An analysis of variance including the stated upward 
counterfactual, stated downward counterfactual, and control conditions was run to check 
if the experimental manipulation was successful. In the stated upward counterfactual 
thinking condition, participants reported higher agreement levels with the statement “The 
character in the story specifically mentioned what he could have done to avoid the 
negative situation he is now in.” (F (2, 156) = 36.43, p < .001; partial η2 = .32; M = 6.20, 
95% CI = [5.69; 6.71]) than both participants in the stated downward counterfactual 
thinking condition (M = 3.82, 95% CI = [3.32; 4.31]) and participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.31, 95% CI = [2.81; 3.81]). As illustrated by overlapping 95% 
confidence intervals, there was no significant difference between the stated downward 
counterfactual condition and the control condition.  
Similarly, in the downward counterfactual thinking condition, participants 
reported higher agreement levels with the statement “The character in the story 
specifically mentioned how his situation could have been worse” (F (2, 156) = 44.56, p < 
.001; partial η2 = .37; M = 5.50, 95% CI = [4.99; 6.00]) than both participants in the 
stated upward counterfactual thinking condition (M = 2.52, 95% CI = [1.99; 3.04]) and 
participants in the control condition (M = 2.54, 95% CI = [2.03; 3.05]). As illustrated by 
overlapping 95% confidence intervals, there was no significant difference between the 
stated downward counterfactual condition and the control condition. The experimental 





 Analysis of covariance. As in experiments 1 and 2, ANCOVA analyses were ran 
first to assess group differences and the effect of the covariates on each of the dependent 
variables (i.e., self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral 
intention). Given that skeweness and kurtosis levels fell within appropriate values (i.e., [-
.80; .80]) for all variables, data transformation was not necessary (Fink, 2009).  
 Self-efficacy. Reported levels of self-efficacy differed based on experimental 
condition (F (5, 301) = 15.11, p < .001; partial η2 = .21). Participants in all upward CFT 
conditions reported higher levels of self-efficacy (MstatedUP = 5.03, 95% CI = [4.78; 5.27]; 
Mgen_outcomes = 5.41, 95% CI = [5.17; 5.66]; Mgen_behaviors = 5.54, 95% CI = [5.29; 5.79]) 
than participants in the stated downward CFT condition (MstatedDown = 4.42, 95% CI = 
[4.18; 4.65]) and those in the control condition (Mcontrol = 4.46, 95% CI = [4.22; 4.69]). 
The stated upward and the self-generated downward CFT conditions were not 
significantly different from one another, as illustrated by overlapping 95% confidence 
intervals (MgenDown = 4.69, 95% CI = [4.44; 4.94]); however, the self-generated upward 
CFT conditions were significantly different form the self-generated downward CFT 
condition. Among upward CFT conditions, participants who generated alternative 
behaviors (Mgen_behaviors = 5.54, 95% CI = [5.29; 5.79]) reported higher levels of self-
efficacy than participants in the stated CFT condition (MstatedUP = 5.03, 95% CI = [4.78; 
5.27]); no other significant differences emerged. There were no significant differences 
among participants in the two downward CFT conditions and those in the control 
condition.  
Among covariates, doctor-patient communication had a significant effect on self-





the participant and their doctor was evaluated, the higher the medication adherence self-
efficacy reported (b = .18, p = .005, 95% CI = [0.04; 0.22]). Because the effect of gender 
on self-efficacy approached significance (p = .07), gender was included as a covariate in 
subsequent mediation and moderation analyses.  
Response-efficacy. Levels of response efficacy also differed based on 
experimental condition (F (5, 301) = 14.99, p < .01; partial η2 = .20). Specifically, 
participants in all upward CFT conditions reported higher levels of response efficacy 
(MstatedUP = 5.11, 95% CI = [4.89; 5.36]; Mgen_outcomes = 5.36, 95% CI = [5.11; 5.60]; 
Mgen_behaviors = 5.56, 95% CI = [5.31; 5.81]) than participants in all downward CFT 
conditions (MstatedDown = 4.34, 95% CI = [4.10; 4.57]; MgenDown = 4.63, 95% CI = [4.39; 
4.89]) and those in the control condition (Mcontrol = 4.55, 95% CI = [4.31; 4.79]). There 
were no significant differences among participants in the upward CFT conditions or 
among participants in the two downward CFT conditions and those in the control 
condition.  
Among covariates, doctor-patient communication had a significant effect on 
response efficacy. The more positive the communication between the participant and 
their doctor was evaluated, the higher the medication adherence self-efficacy reported (b 
= .23, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.08; 0.25]). No other significant covariates emerged. 
Outcome expectancy. Levels of outcome expectancy did not differ among 
experimental conditions (F (5, 301) = 0.70, p = .62). Among covariates, doctor-patient 
communication and risk for nonadherence emerged as significant, while income 
approached significance (p = .08). The more positive participants evaluated their 





.001, 95% CI = [0.31; 0.64]). Similarly, the higher participants’ risk for nonadherence 
was, the higher their outcome expectancy was, as well (b = .21, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.11; 
0.47]).  
Behavioral intention. Finally, behavioral intention to take one’s medication as 
prescribed was different among experimental conditions (F (5, 301) = 17.34, p < .001; 
partial η2 = .23). Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in all upward CFT 
conditions reported higher medication adherence intentions (MstatedUP = 4.86, 95% CI = 
[4.61; 5.11]; Mgen_outcomes = 5.26, 95% CI = [5.02; 5.51]; Mgen_behaviors = 5.34, 95% CI = 
[5.09; 5.60]) than participants in all downward CFT conditions (MstatedDown = 4.32, 95% 
CI = [4.08; 4.55]; MgenDown = 4.20, 95% CI = [4.95; 4.45]) and those in the control 
condition (Mcontrol = 4.22, 95% CI = [3.98; 4.46]). There were no significant differences 
among participants in the upward CFT conditions or among participants in the two 
downward CFT conditions and those in the control condition.  
Among covariates, doctor-patient communication, education level, and gender 
were significant. Regression analyses showed that the more positive doctor-patient 
communication was evaluated, the higher the intention reported (b = .19, p = .003, 95% 
CI = [0.05; 0.23]); that more educated individuals had higher intention to adhere to 
medication (b = .15, p = .015, 95% CI = [0.03; 0.31]); and that women had higher 
intention to adhere to medication as prescribed compared to men (b = .12, p = .033, 95% 
CI = [0.02; 0.48]). 
SPSS Indirect Macro Analyses. To further test the study hypotheses and answer 
its research questions, a series on analyses using SPSS Indirect Macro which uses 





2008). The 95% confidence intervals for all effects used 10,000 bootstrapped samples. 
Specifically, Indirect Macro was used to: 1) test the direct effects of the upward CFT 
conditions (versus the downward CFT conditions) on self-efficacy, response efficacy, 
outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention; 2) test the indirect effects of the upward 
CFT conditions (versus the downward CFT conditions) on behavioral intention, through 
self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy; and 3) test the interaction 
between the upward CFT conditions (versus the downward CFT conditions) and regret on 
self-efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention.  
Stated upward CFT versus stated downward CFT. First, the stated upward CFT 
condition was compared to the stated downward CFT condition. Model 4 was used to 
explore direct and indirect effects (hypotheses 1 through 5; and research questions 1 and 
2); then, model 1 was used to explore the interaction effects (hypotheses 6 and 7; and 
research questions 3 and 4); finally, model 8 was used to explore the existence of 
conditional indirect effects (hypothesis 8; and research questions 5 and 6). 
 Direct effects  
Model 4 was used to test for direct and indirect effects. The independent variable 
was dummy coded such that the stated downward CFT condition served as the reference 
category. Self-efficacy, response efficacy, and outcome expectancy were entered as 
mediators and behavioral intention was entered as the dependent variable. Based on 
ANCOVA results, doctor-patient communication, gender, education, income, and risk for 
medication nonadherence were entered as covariates. 
The model significantly predicted medication adherence behavioral intention (R2 





significant direct effect on intention (b = .17, p = .232, 95% CI = [-0.11; 0.45]).  
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
The model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .13, F (6, 97) = 2.35, p = 
.036). The experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that 
participants in the stated upward counterfactual thinking condition reported higher levels 
of self-efficacy compared to participants in the stated downward counterfactual thinking 
condition (b = .53, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.23; 0.83]). Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Response efficacy was also significantly predicted by the model (R2 = .27, F (6, 
97) = 5.90, p < .001). The experimental condition had a significant direct effect on 
response efficacy, such that participants in the stated upward counterfactual thinking 
condition reported higher levels of response efficacy compared to participants in the 
stated downward counterfactual thinking condition (b = .71, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.44; 
0.99]). Hypothesis 3 was supported.  
The model also significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = .26, F (6, 97) = 
5.80, p < .001), however, mirroring ANCOVA results, the experimental condition did not 
significantly predict this variable (b = -.11, p = .74, 95% CI = [-0.75; 0.53]). The 
response to the first research question, then, is that individuals in the stated upward CFT 
condition do not differ from individuals in the stated downward CFT condition in terms 
of outcome expectancy. 
Indirect effects 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
self-efficacy was significant (b = .16; 95% CI = [0.06; 0.34]), such that individuals in the 





reported higher levels of self-efficacy (b = .53, p = .0006, 95% CI = [0.23; 0.83]); and 
higher levels of self-efficacy were associated with increased medication adherence 
intention (b = .30; p = .009, 95% CI = [0.08; 0.52]). Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
response efficacy was also significant (b = .23; 95% CI = [0.06; 0.46]), such that 
individuals in the stated upward CFT condition, as opposed to those in the stated 
downward CFT condition, reported higher levels of response efficacy (b = .71, p < .001, 
95% CI = [0.44; 0.99]); and higher levels of response efficacy were associated with 
increased medication adherence intention (b = .32; p = .008, 95% CI = [0.08; 0.56]). 
Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
Finally, there was no indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy (b = -.01; 95% CI = [-0.07; 0.02]); nor was the 
association between outcome expectancy and behavioral intention significant (b = .06; p 
= .15, 95% CI = [-0.02; 0.14]). The response to the second research question, then, is that 
there is no indirect effect of experimental condition on medication adherence behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy. 
Interaction effects 
 Whether the experimental condition interacted with regret in predicting self-
efficacy, response efficacy, outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention was tested 
using model 1. Regret was entered as a moderator; self-efficacy, response efficacy, 
outcome expectancy, and behavioral intention were entered as dependent variables (each 





The interaction model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .17, F (8, 97) = 
2.47, p = .017) and the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model was 
also significant (R2 change = .04, F (1, 97) = 4.52, p = .036). Regret significantly 
moderated the effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy (b = -.33; p = .04; 
95% CI = [-0.64; -0.02]). At one standard deviation below the mean and at the mean, the 
effect of the experimental condition (0 – downward CFT condition; 1 – upward CFT 
condition) on self-efficacy was significant and positive; while there was a decrease in the 
effect, the difference was not significant (at one standard deviation below the mean: 
regret = 2.35; b = .86; p = .0004; 95% CI = [0.39; 1.33]; at the mean: regret = 3.39; b = 
.52; p = .001; 95% CI = [0.21; 0.84]). At one standard deviation above the mean for 
regret, the effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy became non-significant 
(regret = 4.44; b = .18; p = .409; 95% CI = [-0.25; 0.60]). Hypothesis 6 was supported. 
The interaction model significantly predicted response efficacy (R2 = .27, F (8, 
97) = 4.41, p = .0001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the 
model was not significant (R2 change = .00, F (1, 97) = 0.06, p = .94). Regret did not 
moderate the effect of the experimental condition on response efficacy (b = -.01; p = .94; 
95% CI = [-0.30; 0.28]). The response to research question 3, then, is that there is no 
interaction between the experimental condition and regret in predicting response efficacy. 
Similarly, the interaction model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = 
.27, F (8, 97) = 4.38, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .001, F (1, 97) = 0.13, p = .72). Regret 
did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy (b = -





there is no interaction between the experimental condition and regret on outcome 
expectancy. 
Finally, the interaction model significantly predicted behavioral intention (R2 = 
.25, F (8, 97) = 3.96, p = .0004); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .000, F (1, 97) = 0.0009, p = .98). 
Regret did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention 
(b = -.01 p = .98; 95% CI = [-0.31; 0.31]). Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
Conditional indirect effects  
In light of the results above, model 7 was also run to test for the existence of a 
moderated indirect effect of experimental condition on behavioral intention, through self-
efficacy, with regret as a moderator of the relationship between experimental condition 
and self-efficacy. The index of moderated mediation (or, of a conditional indirect effect) 
was significant (b = -.16; 95% CI = [-.40; -.03]). Probing of this moderated mediation 
showed that, whereas at lower levels of regret (one standard deviation below the mean 
and at the mean), there was a positive indirect effect of the experimental condition on 
behavioral intention, through self-efficacy, at high levels of regret (one standard 
deviation above the mean), this effect became non-significant: at one standard deviation 
below the mean (regret = 2.35; b = .42; 95% CI = [0.22; 0.80]); at the mean (regret = 
3.39; b = .25; 95% CI = [0.11; 0.48]); at one standard deviation above the mean (regret = 
4.44; b = .09; 95% CI = [-0.14; 0.36]). Hypothesis 8 was supported. 
Model 7 was also run with response efficacy and outcome expectancy as 
mediators, but, in line with findings from models 4 and 1, the moderated indirect effects 





All models were run with the control condition as the reference category and 
results were largely the same, in line with ANCOVA results in which the stated 
downward CFT condition did not differ from the control condition on any of the 
dependent variables. 
Self-generated outcomes upward CFT versus self-generated downward CFT. The 
same analyses as the ones above were repeated with the self-generated counterfactual 
thinking conditions. First, the self-generated upward CFT condition in which participants 
generated alternative outcomes given a different behavior (i.e., that of adhering to one’s 
medication) was compared to the self-generated downward CFT condition.  
Direct effects  
The model significantly predicted medication adherence behavioral intention (R2 
= .39, F (9, 89) = 6.20, p < .001). The experimental condition had a significant positive 
direct effect on intention, such that individuals who generated alternative outcomes 
(given that the character had taken his medication as prescribed) reported higher intention 
to adhere to medication as prescribed than participants who generated downward CFT (b 
= .79, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.40; 1.19]).  Hypothesis 1 was supported for self-generated 
alternative outcomes. 
The model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .21, F (6, 92) = 4.15, p = 
.001). The experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that 
participants who generated alternative outcomes reported higher levels of self-efficacy 
compared to participants who generated downward CFT (b = .77, p = .001, 95% CI = 





Response efficacy was also significantly predicted by the model (R2 = .18, F (6, 
92) = 5.37, p = .005). The experimental condition had a significant effect on response 
efficacy, such that participants who generated alternative outcomes reported higher levels 
of response efficacy compared to participants who generated downward CFT (b = .74, p 
= .001, 95% CI = [0.30; 1.19]). Hypothesis 3 was supported with self-generated 
alternative outcomes.  
The model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = .16, F (6, 92) = 3.02, 
p = .01), however, mirroring ANCOVA results, the experimental condition did not 
significantly predict this variable (b = .38; p = .33, 95% CI = [-0.38; 1.13]). The response 
to the first research question, then, is that individuals who generate alternative outcomes 
do not differ from individuals who generate downward CFT in terms of outcome 
expectancy in a medication adherence context. 
Indirect effects 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
self-efficacy was not significant (b = .18; 95% CI = [-0.05; 0.56]); although the 
experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that individuals who 
generated alternative outcomes, as opposed to those who generated downward CFT, 
reported higher levels of self-efficacy (b = .77, p = .0005, 95% CI = [0.35; 1.20]); self-
efficacy did not predict intention (b = .23; p = .18, 95% CI = [-0.11; 0.58]). Hypothesis 4 
was not supported in this context. 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
response efficacy was not significant either (b = .08; 95% CI = [-0.05; 0.56]); although 





downward CFT, reported higher levels of response efficacy (b = .74, p = .001, 95% CI = 
[0.30; 1.19]); response efficacy did not predict intention (b = .10; p = .54, 95% CI = [-
0.23; 0.43]). Hypothesis 5 was not supported with self-generated alternative outcomes. 
Finally, there was no indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy (b = .02; 95% CI = [-0.02; 0.14]); nor was the 
association between outcome expectancy and behavioral intention significant (b = .05; p 
= .34, 95% CI = [-0.05; 0.15]). The response to the second research question, then, is that 
there is no indirect effect of experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
outcome expectancy when comparing the self-generated alternative outcomes upward 
CFT condition with the self-generated downward CFT condition. 
Interaction effects 
The interaction model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .33, F (8, 90) = 
5.48, p < .001) and the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model was 
also significant (R2 change = .07, F (1, 90) = 7.50, p = .007). Regret significantly 
moderated the effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy (b = -.42; p = .007; 
95% CI = [-0.73; -0.12]). At high levels of regret (one standard deviation above the 
mean), the effect of the experimental condition (0 – self-generated downward CFT 
condition; 1 – self-generated alternative outcomes upward CFT condition) on self-
efficacy was not significant anymore: at one standard deviation below the mean (regret = 
1.80; b = 1.31; p < .001; 95% CI = [0.74; 1.89]); at the mean (regret = 3.17; b = .73; p = 
.0004; 95% CI = [0.34; 1.13]); at one standard deviation above the mean (regret = 4.53; b 
= .16; p = .59; 95% CI = [-0.42; 0.74]). Hypothesis 6 was supported with self-generated 





The interaction model significantly predicted response efficacy (R2 = .31, F (8, 
90) = 5.00, p < .001) and the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model 
was also significant (R2 change = .07, F (1, 90) = 9.71, p = .003). Regret moderated the 
effect of the experimental condition on response efficacy (b = -.50; p = .003; 95% CI = [-
0.82; -0.18]). At high levels of regret (one standard deviation above the mean), the effect 
of the experimental condition on response efficacy was not significant anymore: at one 
standard deviation below the mean (regret = 1.80; b = 1.39; p < .001; 95% CI = [0.79; 
1.99]); at the mean (regret = 3.17; b = .70; p = .001; 95% CI = [0.29; 1.12]); at one 
standard deviation above the mean (regret = 4.53; b = .01; p = .96; 95% CI = [-0.59; 
0.62]). The response to research question 3, then, is that regret moderates the effect of the 
self-generated alternative outcomes upward CFT versus self-generated downward CFT 
on response efficacy.  
Similarly, the interaction model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = 
.23, F (8, 90) = 3.39, p = .002); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .002, F (1, 90) = 0.27, p = .60). Regret 
did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy (b = 
.15; p = .60; 95% CI = [-0.42; 0.72]). The response to research question 4, then, is that 
there is no interaction between the experimental condition and regret on outcome 
expectancy with self-generated alternative outcomes upward CFT. 
Finally, the interaction model significantly predicted behavioral intention (R2 = 
.31, F (8, 90) = 5.06, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .008, F (1, 90) = 1.15, p = .29). Regret 





.16; p = .29; 95% CI = [-0.46; 0.14]). Hypothesis 7 was not supported with self-generated 
alternative outcomes upward CFT. 
Conditional indirect effect  
None of the conditional indirect effects were significant. 
Self-generated behaviors upward CFT versus self-generated downward CFT. 
Second, the self-generated upward CFT condition in which participants generated 
alternative behaviors was compared to the self-generated downward CFT condition.  
Direct effects  
The model significantly predicted medication adherence behavioral intention (R2 
= .52, F (9, 85) = 10.62, p < .001). The experimental condition had a significant positive 
direct effect on intention, such that individuals who generated alternative behaviors 
reported higher intention to adhere to medication as prescribed than participants who 
generated downward CFT (b = .63, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.25; 1.01]).  Hypothesis 1 was 
supported for self-generated alternative behaviors that could undo the outcome. 
The model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .24, F (6, 88) = 4.67, p = 
.0004). The experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that 
participants who generated alternative behaviors that undid the outcome reported higher 
levels of self-efficacy compared to participants in the self-generated downward 
counterfactual thinking condition (b = .91, p = .0001, 95% CI = [0.47; 1.35]). Hypothesis 
2 was supported with self-generated alternative behaviors upward CFT, as well. 
Response efficacy was also significantly predicted by the model (R2 = .27, F (6, 
88) = 5.41, p = .0001). The experimental condition had a significant effect on response 





reported higher levels of response efficacy compared to participants who generated 
downward CFT (b = .98, p = .0001, 95% CI = [0.51; 1.44]). Hypothesis 3 was supported 
with self-generated alternative behaviors upward CFT.  
The model did not significantly predict outcome expectancy (R2 = .12, F (6, 88) = 
2.05, p = .067), and, mirroring ANCOVA results, the experimental condition did not 
significantly predict this variable in these analyses either (b = .25; p = .54, 95% CI = [-
0.54; 1.03]). The response to the first research question, then, is that individuals who 
generate alternative behaviors to undo a negative outcome do not differ from individuals 
who generate downward CFT in terms of outcome expectancy in a medication adherence 
context. 
Indirect effects 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
self-efficacy was not significant (b = .10; 95% CI = [-0.14; 0.43]); although the 
experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that individuals who 
generated alternative behaviors to undo the outcome, as opposed to those who generated 
downward CFT, reported higher levels of self-efficacy (b = .91, p = .0001, 95% CI = 
[0.47; 1.35]); self-efficacy did not predict intention (b = .11; p = .48, 95% CI = [-0.20; 
0.42]). Hypothesis 4 was not supported in this context. 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
response efficacy was significant (b = .43; 95% CI = [0.18; 0.81]), such that individuals 
who generated alternative behaviors upward CFT, as opposed to those who generated 





[0.51; 1.44]); and higher levels of response efficacy were associated with increased 
intention (b = .44; p = .004, 95% CI = [0.14; 0.73]). Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
Finally, there was no indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy (b = .0002; 95% CI = [-0.05; 0.06]); nor was the 
association between outcome expectancy and behavioral intention significant (b = .001; p 
= .99, 95% CI = [-0.10; 0.10]). The response to the second research question, then, is that 
there is no indirect effect of experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
outcome expectancy in this context. 
Interaction effects  
The interaction model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .39, F (8, 86) = 
7.15, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model 
was not significant (R2 change = .008, F (1, 86) = 1.16, p = .28). Regret did not moderate 
the effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy (b = -.15; p = .28; 95% CI = [-
0.44; 0.13]).  
The interaction model significantly predicted response efficacy (R2 = .39, F (8, 
86) = 6.97, p < .001); however, R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the 
model was not significant (R2 change = .02, F (1, 86) = 2.65, p = .11). Regret did not 
moderate the effect of the experimental condition on response efficacy (b = -.25; p = .11; 
95% CI = [-0.55; 0.06]).  
Similarly, the interaction model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = 
.17, F (8, 86) = 2.19, p = .04); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term 





not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy (b = -.10; p 
= .73; 95% CI = [-0.64; 0.45]).  
Finally, the interaction model significantly predicted behavioral intention (R2 = 
.35, F (8, 86) = 5.70, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .000, F (1, 86) = 0.001, p = .98). 
Regret did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention 
(b = -.004; p = .98; 95% CI = [-0.29; 0.29]).  
Conditional indirect effect  
None of the conditional indirect effects were significant. 
Stated upward CFT versus self-generated outcomes upward CFT. One last set of 
analyses was run to compare the stated upward CFT condition to the self-generated 
upward CFT conditions. The stated upward CFT condition served as the reference 
category in these analyses. First, the stated upward CFT condition was compared to the 
condition in which participants generated alternative outcomes if a different behavior had 
been performed (i.e., that of adhering to one’s medication). 
Direct effects 
The model significantly predicted medication adherence behavioral intention (R2 
= .30, F (9, 91) = 4.625, p < .001). The experimental condition had a significant positive 
direct effect on intention, such that individuals who generated alternative outcomes 
reported more intention to adhere to medication as prescribed than participants who were 
exposed to a stated upward CFT message (b = .36, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.02; 0.69]). 
The model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .13, F (6, 94) = 2.30, p = 





participants who generated alternative outcomes reported higher levels of self-efficacy 
compared to participants in the stated upward CFT message condition (b = .40, p = .007, 
95% CI = [0.11; 0.69]).  
Response efficacy was not significantly predicted by the model (R2 = .08, F (6, 
94) = 1.41, p = .22). The experimental condition had a significant effect on response 
efficacy, such that participants who generated alternative outcomes reported higher levels 
of response efficacy compared to participants exposed to a stated upward CFT; however, 
given that the regression model was not significant, this effect should be interpreted with 
caution (b = .27, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.02; 0.53]). Of note, none of the covariates in this 
model were significant predictors of response efficacy. Excluding the covariates from the 
analyses led to a significant regression model (R2 = .05, F (1, 99) = 5.58, p = .02); in this 
model, as well, participants who generated alternative outcomes reported higher levels of 
response efficacy compared to participants exposed to a stated upward CFT (b = .29, p = 
.02, 95% CI = [0.05; 0.53]).   
The model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = .30, F (6, 94) = 6.67, 
p < .001), however, the effect of the experimental condition was not significant (b = .31; 
p = .32, 95% CI = [-0.30; 0.93]).  
Indirect effects 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
self-efficacy was not significant (b = .09; 95% CI = [-0.02; 0.29]); although the 
experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that individuals who 





CFT, reported higher levels of self-efficacy (b = .40, p = .007, 95% CI = [0.11; 0.69]); 
self-efficacy did not predict intention (b = .22; p = .20, 95% CI = [-0.12; 0.55]).  
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
response efficacy was not significant either (b = .09; 95% CI = [-0.02; 0.29]); although 
individuals who generated alternative outcomes, as opposed to those who were exposed 
to a stated upward CFT, reported higher levels of response efficacy (b = .27, p = .04, 95% 
CI = [0.02; 0.53]), higher levels of response efficacy were not associated with increased 
intention (b = -.17; p = .36, 95% CI = [-0.54; 0.19]).  
Finally, there was no indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy (b = .009; 95% CI = [-0.02; 0.11]); nor was the 
association between outcome expectancy and behavioral intention significant (b = .03; p 
= .62, 95% CI = [-0.08; 0.14]).  
Interaction effects  
The interaction model did not significantly predict self-efficacy (R2 = .14, F (8, 
92) = 4.28, p = .06); the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model was 
also not significant (R2 change = .003, F (1, 92) = 0.29, p = .59). Regret did not moderate 
the effect of the experimental condition on self-efficacy (b = .08; p = .59; 95% CI = [-
0.21; 0.36]). 
The interaction model did not significantly predict response efficacy either (R2 = 
.11, F (8, 92) = 1.46, p = .18); the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the 
model was not significant (R2 change = .005, F (1, 92) = 0.49, p = .49). Regret did not 
moderate the effect of the experimental condition on response efficacy (b = -.09; p = .49; 





Similarly, the interaction model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = 
.33, F (8, 92) = 5.70, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .007, F (1, 92) = 0.92, p = .34). Regret 
did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy (b = 
.29; p = .34; 95% CI = [-0.31; 0.90]).  
Finally, the interaction model significantly predicted behavioral intention (R2 = 
.29, F (8, 92) = 4.76, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .01, F (1, 92) = 1.30, p = .26). Regret 
did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention (b = -
.18; p = .26; 95% CI = [-0.50; 0.14]).  
Conditional indirect effect  
None of the conditional indirect effects were significant. 
Stated upward CFT versus self-generated behaviors upward CFT. Second, the 
stated upward CFT condition was compared to the condition in which participants 
generated alternative behaviors to undo the negative outcome. Here, as well, the stated 
upward CFT condition served as the reference category.  
Direct effects 
The model significantly predicted medication adherence behavioral intention (R2 
= .39, F (9, 87) = 6.20, p < .001). The experimental condition did not have a significant 
effect on intention (b = .22, p = .21, 95% CI = [-0.12; 0.57]). 
The model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .19, F (6, 90) = 3.49, p = 
.004). The experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that 





story reported higher levels of self-efficacy compared to participants in the stated CFT 
condition (b = .55, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.25; 0.85]).  
Response efficacy was also significantly predicted by the model (R2 = .25, F (6, 
90) = 4.95, p < .001). The experimental condition had a significant effect on response 
efficacy, such that participants who generated alternative behaviors reported higher levels 
of response efficacy compared to participants exposed to a stated upward CFT (b = .46, p 
= .002, 95% CI = [0.18; 0.75]).  
The model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = .17, F (6, 90) = 3.16, 
p = .007), however, the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy was 
not significant (b = .38; p = .26, 95% CI = [-0.28; 1.05]).  
Indirect effects 
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
self-efficacy was not significant (b = .08; 95% CI = [-0.09; 0.29]); although the 
experimental condition had a significant effect on self-efficacy, such that individuals who 
generated alternative behaviors, as opposed to those who were exposed to a stated 
upward CFT, reported higher levels of self-efficacy (b = .55, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.25; 
0.85]); self-efficacy did not predict intention (b = .15; p = .37, 95% CI = [-0.18; 0.47]).  
The indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention through 
response efficacy was significant (b = .19; 95% CI = [0.04; 0.45]); individuals who 
generated alternative behaviors, as opposed to those who were exposed to a stated 
upward CFT, reported higher levels of response efficacy (b = .46, p = .002, 95% CI = 
[0.18; 0.75]), and higher levels of response efficacy were associated with increased 





Finally, there was no indirect effect of the experimental condition on behavioral 
intention through outcome expectancy (b = .007; 95% CI = [-0.03; 0.11]); nor was the 
association between outcome expectancy and behavioral intention significant (b = .02; p 
= .70, 95% CI = [-0.08; 0.12]).  
Interaction effects  
The interaction model significantly predicted self-efficacy (R2 = .28, F (8, 88) = 
4.28, p < .001); the R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the model was also 
significant (R2 change = .05, F (1, 88) = 5.80, p = .02). Regret moderated the effect of the 
experimental condition on self-efficacy (b = .33; p = .02; 95% CI = [0.06; 0.61]), such 
that, at low levels of regret (one standard deviation below the mean), the effect of the 
experimental condition (self-generated alternative behaviors versus stated upward CFT) 
on self-efficacy was not significant (regret = 2.49; b = 0.16; p = .49; 95% CI = [-0.29; 
0.61]). However, at higher levels of regret, the experimental condition had a positive 
effect on self-efficacy, as follows: at the mean (regret = 3.70; b = .56; p < .001; 95% CI = 
[0.27; 0.85]); at one standard deviation above the mean (regret = 4.91; b = .97; p < .001; 
95% CI = [0.53; 1.40]). 
The interaction model significantly predicted response efficacy (R2 = .29, F (8, 
88) = 4.42, p < .001); however, R2 increase due to adding the interaction term to the 
model was not significant (R2 change = .01, F (1, 88) = 1.27, p = .26). Regret did not 
moderate the effect of the experimental condition on response efficacy (b = .15; p = .26; 
95% CI = [-0.12; 0.42]).  
Similarly, the interaction model significantly predicted outcome expectancy (R2 = 





to the model was not significant (R2 change = .001, F (1, 88) = 0.15, p = .70). Regret did 
not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on outcome expectancy (b = .13; p 
= .70; 95% CI = [-0.52; 0.77]).  
Finally, the interaction model significantly predicted behavioral intention (R2 = 
.31, F (8, 88) = 4.90, p < .001); however, the R2 increase due to adding the interaction 
term to the model was not significant (R2 change = .001, F (1, 88) = 0.13, p = .72). Regret 
did not moderate the effect of the experimental condition on behavioral intention (b = 
.06; p = .72; 95% CI = [-0.27; 0.39]).  
Conditional indirect effect  
None of the conditional indirect effects were significant. 
A summary of findings across hypotheses and research questions can be found in 
Table 15. 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 was conducted to address some of the issues identified at the 
conclusion of experiments 1 and 2 and to provide an additional test of the persuasiveness 
of counterfactual thinking-based messages in a medication adherence context. 
Specifically, the counterfactual thinking manipulation was strengthened in experiment 3 
by including two counterfactual thinking statements. Furthermore, to facilitate participant 
engagement, the messages were created in audio format. Also, to assist with engagement 
throughout the survey, several strategic attention checks were added to separate 
participants who carefully considered the survey from those who paid less attention. 
Finally, the two incidental counterfactual thinking conditions from experiment 1 and 2 





light of past research that has found effects of self-generated counterfactuals on efficacy 
perceptions and behavioral intentions. In a sample of individuals who self-identified as 
having been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes, findings showed a robust persuasive effect 
of messages including upward counterfactual thoughts (either stated or generated by 
participants) on perceptions of self- and response efficacy, and on behavioral intention to 
take one’s medication as prescribed. Each of the results is discussed in detail below. 
Counterfactual thinking and self-efficacy 
In line with prior research, both self-generated and stated upward counterfactual 
thinking messages, relative to downward counterfactual thinking messages and control, 
increased perceptions of self-efficacy about taking one’s medication as prescribed (Tal-
Or, Boninger, & Gleicher, 2004). This finding extends prior research that has found a 
positive effect of counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy in an educational context to a 
health context (medication adherence). Moreover, whereas Tal-Or and colleagues (2004) 
studied the effects of counterfactual thinking in a performance context (i.e., an exam), the 
findings here suggest that counterfactual thinking is effective as a persuasive health 
message strategy, as well, when the goal is to increase individuals’ perceptions of self-
efficacy. The results provide additional support for Roese’s (1997) theorizing that upward 
counterfactual thinking, by providing explicit information about what behaviors should 
be performed in the future to avoid negative outcomes, reinforces individuals’ confidence 
in their abilities to engage in those behaviors at a future time.   
Downward counterfactual thinking, relative to the control condition, did not 
change self-efficacy. This finding is different from Tal-Or et al.’s (2004), who found that, 





grade, their perceptions of self-efficacy that they would do better on a future exam 
decreased (Experiment 1). Tal-Or and colleagues explained that imagining how things 
could have been worse (i.e., downward counterfactual thinking) likely undermines 
perceptions of self-efficacy. However, their explanation lacks information on why 
imagining how things could have been worse reduces self-efficacy. Whereas it is true that 
downward counterfactual thinking does not inform on how one can improve their 
outcomes in the future (and, therefore, should not reinforce self-efficacy), downward 
counterfactual thinking does not equate negative feedback either; it does not tell people 
they are not able to do something, to the contrary, it suggests what happened is not the 
worst-case scenario.  
Tal-Or and colleagues’ findings, then, may be explained by something else, 
specifically, their stimuli. Participants in the downward counterfactual condition were 
told that their decision to change some of the exam answers they were unsure of was the 
right one and that their grade improved as a result; they were then told that if they had 
stayed with their initial answers, they would have done much worse. Participants in the 
upward counterfactual thinking condition, on the other hand, were told that their decision 
to change their exam answers was the wrong one and that their grade was worse as a 
result; they were then told that if they had stayed with their initial answers, they would 
have done much better. Participants in the control condition received no feedback, only 
their exam grade, which was the same across conditions. The feedback in the downward 
counterfactual thinking condition suggested to students that their better grade was due to 
luck or chance; such a suggestion, then, likely reduced one’s confidence in their ability to 





counterfactual thinking conditions included the same feedback (i.e., that changing exam 
answers was the wrong decision), a negative effect of downward counterfactual thinking 
on self-efficacy would not have been observed. The stimuli used in the present study 
were identical across conditions and they only differed in terms of the concluding 
counterfactual thinking statements.  
The present study also included two upward self-generated counterfactual 
thinking conditions. In the first such condition, after hearing the vignette, participants 
were instructed to fill in sentences with alternative outcomes given that the character in 
the vignette had taken his medication as prescribed. In the second such condition, 
participants were instructed to fill in sentences with alternative behaviors that would undo 
the negative outcome in the vignette (i.e., the character’s health condition worsening). In 
prior work, participants were typically asked to do the latter and fill in statements with 
alternative behaviors (e.g., Baek, Shen, & Reid, 2013; Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003). 
However, in these studies, counterfactual thinking was not used as a persuasive message 
design component. As a result, the behaviors that participants generated were likely not 
of great importance. Here, however, counterfactual thinking was tested as a persuasion 
strategy; thus, it was important to ensure that participants focused on the key behavior 
promoted, that of medication adherence, and this is why a condition in which participants 
generated alternative outcomes if the key behavior had been performed was of interest.  
Both conditions led to increased perceptions of self-efficacy, compared to the 
downward counterfactual thinking conditions, the stated upward counterfactual condition, 
and the control condition. These results are in line with prior research on self-generated 





findings also expand prior work by showing that generating alternative outcomes versus 
alternative actions (which has been the norm in past research) are both effective ways to 
increase self-efficacy. This finding is particularly important for persuasion research and 
practice because it suggests that, as long as individuals engage in upward counterfactual 
thinking, their self-efficacy receives a boost.  
However, it is also possible that this finding is specific to this context and, more 
importantly, to the stimulus used. Specifically, given the vignette participants listened to 
in this study, it is possible that their generation of alternative actions was constrained to 
behaviors related to one’s medication adherence. Indeed, an examination of the 
alternative behaviors that participants typed in shows that the great majority focused on 
medication adherence: “not stopped the pills”; “taken his pills”; “took his doctor’s 
advice”; “taken medicines properly”; “listen to his doctor”. However, this focus on the 
key behavior may not happen when perhaps other behaviors are plausible, as well. For 
instance, in a car accident scenario in which not speeding is the behavior of interest, 
participants may generate alternative behaviors that focus on the other driver or the road 
conditions, rather than on a character’s speeding. To conclude, then, whereas self-
generated upward counterfactual thinking that focuses on undoing behaviors or outcomes 
matters in a persuasion context should be further tested. 
Finally, that self-generated upward counterfactual thinking outperformed stated 
upward counterfactual thinking in increasing perceptions of self-efficacy is a new and 
important finding. In the one study that compared the two methods of engaging 
participants in counterfactual thinking, Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, and Gleicher (2004) 





undo an outcome) and stated upward counterfactual thinking (Experiment 2). In their 
study, participants viewed a three-minute film in which a woman in a wheelchair shared 
how she became paralyzed from waist down after a collision at an intersection due to 
failure to heed a yield sign. Whether participants had to create their own upward 
counterfactual thoughts following instructions or listened to upward counterfactuals as 
uttered by the character in the story, their attitudes toward traffic safety regulations were 
not significantly different. One explanation as to why a difference was not observed was 
perhaps lack of power; Tal-Or et al.’s sample was 61 for a two-condition design.  
Another explanation may reside in the content of the counterfactual thoughts that 
participants generated themselves. It is possible that the thoughts participants generated 
were very diverse (i.e., less congruent with the message) and, thus, overall, their effect on 
attitudes was weaker compared to a situation in which the thoughts would have been 
more focused, as in the present study. Yet, Tal-Or and colleagues (2004) ran a second, 
more stringent analysis in which only participants who generated the right 
counterfactuals were compared to those who were given a stated counterfactual; the 
effect of the two conditions on attitudes was not distinct (the sample for this analysis, 
however, included only 11 cases, suggesting, again, that low power may have underlined 
the findings). Perhaps, then, self-generated versus stated upward counterfactuals have a 
distinct effect on perceptions of self-efficacy, but not on attitudes.    
That self-generated counterfactuals were more effective than stated 
counterfactuals in increasing self-efficacy is not that surprising. Prior research does 
suggest that conclusions drawn by people themselves compared to conclusions given to 





motivated and able to generate their own conclusions (McGuire, 1969). Yet, in a meta-
analysis, O’Keefe (1997) found that persuasive messages that include an explicit 
conclusion are more effective. O’Keefe explains that, when a conclusion is omitted, 
assimilation and contrast effects are likely, such that receivers of the persuasive message 
infer the position of the message to be aligned with their own or more discrepant from 
their own than it actually is. Both these types of inferences reduce message 
persuasiveness because they either reduce the perceived change advocated by the 
message (in the case of assimilation effects) or they create the perception that the 
message is advocating an unacceptable view (in the case of contrast effects) (O’Keefe, 
2002).  
In the present study (and in research on counterfactual thinking overall), however, 
a conclusion was not fully absent in that participants were guided to generate their own 
conclusions. The keyword here is “guided”: individuals’ inferences are constrained to 
counterfactual thinking and participants are given instructions on what kind of thoughts 
to generate, which might explain why persuasion still occurs. Moreover, as noted above, 
participants’ level of involvement is also an important factor. At least in the present 
study, there is reason to believe that participants, who had diabetes themselves, were 
likely involved with the content of the message; hence, their generation of conclusions to 
the message had a higher persuasive effect than when a conclusion was spoon-fed to 
them (McGuire, 1969). 
Counterfactual thinking and response efficacy 
As with self-efficacy, all upward counterfactual thinking conditions significantly 





conditions. This finding is a new one in the persuasion and counterfactual thinking 
literature and it signifies that upward counterfactual thinking is effective at increasing 
both people’s confidence in their ability to perform a behavior and their confidence that 
said behavior will help them avoid or alleviate a threat. In other words, this finding 
suggests that upward counterfactual thinking is a powerful persuasive strategy because 
when both response and self-efficacy are high, behavioral change is more likely to occur 
(Witte, 1992).  
Theoretically, that upward counterfactual thinking increases response efficacy 
suggests that the causal information between the behavior and the outcome contained in 
the counterfactual (i.e., not taking the medication led to his health condition to worsen) 
triggers an expectation of the consequences of that behavior in the future (i.e., not taking 
one’s medication again will result in poorer health) (Roese & Olson, 1995, p. 171). A 
corollary of that expectation is a response efficacy statement: if medication is taken as it 
should be, one’s health will not be affected. It appears, then, that participants engaged in 
a similar thought process.  
The effect of upward counterfactual thinking on response efficacy can also be 
explained drawing from research on message repetition. Specifically, repeated exposure 
to messages about preventing melanoma led to increased response efficacy regarding 
several actions to protect oneself against melanoma (Shi & Smith, 2015). An upward 
counterfactual thought functions as a repetition of the information in that message. The 
story in this study described a person with diabetes who decided to stop taking their 
medication and ends up in the hospital. The upward counterfactual thought at the end of 





response efficacy compared to the downward counterfactual thinking and control 
conditions in which the information was not repeated (“it could have been worse” is not a 
repetition of the information in the message).   
That self-generated counterfactual thinking, compared to stated counterfactual 
thinking, led to higher levels of response efficacy is likely explained by the superior 
persuasive effect of participants generating their own conclusions versus being exposed 
to a message with an explicit conclusion, as stated earlier (McGuire, 1969; Sawyer, 
1988). 
Finally, both self-generated upward counterfactual thinking conditions, relative to 
the downward counterfactual thinking and control conditions, increased response 
efficacy, suggesting again that whether participants undo actions or outcomes does not 
seem to make a difference in this context. 
Counterfactual thinking and outcome expectancy 
Counterfactual thinking had no effects on outcome expectancy, measured here as 
an individual’s expectancy about family and friends’ reactions to their taking the 
medication recommended by the doctor. There are a few potential explanations for this 
lack of effect. First, the messages were focused on the self and did not make any 
reference to families or friends and perhaps participants failed to make that connection 
themselves. Second, participants in this study may simply not think that their medication 
adherence should have any implications for their families and friends, supported by the 
finding that outcome expectancy was not significantly associated with behavioral 
intention. This idea is particularly viable if participants in the study did not regularly 





close proximity to who they consider as family and friends, or did not have family and 
friends. Because these variables were not measured, however, this explanation is tentative 
and future research can help shed light on this issue. 
In retrospect, the items used to measure expectations about friends and family 
may have lacked specificity. For example, one item read “I believe that if I take my 
medication as prescribed by my doctor, my family and friends will trust me more”. 
Perhaps participants did not know how to interpret what “family” meant in this case and, 
as a result, they each had different family members in mind when answering (e.g., 
grandparents, parents, children, a spouse). Or, they may have thought that their family 
members would have trusted them more, but not their friends, and, thus, averaged these 
expectations in answering the question. Using better, more specific measures in future 
studies may show different results. 
Finally, more than half of participants in the study reported having been 
diagnosed with diabetes less than one year ago (and more than six months ago, given that 
individuals who reported having been diagnosed less than six months ago were not 
eligible for participation). Potentially this amount of time of having lived with type 2 
diabetes was not enough for individuals to fully understand the implications of their 
illness for their family and friends and, thus, they may not have considered adhering to 
medication to have an effect on friends and family. 
Counterfactual thinking and behavioral intention 
Past research has found a positive effect of upward counterfactual thinking, 
relative to downward counterfactual thinking, on behavioral intentions (Roese, 1994; 





Whereas such an effect was observed in this study, as well, the effect of counterfactual 
thinking on behavior was largely direct for self-generated counterfactuals (with one 
exception, noted below) and indirect for stated counterfactuals. Concretely, the message 
including stated upward counterfactual thinking statements, compared to the message 
including stated downward counterfactual thinking statements, had an indirect positive 
effect on behavioral intentions to adherence to one’s medication as prescribed, through 
self- and response efficacy; whereas the messages in which participants were instructed 
to generate their own counterfactuals that undo either actions or outcomes, relative to the 
message in which participants were instructed to generate downward counterfactuals, had 
a direct effect on behavioral intentions and no indirect effect through self- or response 
efficacy.  
The lack of indirect effects in the self-generated counterfactual thinking 
conditions was due to self- and response efficacy not being significant predictors of 
behavior, after accounting for experimental condition. Thus, it appears that the 
experimental conditions (and the covariates included in the model) explained all the 
variance there was to explain in behavioral intention and, therefore, self- and response 
efficacy were not significant predictors anymore.  
This post-hoc rationalization was tested in a regression model in which self-
efficacy, response efficacy, and covariates (i.e., doctor-patient communication, gender, 
education) were entered in the first block and experimental condition (self-generated 
upward counterfactual thinking vs. downward counterfactual thinking) was entered in the 
second block. For the self-generated upward counterfactual thinking condition in which 





of behavior in the first regression block (pself-efficacy= .03; presponse efficacy = .59); but fell 
below significance once the experimental condition was controlled for in the second 
block (pself-efficacy= .10; presponse efficacy = .70).  
For the self-generated upward counterfactual thinking condition in which 
participants typed in alternative behaviors, only response efficacy was a significant 
predictor of behavior in the first block (pself-efficacy= .25; presponse efficacy = .001) and the 
second block (pself-efficacy= .37; presponse efficacy = .003). Of note, that response efficacy was a 
significant predictor of behavior in this situation is in agreement with the finding that 
messages in which participants generated alternative behaviors, compared to those in 
which they generated downward counterfactuals, did have an indirect effect on 
behavioral intention, through response efficacy.  
The results were different for the stated upward counterfactual thinking message 
(versus stated downward counterfactual thinking message), such that both self- and 
response efficacy significantly predicted intention in both the first (pself-efficacy= .009; 
presponse efficacy = .001) and in the second regression block (pself-efficacy= .01; presponse efficacy = 
.008); while experimental condition was not a significant predictor of behavioral 
intention (p = .25). Overall, then, these findings support the idea that self-generated 
upward counterfactual thinking, relative to self-generated downward counterfactual 
thinking, is a powerful predictor of behavioral intention and its effect on intention is not 
mediated by self- or response efficacy. Whether other variables mediate the effect of self-
generated CFT on behavioral intention remains a question for future research. 
When comparing effects on behavioral condition of the upward self-generated 





condition, results are ambiguous. When participants were asked to come up with 
alternative outcomes to a given medication adherence behavior, their behavioral intention 
to adhere to medication was higher than that of participants who listened to a message in 
which upward counterfactual thinking statements were explicit. This finding follows the 
results on self-efficacy, suggesting that participants prefer generating their own 
conclusions and are, therefore, more persuaded when they do so (i.e., they report higher 
behavioral intentions to engage in a key behavior). Of note, the outcomes that 
participants generated were similar to the ones given in the stated upward counterfactual 
thinking statements (i.e., my condition wouldn’t have worsened; I would not be in the 
hospital right now): “gotten sick”; “had to go to the ER”; “not ended up in the ER”; 
“made his diabetes worse”; “felt sick”.  
However, when participants were asked to come up with alternative behaviors 
that would lead to a better outcome than the one in the story, their behavioral intention to 
adhere to medication was not different from that of participants who listened to a 
message in which upward counterfactual thinking statements were explicit. This finding 
is in line with Tal-Or and colleagues’ (2004) findings that self-generated versus stated 
upward CFTs do not have a distinct effect on attitudes toward traffic safety regulations. 
However, this result is somewhat surprising, given that, as mentioned previously, 
individuals in the present study by and large typed in behaviors focused on medication 
adherence, as opposed to irrelevant behaviors. So why did not generating one’s own 
conclusions in the form of alternative behaviors (versus being spoon-fed conclusions) 
increase behavioral intentions, as well? The answer is unclear, but it is possible that 





the one in the story found it easier to feel more confident that they were able to perform 
those behaviors (i.e., adhere to medication), but not necessarily more inclined to do so. 
Future research can investigate this issue further. 
Counterfactual thinking and regret 
Regret only moderated the effects of messages including upward stated and self-
generated alternative outcomes CFT (versus downward counterfactual thinking) on self-
efficacy; at high levels of regret, the effect of the condition on self-efficacy failed to 
reach significance. These findings are congruent with those of Arora et al. (2013) who 
found a negative association between regret and self-efficacy in a counterfactual thinking 
context. Relatedly, Sanna (1997) found that experimentally manipulated lower levels of 
self-efficacy reduced the effect of upward CFT on negative affect.  
Regret is an emotion experienced after one has made a bad decision (Zeelenberg 
et al., 1988). Regret is associated with appraisals of personal responsibility and a belief 
that the negative outcome can be rectified through one’s actions (Roseman et al., 1994). 
That regret reduced the effect of upward counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy may be 
an indication that, at high levels of regret, individuals may have also experienced a 
feeling similar to helplessness which, in turn, made them feel less confident in their 
abilities to adhere to medication. In other words, the feeling that they could be 
responsible for aggravating their own illness due to a clearly poor decision (i.e., stopping 
to take one’s pills) may have been so demotivating/demoralizing that their self-efficacy 
took a hit. In Roseman et al.’s study (1994), participants who recalled a past experience 
that has caused them to feel regret, also reported feeling “a sinking feeling”, although 





Furthermore, research also finds that individuals who experience negative 
emotions have an inclination to remember past events that were also negative or that led 
to a negative outcome (LeBlanc, McConnell, & Monteiro, 2015; Maher, 2007). What this 
means is that the regret experienced by participants in this study may have fostered 
remembrance of similar events from their past, to the extent that such events took place 
(of note, about half of the sample reported having experienced health complications due 
to nonadherence, however, participants may have recalled negative medication-related 
experiences other than their own). The recollection of past negative events in addition to 
the negative content of the stimulus participants were exposed to may have been 
overwhelming, creating a feeling of helplessness which hampered the positive effect of 
upward counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy. A more thorough investigation into what 
appraisals associated with regret impact self-efficacy could be pursued in future research. 
That regret only moderated the effect of stated counterfactuals and that of self-
generated outcomes (and not self-generated behaviors) on self-efficacy is intriguing. Both 
of these conditions clearly stated the bad decision that led to the negative outcome, i.e., 
the character not taking his medication as prescribed. In the stated upward counterfactual 
thinking condition, the message ended with statements such as “I couldn’t help but think 
that if only I had taken my medication as prescribed, I would have been fine! If only I 
had taken my medication as prescribed, my condition wouldn’t have worsened”. 
Similarly, in the self-generated outcomes condition, the sentences that participants were 
asked to fill in with outcomes other than the ones in the story they listened to, began as 
follows: “if only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have _____”. The 





which this bad decision was, of course, omitted: “If only the character had _____, his 
illness wouldn’t have gotten worse”. Although the majority of participants in this 
condition wrote in behaviors related to taking one’s medication, it seems that the effects 
of the regret experienced were different; regret moderated the effect of the experimental 
condition on self-efficacy only when the bad decision was explicitly given to participants. 
Yet, although this observation explains why effects were observed with the stated and 
self-generated outcomes conditions, it does not explain why such effects occurred and, as 
mentioned above, further investigations are needed to understand the phenomenon.  
Although rooted in theory, the prediction that regret would enhance the effects of 
upward counterfactual thinking messages (versus downward counterfactual thinking 
messages) on behavioral intention was not supported by data in this research. Studies on 
regret have found that experiencing this emotion motivates behavior that corrects or 
alleviates the negative outcome that caused the feeling of regret (Roseman et al., 1994).  
Indeed, regret was significantly and positively correlated with behavioral 
intention, albeit that correlation was modest (Pearson’s r = .195, p < .001). However, 
regret did not predict behavioral intention (p = .26 for the stated upward counterfactual 
thinking versus downward counterfactual thinking conditions; p = .07 for the self-
generated outcomes versus self-generated downward counterfactual thinking conditions; 
p = .05 for the self-generated actions versus self-generated downward counterfactual 
thinking conditions, yet the 95% confidence interval was very close to including zero, 
[.002; .41]). It is not clear why, but perhaps these findings are context-specific and regret 





It is also possible that higher levels of regret are necessary to motivate behavior 
(i.e., activate action tendencies). The average levels of regret across upward 
counterfactual thinking conditions were below 3.8 on a scale from 1 to 7 (i.e., 3.78 for the 
stated upward counterfactual thinking condition; 3.17 for the self-generated alternative 
outcomes condition; and 3.57 for the self-generated alternative behaviors condition). 
Perhaps participants were not too uncomfortable at these levels of regret and did not need 
to consider engaging in reparatory actions; for regret, such actions would involve taking 
one’s medication as prescribed to correct the negative outcome that occurred due to not 
taking one’s medication as prescribed.  
Regarding why experienced regret was not higher, it is possible that the vignettes 
were not as effective as expected. It is also possible that asking participants to rate their 
experience of regret lowered its levels, as there is research to suggest that linguistic 
processing of emotions (i.e., labeling) reduces emotional reactivity (Lieberman, 
Eisenberger, Crockett, Tom, Pfeifer, & Way, 2007). Utilizing other methods for 
measuring the experience of regret (e.g., the use of a dial that participants can turn up and 
down depending on the level of regret experienced) could circumvent this issue and lead 
to different findings than the ones reported here.  
Overall, then, experiment 3 provides support for the effectiveness of 








Chapter 8: General Discussion   
 
This final chapter discusses the findings across experiments 1, 2, and 3. First, the 
discussion of findings from experiments 1, 2, and 3 is briefly reiterated. Second, the 
differences observed among the three experiments is discussed. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a summary of theoretical and practical implications derived from the 
findings, limitations of the current research, and directions for future research. 
Experiments 1 and 2 
 Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find an effect of counterfactual thinking on efficacy 
perceptions and behavioral intentions to take one’s medication as prescribed for patients 
with type 2 diabetes and hypertension. None of the counterfactual thinking conditions 
(stated integral or incidental) led to different efficacy perceptions and behavioral 
intention when compared to the control condition or when compared with one another. It 
is possible that counterfactual thinking is not an efficient persuasive message design 
strategy in the context of medication adherence.  
It is also possible that self-generated, as opposed to stated counterfactual thinking, 
is more effective at changing efficacy perceptions and behavioral intentions. Prior studies 
that have investigated the persuasive role of counterfactual thinking in health contexts 
(Baek et al., 2013; Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003; Tal-Or et al., 2004) and have found 
persuasive effects of counterfactual thinking used primarily self-generated counterfactual 
thinking or a combination of integral stated and self-generated counterfactual thinking. 





they draw themselves (so, similar to generating a counterfactual thought) compared to 
conclusions given to them in a persuasion message (Sawyer, 1988), thus, suggesting that 
self-generated counterfactual thoughts, as opposed to stated ones, could be more 
persuasive. However, findings from experiment 3, discussed below, suggest that both 
stated and self-generated upward CFTs are persuasive, relative to downward CFT or no 
CFT, although self-generated upward CFTs seem to have a persuasive advantage over 
stated CFT. 
It is also possible that factors other than the consequences of not taking one’s 
medication/ the importance of taking one’s medication and one’s ability to take 
medication as prescribed are more efficient at increasing medication adherence. Such 
factors include fear of side effects, misperception of side effects, lack of interest in 
managing one’s illness perhaps due to depression, or medication cost (Garcia-Perez, 
Alvarez, Dilla, Gil-Guillen, & Beltran, 2013; Gazmararian, Kripalani, Miller, Echt, Ren, 
& Rask, 2006; Kreps et al., 2011; Mann, Ponieman, Leventhal, & Halm, 2007). In other 
words, other counterfactual thinking-based message contents that address some of these 
factors may be more effective at increasing medication adherence. 
Another potential reason for the non-significant findings in experiments 1 and 2 
may have been the counterfactual thinking manipulation itself. Specifically, the messages 
used in the studies included only one counterfactual thinking statement and it is possible 
that participants failed to notice and, thus, process it. Prior studies included multiple 
counterfactual thinking statements (i.e., asked participants to generated multiple 
counterfactual thoughts: Baek et al., 2013; Nan, 2008; Page & Colby, 2003; included one 





an additional counterfactual thought after message exposure: Tal-Or et al., 2004). Thus, 
designing messages that include more than one counterfactual thought, either by asking 
participants to generate their own counterfactual thoughts or by stating multiple such 
thoughts as part of the message, may be a more powerful manipulation, as shown in 
experiment 3. 
The sample recruited for experiments 1 and 2 may also underlie the lack of 
significant findings. Specifically, participants self-reported their risk for nonadherence 
and were, perhaps, dishonest. If participants were not at risk for nonadherence, the 
messages they were exposed to could do little to change their already positive efficacy 
perceptions and behavioral intentions (as evidenced by the high average ratings for all 
dependent variables). Medication adherent individuals may have approached the 
messages from a disinterested perspective and thought that the messages were applicable 
to others rather than themselves. As a result, the messages had no differential effect on 
their efficacy perceptions and behavioral intentions.  
Finally, it is also argued that participants may not have engaged with the message 
content due to the format of the message (i.e., text). Given that the two experiments were 
conducted online, participants may have easily chosen to skip reading the messages or 
quickly skim through, undermining any potential persuasive effect from manifesting. 
Utilizing formats other than text (e.g., audio or video) may foster information processing 







The purpose of experiment 3 was to provide an additional test of the effect of 
counterfactual thinking on medication adherence. This experiment was designed in light 
of the issues identified with experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, experiment 3 incorporated 
a stronger manipulation in the form of two counterfactual thinking statements at the end 
of each message (as opposed to just one such statement which may easily be overlooked 
by participants); a manipulation check to verify if the messages (i.e., counterfactual 
thoughts) were perceived as intended; several attention checks to verify participant 
engagement; and three self-generated counterfactual thinking conditions (given that prior 
research finding strong effects of counterfactual thinking on persuasion-related outcomes 
almost exclusively looked at self-generated counterfactual thoughts). Finally, messages in 
experiment 3 were in audio format to facilitate information processing (Stanczyk et al., 
2016). By strengthening the experimental design in this manner, if the results again failed 
to show an effect of counterfactual thinking on medication adherence-related factors, the 
conclusion that counterfactual thinking does not have a persuasive effect in this health 
context would be stronger.  
Several of the hypothesized findings in experiment 3 were significant. These 
results tentatively rule out the conclusion that counterfactual thinking is not an effective 
persuasive strategy when the goal is to increase chronic illness patients’ intention to take 
their medication as prescribed and their self- and response efficacy related to medication 
adherence.  
The effects observed were rather robust across experimental conditions, such that, 





clearly more persuasive than messages including downward counterfactual thinking (self-
generated and stated) or control messages (no counterfactual thinking). Specifically, 
messages including upward counterfactual thinking led to increased intentions to take 
one’s medication as prescribed, increased self-efficacy, and increased response efficacy; 
counterfactual thinking had no effect on outcome expectancy (measured as an 
individual’s expectations about his/her family’s and friends’ reactions to his/her taking 
their medication as prescribed). The indirect effects of counterfactual thinking on 
intention through self- and response efficacy were less homogeneous across experimental 
conditions; likewise, the moderating effects of regret on the relationship between the 
experimental condition and self-efficacy, response efficacy and behavioral intention were 
not consistent across conditions.  
Experiment 3 versus Experiments 1 and 2 
Sample characteristics 
One could argue that the significant results observed in experiment 3 may be 
sample specific, given that findings for experiments 1 and 2 were largely non-significant. 
However, quite a few relevant participant characteristics were controlled for in the 
analyses, meaning that differences in such characteristics between the sample recruited 
for experiment 3 versus the samples in experiments 1 and 2 do not account for the 
different findings. Furthermore, the individuals with type 2 diabetes who participated in 
experiment 1 and experiment 3 were overall demographically similar. All participants 
were recruited using the same platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk, and were screened for 





years old (Mexperiment1 = 36.65 years old; Mexperiment3 = 37.43 years old); predominantly 
women (57.8% in experiment 1; 52.5% in experiment 3) and white (69.3% in experiment 
1; 68.0% in experiment 3). In both experiments, around 75% of participants reported 
having some college education or being college graduates (75.6% in experiment 1; 74.9% 
in experiment 3). Income levels were also similar, although a larger percentage of 
participants in experiment 3 reported income levels between $65,001 and $100,000 
(19.5% compared to 17.9% in experiment 1) and over $100.000 (9.6% compared to 5.9% 
in experiment 1).  
The largest difference between the two samples was that more participants in 
experiment 1 reported having been diagnosed with diabetes longer compared to 
experiment 3; specifically, only 28.8% of participants in experiment 1 reported having 
been diagnosed with diabetes less than a year ago, whereas 57.8% of participants in 
experiment 3 reported having been diagnosed with diabetes less than a year ago. 
However, this variable was controlled for in the analyses. Relatedly, fewer participants in 
experiment 3, compared to participants in experiment 1, said they experienced health 
complications (49.5% compared to 65.4% in experiment 1) or had been hospitalized due 
to nonadherence (15.9% versus 30.4% in experiment 1). It is possible, then, that 
participants in experiment 3 were more receptive to messages depicting health 
complications and hospitalization, whereas participants in experiment 1 who have lived 
through these events may have dismissed them as not that terrifying. Again, though, these 







A more plausible explanation of the difference of effects in experiment 1 versus 
experiment 3, then, lies in the study design modifications. Specifically, experiment 3 
incorporated audio messages; two rather than one counterfactual thinking statements at 
the end of each message (with the exception of the control); manipulation checks to 
ensure the messages were perceived as intended; and several strategic attention checks to 
help identify participants who may not have engaged with the study content. Of note, the 
manipulation check questions were asked after measuring the dependent variables in the 
study, therefore, they should not have affected how participants rated the dependent 
variables. Yet, because these changes were not incremental, it is hard to tell which one in 
particular led to the experimental manipulation being successful. However, each of these 
changes has important implications that deserve consideration.  
Audio versus text messages. Research on whether text versus audio messages are 
more engaging is scarce. As previously mentioned, existing evidence does suggest an 
advantage of audio messages over text (Stanczyk, De Vries, Candel, Muris, & Bolman, 
2016) and even audio-video (Muller & Cameron, 2014). Yet, whether the differences 
observed in the cited studies are robust across contexts is a question for future research. 
The present study adds to this body of literature and raises the question of whether text-
based communication efforts to raise medication adherence, such as mHealth or text 
messaging, should be compared to interventions in which medication adherence 
information is transmitted in different formats, such as audio or video. Existing 
systematic analyses of mobile messaging interventions primarily focus on comparing 





generic content (Finitsis, Pellowski, & Johnson, 2014); or reminders versus motivational 
content (Park, Howie-Esquivel, & Dracup, 2014)) rather than comparing between 
different formats such as audio versus text.  
Of note, individuals participating in mHealth interventions likely self-select into 
these efforts. For example, patients who desire to be reminded to refill their prescriptions 
by CVS pharmacy opt into this service, it is not imposed on them (m.cvs.com). Perhaps 
choosing to be part of a service that helps maintain one’s medication adherence means 
that individuals are more motivated to engage with the content sent to them via text than 
if they had not chosen to be part of that service. Yet, the fact that one opts into these 
services may also mean that only individuals who are already aware about the importance 
of medication adherence and are motivated to follow their doctor’s advice self-select into 
this task, but this is an empirical question, as well. 
Number of counterfactual thinking statements. Multiple counterfactual 
thinking statements (given to or generated by participants) may be necessary to observe 
an effect of counterfactual thinking on perceptions and behavioral intention. This idea, 
although not explicitly tested in prior research, does find support in other studies in which 
researchers included multiple counterfactual thinking statements in their messages (Tal-
Or et al., 2004). Why this may be the case is unclear. It is possible that in experimental 
designs in which participants are prompted to read or listen to a message, they need more 
time and context to process counterfactual thinking compared to an everyday life 
situation in which they naturally engage in such thinking and one counterfactual thought 
may suffice. Relatedly, research on message repetition finds that repeated exposure to 





Therefore, the use of multiple CFT statements in persuasive messages may be more 
effective than including just one such statement.  
Attention checks. Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema (2013) found that attention 
checks are particularly useful when conducting studies on the MTurk platform. Their 
results suggested that MTurk participants are not as motivated as other samples (e.g., 
student samples) to engage in cognitive processing. They recommend that for studies, 
that require participants to pay careful attention to materials and instructions, researchers 
use attention checks to improve statistical power and reduce Type II error. Goodman and 
colleagues do not discuss how such attentions checks should look like, but do suggest 
that attention checks placed at the end of the survey may be missed due to fatigue rather 
than inattentiveness and that attention questions that require factual answers might 
prompt internet searches among participants.  
The attention checks in the current study were positioned early on in the survey 
(before its midpoint) and required that participants answered using either information 
from the stimuli or by following instructions. Therefore, it is quite possible that these 
attention checks were successful in screening out participants who did not engage with 
the information or who rushed through the survey without paying attention and, as a 
result, in increasing statistical power. Future research could compare online experiments 
in which attention checks are and are not used, as well as types of attention checks and 
positioning within the experiment. Findings from such studies would help researchers 







This research makes several important theoretical contributions to both the 
counterfactual thinking literature and the field of health communication. First, this 
research is one of the few to combine persuasion and counterfactual thinking. Although a 
heavily studied matter in some domains of the social sciences (e.g., psychology, political 
sciences, decision making), counterfactual thinking has received less attention in the 
communication discipline. Given counterfactuals’ influence on a variety of processes and 
factors of relevance to persuasion, research in this area represents an opportunity to 
expand our knowledge.  
Using a controlled experimental design, this research provides evidence that 
messages including upward counterfactual thinking, relative to messages including 
downward counterfactual thinking and no counterfactual thinking (control), are an 
effective persuasive strategy to increase medication adherence self- and response 
efficacy, and behavioral intention to take one’s medication as prescribed. Persuasive 
effects are observed with both stated and self-generated counterfactual thinking 
messages, with a slight persuasive advantage of the latter over the former. Findings also 
suggest that more than one counterfactual thinking statement may be necessary to 
persuade individuals.  
Furthermore, although not explicitly measured in the studies presented here, that 
persuasive effects of counterfactual thinking were observed only with audio versus text 
messages suggests that facilitating cognitive processing of the messages by the recipients 





might be more relevant for stated rather than self-generated counterfactual thinking, 
given that cognitive engagement can likely be assumed with self-generated counterfactual 
thoughts and future research can test this possibility. 
This research is also the first to provide evidence for an effect of messages 
including counterfactual thinking on response efficacy, an important persuasive message-
related variable (Witte, 1992). Third, this research is also one of the few to compare 
stated with self-generated counterfactual thinking as a message design strategy (the only 
other study in which the two types of CFT were compared is Tal-Or et al.’s (2004)); in 
doing so, a new method of generating counterfactual thoughts was introduced in 
experiment 3 (i.e., by undoing outcomes versus behaviors). Findings showed that both 
methods were overall superior to the stated counterfactual thinking condition in directly 
increasing self-efficacy and response efficacy; and that the self-generated alternative 
outcomes upward CFT condition increased behavioral intentions more than did the 
upward CFT condition.  
This research extends prior work that has found a positive effect of counterfactual 
thinking on self-efficacy in an educational context to a health context (medication 
adherence). Finally, this research also shows that regret limits the persuasive effect of 
both stated and self-generated upward counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy.  
Practical implications 
From a practical perspective, this research adds to the thin body of literature on 
effective message design for increasing medication adherence; it proposes and formally 
tests a theory-grounded model of counterfactual thinking-based persuasive 





increased motivation to take one’s medication as prescribed is a valuable finding, given 
that, for a significant number of patients, medication nonadherence is a lack of 
motivation issue, above everything else. Prior research provides little insight into how to 
motivate people to take their medication (with a few notable exceptions, Krebs et al., 
2015; Kreps et al., 2011; and Zhao et al., 2012). This study provides an additional theory 
grounded message design strategy that can be incorporated in more complex health 
interventions as a tool for improving people’s motivation to adhere to their medication 
therapy.  
Counterfactual thinking can also be employed by health care providers in their 
conversations with patients. For example, health care providers could use upward 
counterfactual thinking statements when explaining the importance of treatment 
adherence to their patients or they could invite patients to engage in such thinking 
themselves given that self-generated counterfactual thinking statements appear to be 
more effective. A similar strategy can be used by pharmacists, as well, when they 
dispense medicine to patients. Moreover, some pharmacies initiate reminder phone 
calls/voice messages when a patient’s medication is due for a refill. Such call could easily 
include counterfactual thinking statements to motivate patients to go get their medication 
refill. 
Of note, it is possible that counterfactual thinking-based persuasive 
communication is effective at increasing adherence to certain types of medications versus 
others. For example, CFT messages may backfire if targeting adherence to medications 
associated with stigma, such as antidepressants or PrEP (HIV medicines taken daily to 





be perceived as blaming the individuals for their condition and, thus, lead to the 
experience of guilt, shame, or anger among these already stigmatized individuals. Such 
feelings, together with the perception of being blamed, might reduce willingness to 
adhere to treatment further. Future research could explore how CFT messages work 
across various types of medicines. 
Research Limitations 
This research is not without limitations. This research could be improved by 
collecting data at multiple points in time. That way, the long-term effect of counterfactual 
thinking-based persuasive messages could be assessed. Also, the impact and 
generalizability of the proposed model would be more rigorously assessed if tested with 
other chronic illnesses; this is particularly relevant, given that experiment 3 only included 
type 2 diabetes patients.  
Regarding sampling, although a screener was used to recruit participants, it is 
possible that some individuals were dishonest in order to qualify for the study and receive 
the incentive, given that completing studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk serves as a job 
for some. Replicating this study using a different recruitment strategy that more 
rigorously assesses one’s illness status (i.e., a diabetes clinic database) and risk for 
nonadherence (e.g., pill counts, pharmacy databases) would be useful.  
This research also has a few design-related limitations. Experiments administered 
over the internet have been criticized for lacking control and precision (Ferrer, Grenen, & 
Taber, 2015; Skitka & Sargis, 2006). When experiments are conducted online versus in a 
laboratory, researchers cannot ensure that all participants are completing the tasks under 





other people) or that they are fully engaged with the experiment content and understand 
instructions (Ferrer, Grenen, & Taber, 2015). However, there is research to suggest that 
online experiments have results similar to laboratory-based experiments (Berinsky, 
Huber, & Lenz, 2012). Yet, replicating the present study using a laboratory-based 
experiment would increase confidence in the results.  
With regard to experiment 3, the design changes (i.e., message format, number of 
counterfactual thinking statements, attention checks) were not incorporated 
incrementally, making it hard to establish what modification was responsible for the 
findings as compared to experiments 1 and 2. Also, the messages in experiment 3 were 
narrated by a man and it is possible that participants may have reacted differently to a 
woman’s voice or if the voice narrating the message would have been matched to each 
participant’s gender. Future research can explore this possibility. 
Actual medication adherence behavior was not measured in this research. 
Therefore, whether the behavioral intention increase due to counterfactual thinking 
observed translates into actual behavior is uncertain. Future studies, particularly if 
designed longitudinally, could assess actual behavior instead. 
Another limitation of the studies reported here is that involuntary medication 
nonadherence was not measured. Specifically, the study measures did not include items 
about medication cost, access to healthcare, or forgetting to take one’s medication. It is 
possible that participants in the study, in addition to lacking motivation to take one’s 
medication (i.e., voluntary nonadherence), also encountered cost-, healthcare access-, or 
memory-related barriers. Regarding cost, participants’ income was measured and used as 





adequate funds can be allocated for purchasing medication, as individuals may have 
additional expenses that they prioritize over their treatment.  
Finally, participants in this research were not asked about other chronic illnesses 
they may have had. Given that 42 percent of Americans had more than one chronic 
condition in 2014 (Buttorff, Ruder, & Bauman, 2017), it is likely that participants in any 
of the three experiments reported here may have been dealing with more than just type 2 
diabetes or hypertension. If that were the case, the complexity of their overall medication 
regimen may have affected their adherence intentions and efficacy perceptions.  
Future Research 
In addition to the future research directions already mentioned in the limitations 
and discussion of findings sections above, subsequent studies should apply this model to 
other health contexts (e.g., smoking, exercising, eating habits). That way, the 
generalizability of the persuasive message design strategy proposed here is tested across 
health domains. 
Also, future research could directly compare text, audio, and video messages, as 
well as the underlying mechanisms responsible for potential differential effects (e.g., 
information processing type – heuristic or systematic; identification with the character in 
the message; message perceived vividness or credibility). 
Comparing various message contents that conclude with a related counterfactual 
thought would also be useful. As already mentioned, in addition to beliefs about 
medication adherence and one’s ability to take the medication as prescribed, barriers such 
as fear of side effects or perceived side effects are common. Messages that address such 





motivating adherence for some individuals. Specifically, matching the message content to 
individuals’ stated reasons for nonadherence may increase persuasiveness. There is 
research to suggest that matching message content to individuals’ characteristics 
increases persuasiveness (e.g., Carpenter, 2012; Latimer et al., 2008). In the present 
research, although participants reported on a series of items measuring risk for 
nonadherence, the messages they were exposed to were not tailored to those items that 
were rated the highest by a particular individual. Rather, all messages addressed the 
negative consequences of not taking one’s medication as prescribed, and, through that, 
underlined the importance of taking one’s medication as prescribed.  
Related to different message contents, testing the interaction between 
counterfactual thinking and emotions other than regret is also a direction for future 
research. Specifically, persuasion scholars note that, when one’s behavior may harm 
other people and that behavior is under one’s control, guilt appeals are an efficient 
strategy to elicit change (Turner, 2012). For example, not taking one’s medication could 
affect other people such as loved ones if an individual’s condition worsens as a result of 
nonadherence and results in financial or psychological burden for one’s family. A 
message depicting this scenario would likely lead to the experience of guilt. Research on 
counterfactual thinking and guilt finds that individuals experiencing guilt are prone to 
generating counterfactuals that undo actions (e.g., if only I had taken my medication) 
(Niedenthal et al., 1994), suggesting that a guilt appeal followed by such a counterfactual 
could be a strong persuasive strategy. However, guilt appeals can also lead to high 





the audience prior to using guilt-based messages is necessary (Bessarabova, Turner, Fink, 
& Blustein, 2015).  
Finally, counterfactual thinking-based messages should be incorporated in a 
multicomponent intervention aimed at increasing medication adherence. Whereas 
effective persuasive communication is important for persuading and motivating people to 
take their drugs, medication nonadherence is a complex issue that necessitates a 






















Appendix A. Proposed stimuli for experiments 1 and 2 
Integral upward counterfactual condition 
I have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication that I took for a while and then decided that I didn’t need it. So I stopped 
taking it, thinking that I will be alright. But today I stated feeling really bad and I had to 
go to the emergency room. The doctors there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got 
worse.  
Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that if only I had taken my medication 
as prescribed, I wouldn’t be in the emergency room! 
Integral downward counterfactual condition 
I have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication that I took for a while and then decided that I didn’t need it. So I stopped 
taking it, thinking that I will be alright. But today I stated feeling really bad and I had to 
go to the emergency room. The doctors there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got 
worse.  
Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that at least I didn’t die! 
Incidental upward counterfactual condition 
I have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication that I took for a while and then decided that I didn’t need it. So I stopped 
taking it, thinking that I will be alright. But today I stated feeling really bad and I had to 






Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that if only I had my dog with me, I 
wouldn’t feel so bored! 
Incidental downward counterfactual condition 
I have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication that I took for a while and then decided that I didn’t need it. So I stopped 
taking it, thinking that I will be alright. But today I stated feeling really bad and I had to 
go to the emergency room. The doctors there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got 
worse.  
Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that at least now I have a reason not to 
attend that dreadful work meeting tomorrow! 
Control condition 
I have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication that I took for a while and then decided that I didn’t need it. So I stopped 
taking it, thinking that I will be alright. But today I stated feeling really bad and I had to 
















Appendix B. Revised Stimuli for experiments 1 and 2 
Integral upward counterfactual condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that if only I had taken my medication 
as prescribed, my condition wouldn’t have worsened! 
Integral downward counterfactual condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
Now here I am, lying on a hospital bed, thinking that at least I didn’t die! 
Incidental upward counterfactual condition 
A few months ago, I bought a laptop. I decided to go for a cheaper one and save some 
money. But the laptop I ended up buying is very slow, it often freezes and then I need to 





I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
Incidental downward counterfactual condition 
A few months ago, I bought a laptop. I decided to go for a cheaper one and save some 
money. But the laptop I ended up buying is very slow, it often freezes and then I need to 
restart it. Oh well, at least I have a laptop to use for my work! 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
Control condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 





Appendix C. Institutional Review Board Application Materials for Experiments 1 
and 2 
 
Initial Application Part  
 
1. Abstract:   
 
Chronic illnesses among the most common, costly, and preventable of all health problems 
in the United States. After an individual has been diagnosed with a chronic illness, he/she 
must follow a doctor-recommended course of treatment in order to manage their 
condition and avoid medical complications. Adherence to treatment, however, is low and 
understanding how to effectively communicate to patients about the importance of 
treatment is important. This study tries to understand how individuals with type 2 
diabetes or hypertension, two major chronic illnesses that have low treatment adherence, 
process and react to information about treatment adherence. The goal of this study is to 
offer advice on how to effectively communicate with patients about treatment adherence 
in order to maximize their willingness to follow said treatment.  
 
2. Subject Selection: 
 
a. Recruitment: Participants for this study will be recruited via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk.  
 
b. Eligibility Criteria:  In order to be eligible for this study, individuals must 1) be at 
least 18 years of age; 2) have been diagnosed with either type 2 diabetes or 
hypertension in the past 6 months; 3) not be pregnant or 3 months postpartum (for 
female participants); and 4) be at risk for treatment nonadherence. 
 
c. Rationale: This study focuses on effective communication about treatment 
adherence for type 2 diabetes and hypertension. Thus, individuals who participate 
in the study must have one of these 2 conditions. The 6 month cutoff has been 
chosen based on the literature which suggests that individuals give up treatment 
starting 6 months after they have been diagnosed with a chronic condition. 
Pregnant women or women within 3 months from having given birth are excluded 
because it is common for these patients to not take chronic illness medication 
during this time period due to its potential negative effects on the fetus/on the 
baby through breastfeeding. Finally, this study focuses on individuals who are at 
risk for not adhering to their treatment; therefore, following recommendations 
from prior literature, it is necessary that only individuals who present such risks 
are included in our study in order to determine the effectiveness of the 
communications tested. Including individuals who are not at risk for 






d. Enrollment Numbers: A total of 100 participants will be recruited for the pilot 
study and a total of 1000 participants will be recruited for the main study.  
 
e. Rationale for Enrollment Numbers: The aim of the pilot study is to make sure 
that the communications tested in the main study are readable, easy to understand, 
relevant to this group of patients. The pilot study will also be used to estimate 
how much time on average is needed to read the communications tested. Thus, 
given the descriptive nature of the pilot study, 100 participants represents an 
appropriate number.  
 
For the main study, the number of participants has been established based on 
statistical power calculations. 1000 participants ensures enough statistical power 
to make accurate inferences. By setting a maximum number of participants, the 
survey software used (Qualtrics) will automatically stop collecting data once 1000 




A quasi-experiment will be conducted online to test the hypotheses. In the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk participant recruitment system, the study will be introduced as a study 
that investigates patients’ reactions to communications discussing adherence to treatment 
for chronic illnesses. Once participants identify themselves as eligible and agree to 
participate, they will be redirected to an online survey webpage hosted by Qualtrics.  
 
The research presents no risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which 
written consent is normally required outside of the research context. The study will be 
conducted using Qualtics survey software. Participants will be able to complete the study 
from their personal computers. 
 
After signing the consent form, participants will report if they have type 2 diabetes or 
hypertension and will be assigned to the corresponding health condition group. Within 
each of these two groups, participants will be randomly assigned to one of the five 
experimental conditions. The five experimental conditions are the same, with the 
exception of a concluding statement. They will all describe the story of a patient who has 
decided not to take their medication as prescribed because he/she thought that the 
medication wasn’t necessary. As a result, the patient finds himself/herself in the 
emergency room. There, the doctor tells him/her that their chronic illness has worsened 
significantly. Depending upon the experimental condition, the story will end with one of 
the following statements: 1) If only I had taken my medication, I wouldn’t be here right 
now.; 2) At least I didn’t die!; 3) If only I had my dog with me here, I wouldn’t feel so 
bored.; 4) At least now I have a reason not to attend that dreadful work meeting 
tomorrow!; 5) no statement. 
 
Each of these communications will be showed to participants as black text on a white 









Participants in the pilot study will report demographic information. After that, they will 
rate the message they read in terms of readability, comprehension, relevance, 
effectiveness. They will also provide qualitative feedback about what should be changed 
about the message in order to make it more relevant and easy to understand for other 
patients like them. The pilot study should take no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
Following Amazon Mechanical Turk guidelines, participants in the pilot study will 
received 50 cents for their participation. The compensation will be handled through the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk system. An amendment application will be submitted to revise 
the messages (if necessary) based on the results of the pilot study. 
 
Main Study 
Participants in the main study will report demographic information. After that, 
participants will report on the emotions they felt while reading the story, their self-
efficacy to take their medication as prescribed, their beliefs that the recommendation to 
take their medication is effective in managing their illness, and their intentions to take 
their medication as prescribed at the time of the study and in the future. Participants will 
also answer questions regarding the length of their disease, their communication with 
their health care provider, the side effects of their medications, and others. The main 
study should take approximately 25 minutes to complete. Following Amazon Mechanical 
Turk guidelines, participants in the main study will receive $1 for their participation. The 








There are no direct benefits to participants. We are hoping that this study will add 
knowledge to how to effectively communicate to chronic illness patients about the 




The researchers will not have any direct way of linking participants' responses to their 
identity, so the information they provide will be confidential. If the online survey system 
returns IP addresses or other identifying information, it will be immediately deleted. Only 
approved researchers will have access to the data collected. Data collected will be stored 
in a password-protected computer in a limited access space. The data will be retained for 






7. Consent Process: 
 
The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not 
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. 
 
Participants will be presented an online consent form after they click the link of the 
survey via the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. 
 
This study needs a waiver of physical signed consent. Participants’ rights and welfare 
will not be violated by the waiver of consent. 
 
Participants will give their consent online by clicking a button saying, "I agree to 
participate in this study". Participants will have the ability to print a copy of the consent 
form for their records. 
 
Because the study involves an online survey, it could not have been conducted without 
the alteration of consent. 
 
Participation in the study will be voluntary. If they withdraw or decline participation, 
they will not be penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the study. If they 
decide to participate, they may decline to answer any question and may choose to 
withdraw at any time. 
If participants have any questions or concerns about the study, participants may contact 
the principal investigator whose name and email address will be specified on the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk system and the consent form. 
 
8. Conflict of Interest: 
  
No conflict of interest. 
 


















Your Initial Application must include a completed Initial Application Part 1 
(On-Line Document), the information required in items 1-11 above, and all 
relevant supporting documents including: consent forms, letters sent to recruit 
participants, questionnaires completed by participants, and any other material that 
will be presented, viewed or read to human subject participants. 
 
For funded research, a copy of the Awarded Grant Application (minus the 
budgetary information) must be uploaded.  If the Grant has not been awarded at 
the time of submission of this Initial Application, a statement must be added to 
the Abstract Section stating that an Addendum will be submitted to include the 
Grant Application once it has been awarded. 
 
 
THE IRB OFFICE WILL NO LONGER STAMP CONSENT 
FORMS.  THE CONSENT FORMS IN YOUR APPROVED 
IRBNET PACKET MUST BE USED.  THESE ARE YOUR 
























Consent form pilot study 
 
Project Title 
 Communicating about treatment adherence for chronic illness. 





This research is being conducted by Irina Iles and Xiaoli Nan at the 
University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you to 
participate in this research project because you have a chronic 
illness.  The purpose of this research project is to understand how 
individuals with chronic illness process and react to information 





The procedures involve a 10 minutes computer-based study. You will 
read a short story about a person who has the same chronic illness 
you have and who decides not to take their medication. Then, you 
will provide basic demographic information and answer a few 
questions that assess your reactions to the story you read. Sample 
questions include: 
The story I just read grasped my attention immediately.  
The story I just read was easy to understand. 
 
You will be compensated with 50 cents for your participation. The 
compensation will be provided to you via the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk System.  
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study. 
Specifically, the story you will read might make you feel some 
discomfort because it will depict a person who shares your chronic 
illness.   
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits from participating in this research. 
However, we hope that, in the future, other people might benefit 
from this study through improved understanding of how to best 










Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing 
data in a password protected computer in a locked office. Hard 
copy materials will be stored in a locked office. For an online 
survey, we will immediately delete any identifying information like 
IP address after the data have been collected. 
Only approved researchers will have access to the data you provide.  
 
If we write a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your 
information may be shared with representatives of the University of 
Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or 




You will receive 50 cents.  You will be responsible for any taxes 
assessed on the compensation.   
 
If you will earn $100 or more as a research participant in this study, 
you must provide your name, address and SSN to receive 
compensation. 
 
If you do not earn over $100 only your name and address will be 
collected to receive compensation. 
 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not 
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise 
qualify.  
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to 
the research, please contact the investigator:  
Irina Iles 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
0107 Skinner Building 







Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your online consent by clicking the radio button below indicates that 
you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or 
have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your 
satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
study. You will receive a copy of this consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please choose the radio button “I agree 


















Consent form experiments 1 and 2 
 
Project Title 
 Communicating about treatment adherence for chronic illness. 





This research is being conducted by Irina Iles and Xiaoli Nan at the 
University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you to 
participate in this research project because you have a chronic 
illness.  The purpose of this research project is to understand how 
individuals with chronic illness process and react to information 





The procedures involve a 25 minutes computer-based study. You will 
read a short story about a person who has a chronic illness like you 
and who decides not to take their medication. Then, you will provide 
basic demographic information and answer a few questions that 
assess your reactions to the story you read. Sample questions 
include: 
I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will 
help me stay healthy.  
How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you feel 
you do not need it? 
 
You will be compensated with $1 for your participation. The 
compensation will be provided to you via the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk System.  
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study. 
Specifically, the story you will read might make you feel some 
discomfort because it will depict a person who shares your chronic 
illness.   
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits from participating in this research. 
However, we hope that, in the future, other people might benefit 
from this study through improved understanding of how to best 










Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing 
data in a password protected computer in a locked office. Hard 
copy materials will be stored in a locked office. For an online 
survey, we will immediately delete any identifying information like 
IP address after the data have been collected. 
Only approved researchers will have access to the data you provide.  
 
If we write a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your 
information may be shared with representatives of the University of 
Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or 




You will receive $1.  You will be responsible for any taxes assessed 
on the compensation.   
 
If you will earn $100 or more as a research participant in this study, 
you must provide your name, address and SSN to receive 
compensation. 
 
If you do not earn over $100 only your name and address will be 
collected to receive compensation. 
 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not 
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise 
qualify.  
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to 
the research, please contact the investigator:  
Irina Iles 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
0107 Skinner Building 







Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your online consent by clicking the radio button below indicates that 
you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or 
have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your 
satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
study. You will receive a copy of this consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please choose the radio button “I agree 


















Participant recruiting and screening 
The same text will be used for both the pilot and the main study. 
This text will appear on Amazon Mechanical Turk: 
 
In this study, we are interested in what individuals who have a chronic illness think 
about a brief story in which the importance of medical treatment is discussed. We 
are only looking for people who meet certain criteria. Please check to see if you 
qualify before accepting this HIT by clicking the link below. 
 
[the link will redirect to a short screener hosted by Qualtrics] 
 
 Qualtrics Screener: 
1. Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes/no 
If no, terminate 
2. Are you pregnant? Yes/no 
If yes, terminate 
3. If you are a woman, are you 3 months postpartum? Yes/no 
If yes, terminate 
4. Have you been diagnosed with either hypertension or type 2 diabetes in 
the past 6 months?  
• Yes, with type 2 diabetes [jump to Questions 5-10] 
• Yes, with hypertension [jump to Questions 11-16] 
• No 
If no, terminate 
5. Are you currently taking type 2 diabetes medication? Yes/no 
If no, terminate 
6. Do you perceive the severity of your illness to be low? Yes/no 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
7. Are you concerned that you will gain weight if you take your medication? 
Yes/no 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
8. Are you concerned that your risk for cardiovascular illness might increase 
if you take your medication? Yes/no 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
9. Do you believe that your medication is not effective? Yes/no 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
10. Do you believe that your medication is not necessary? Yes/no 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
[if participant answers no to all questions above, terminate] 
 
11. Are you currently taking blood pressure lowering medication? Yes/no 
If no, terminate 
12. Do you perceive the severity of your illness to be low? 





13. Do you believe that your medication is not effective? 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
14. Do you believe that your medication is not necessary? 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
15. Are you concerned that your medication may cause side effects? 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
16. Is your hypertension condition asymptomatic, meaning that you are 
experiencing no symptoms because of your illness? 
If yes, participant is eligible -> redirect to main study survey 
[if participant answers no to all questions above, terminate] 
 
Message to appear on screen if “terminate”: We’re sorry, but you do not meet 
the requirements of this study. Thank you for participating. 



























Survey instrument pilot study 
Consent form 
[as detailed in the attached Consent Form document] 
 
Chronic condition assignment: 
Do you have: 
1) Diabetes – if yes, assign to diabetes group 
2) Hypertension – if yes, assign to hypertension group 
 
Experimental manipulation for both the diabetes and the hypertension 
groups 
 
A short story will now appear on the screen. Please read it carefully and pay 
attention to details. Imagine that what is being described in the story actually 
happened to you. Take as much time as you need to read the story. When you are 
done, click the “Next” button in the bottom right corner in the screen. You will 




Now, please answer the questions that follow. Keep in mind that this is a survey 
designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. This is not a test 
and there are no right or wrong answers. Please answer the questions based on 
what you really think and have experienced.  
Remember that this is an anonymous survey and that your answers will not be 
connected to your name or contact information. 
All of your answers are very important. We want to hear YOUR thoughts and 
opinions.  
Please make sure to read every question. If you don’t find an answer that fits 
exactly, use the one that comes closest.  
Note that there will be no back button throughout the survey because we 
want to know your first impressions. 
 
1. Relevance. 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree 
• The story I just read said something highly relevant to me. 
 
2. Believability. 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree 
• The story I just read was believable. 
 





• The story I just read was easy to understand. 
• I had no difficulty in understanding the story I just read.  
 
4. Interest in the message 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree 
• The story I just read grasped my attention immediately.  
 
5. Message derogation 1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree 
To what extent do you think the story you just read was: 
• Exaggerated 
• Distorted  
• Overblown  
 
6. Identification with the message 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree 
• I could easily relate to what happened in the story. 
• I think that the events I just read could happen to me in real life.  
 
7. Qualitative feedback  
In the space provided below, please mention any thoughts you might have 
about the story you just read. Please focus on what aspects (words, ideas) in 
the story should be changed to make it more relevant and easier to understand 



















Survey experiments 1 and 2 
Consent form 
[as detailed in the attached Consent Form document] 
 
Chronic condition assignment: 
Do you have: 
3) Diabetes – if yes, assign to diabetes group 
4) Hypertension – if yes, assign to hypertension group 
 
Experimental manipulation for both the diabetes and the hypertension 
groups 
 
A short story will now appear on the screen. Please read it carefully and pay 
attention to details. Imagine that what is being described in the story actually 
happened to you. You will have X minutes [X to be estimated in the pilot study] 
to read the story. After X minutes, the story will disappear from the screen and 




Now, please answer the questions that follow. Keep in mind that this is a survey 
designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. This is not a test 
and there are no right or wrong answers. Please answer the questions based on 
what you really think and have experienced.  
Remember that this is an anonymous survey and that your answers will not be 
connected to your name or contact information. 
All of your answers are very important. We want to hear YOUR thoughts and 
opinions.  
Please make sure to read every question. If you don’t find an answer that fits 
exactly, use the one that comes closest.  
Note that there will be no back button throughout the survey because we 




What were your feelings while reading the story? 
 
1 – did not experience that emotion at all; 7 – experienced the emotion 











2. Self-efficacy   
• How confident are you that you can follow the medication 
treatment that your doctor prescribed to you for your chronic 
condition? 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you 
experience side effects? 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you feel 
you do not need it? 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you do 
not have symptoms? 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you are 
feeling well? 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the 
doctor prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you are 
afraid of becoming dependent on them? 
• How confident are you that you can make taking medication part 
of your routine? 
 
1 – not at all confident to 7 – very confident. 
 
3. Response Efficacy 1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will help me 
stay healthy 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will improve 
the quality of my life 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will improve 
my ability to function in day to day life 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will allow me 
to have a long life 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will allow me 
to lead a normal life 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will decrease 





• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will prevent 
hospitalization 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will allow me 
to enjoy life. 
 
 
4. Behavioral intentions 1 – not strong at all to 7 – very strong  
 
• Think about this moment. How strong is your intention to take your 
medication as advised by your doctor right now? 
• Think about tomorrow. How strong do you think your intention to take 
your medication as advised by your doctor will be tomorrow? 
• Think about one week from today. How strong do you think your 
intention to take your medication as advised by your doctor will be one 
week from today? 
 
5. Covariates 
a. History of medical complications 
• Have you ever experienced health complications, such as chronic 
illness symptom aggravation, due to not taking your medications? 
(yes, one time; yes, more than once; no, never) 
• Have you ever been hospitalized because you did not take your 
medications? (yes, one time; yes, more than once; no, never).  
 
 
b. Experience of medication side effects 1-not at all; 7 – very much 
• How much do you fear that your chronic illness medication 
will cause side effects  
• Have you experienced any side effects caused by your chronic 
illness medication? 
 
c. Depressive symptoms 
In the past 2 weeks, how much did you experience any of the 
following: 1- not at all; 7 – very much 
• Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
• Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
• Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge 
• Not being able to stop or control worrying 
 
d. Doctor-patient communication 1 – strongly disagree; 7 – 
strongly agree 
• The physician gave me detailed information about the 





• The physician and I made all treatment decisions together. 
• The physician’s explanations were easy to understand. 
• The physician spoke to me in detail about the risks and side 
effects of the proposed treatment. 
• The doctor asked about how my illness affects my 
everyday life. 
• The doctor gave me enough time to talk about all my 
problems. 
• The physician respects that I may have a different opinion 
regarding treatment. The physician gave me detailed 
information about my illness. 
 
e. Length of illness 
For how long have you diagnosed with diabetes/hypertension? 
Less than a year 
• 2 years 
• 3 years 
• 4 years  
• 5 years 
• 6 years 
• more than 6 years 
 
6. Demographic information. Participants will be asked to report their 
gender, race/ethnicity, and age.  
a. Age: _________  
b. Sex:    Female      Male  
c. Race/Ethnicity: 
  African-American/Black   Asian or Pacific Islander  
   Latino/Hispanic    Native-American  















Appendix D. Stimuli used in Experiment 3 
 
Condition 1: Stated upward counterfactual condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
I couldn’t help but think that if only I had taken my medication as prescribed, I would 
have been fine! If only I had taken my medication as prescribed, my condition wouldn’t 
have worsened and I would not be in the hospital right now! 
Condition 2: Stated downward counterfactual condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 
effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
I couldn’t help but think that it could have been worse and I could have died!  
Condition 3: Spontaneous upward counterfactual condition version 1 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 





I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
 
After listening to the text above, participants read the following instructions [the bold text 
appeared in the survey, as well]: 
 
People often have thoughts like “if only . . .” after negative events, in that they can see 
how things may have turned out better. For example, an Albany woman who recently 
sustained minor injuries when she was hit by a car told reporters, “If only I had looked 
down the street a second time, I wouldn’t have been hit!”  
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think about how things could have been 
better if the character had taken their medication as prescribed. Please fill in the 
following statements with your thoughts.  
 
If only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have  ________ 
If only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have  ________ 
 
Condition 4: Spontaneous upward counterfactual condition version 2 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 





I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
 
After listening to the text above, participants read the following instructions [the bold text 
appeared in the survey, as well]: 
 
People often have thoughts like “if only . . .” after negative events, in that they can see 
how things may have turned out better if they had done things differently. For example, 
an Albany woman who recently sustained minor injuries when she was hit by a car told 
reporters, “If only I had looked down the street a second time, I wouldn’t have been 
hit!”  
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think what the character in the story 
could have done differently to prevent his illness from getting worse. Please fill in the 
following statements with your thoughts.  
 
If only the character had ________, his illness wouldn’t have gotten worse. 
If only the character had ________, his illness wouldn’t have gotten worse. 
 
Condition 5: Spontaneous downward counterfactual condition 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 





effects, so I wanted to see if it was really necessary. So I stopped taking it, thinking that 
I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 
there told me that my diabetes/hypertension got worse.  
 
After listening to the text above, participants read the following instructions [the bold text 
appeared in the survey, as well]: 
People often have thoughts like “it could have been worse and I could have…” after 
negative events, in that they can see how things may have turned out even worse. For 
example, an Albany woman who recently sustained minor injuries when she was hit by a 
car told reporters, “it could have been worse and I could have died!” 
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think about how the character’s situation 
could have been worse than it currently is. Please fill in the statements below with your 
thoughts. 
 
The character could have ____ 
The character could have ____ 
 
Condition 6: Control condition (no counterfactual) 
I’ve been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes/hypertension. My doctor prescribed me 
medication. I took the medication for a while and it was causing uncomfortable side 





I’ll be alright. After about a week of not taking my pills, I started feeling really bad, I felt 
very dizzy, I could barely walk or talk, so I had to go to the emergency room. The doctors 































Appendix E. Institutional Review Board Application Materials for Experiment 3 
 
Initial Application Part 2 
 
13. Abstract:   
 
Chronic illnesses among the most common, costly, and preventable of all health problems 
in the United States. After an individual has been diagnosed with a chronic illness, he/she 
must follow a doctor-recommended course of treatment in order to manage their 
condition and avoid medical complications. Adherence to treatment, however, is low and 
understanding how to effectively communicate to patients about the importance of 
treatment is important. This study tries to understand how individuals with type 2 
diabetes, a major chronic illness that has low treatment adherence, process and react to 
information about treatment adherence. The goal of this study is to offer advice on how to 
effectively communicate with patients about treatment adherence in order to maximize 
their willingness to follow said treatment.  
 
14. Subject Selection: 
 
f. Recruitment: Participants for this study will be recruited via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk.  
 
g. Eligibility Criteria:  In order to be eligible for this study, individuals must 1) be at 
least 18 years of age; 2) have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes in the past 6 




h. Rationale: This study focuses on effective communication about treatment 
adherence for type 2 diabetes. Thus, individuals who participate in the study must 
this condition. The 6 month cutoff has been chosen based on the literature which 
suggests that individuals give up treatment starting 6 months after they have been 
diagnosed with a chronic condition. Pregnant individuals or individuals within 3 
months from having given birth are excluded because it is common for these 
patients to not take chronic illness medication during this time period due to its 
potential negative effects on the fetus/on the baby through breastfeeding. Finally, 
this study focuses on individuals who are at risk for not adhering to their 
treatment; therefore, following recommendations from prior literature, it is 
necessary that only individuals who present such risks are included in our study in 
order to determine the effectiveness of the communications tested. Including 
individuals who are not at risk for nonadherence might inflate the effectiveness of 











j. Rationale for Enrollment Numbers: The number of participants has been 
established based on statistical power calculations. 500 participants ensure enough 
statistical power to make accurate inferences. By setting a maximum number of 
participants, the survey software used (Qualtrics) will automatically stop 





A quasi-experiment will be conducted online to test the hypotheses. In the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk participant recruitment system, the study will be introduced as a study 
that investigates patients’ reactions to communications discussing adherence to treatment 
for chronic illnesses. Once participants identify themselves as eligible and agree to 
participate, they will be redirected to an online survey webpage hosted by Qualtrics. The 
screening of participants will include questions about 1) their diagnosis with diabetes; 2) 
their currently taking medication to treat the illness; 3) their concerns with side effects of 
the medication; 4) their concerns with the necessity and effectiveness of the medication. 
Participants who have diabetes, are taking medication, and express some concern 
regarding side effects or medication necessity or medication effectiveness will be 
included in the study.  
 
The research presents no risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which 
written consent is normally required outside of the research context. The study will be 
conducted using Qualtrics survey software. Participants will be able to complete the 
study from their personal computers. 
 
If agreeing to participate in the study, participants will report if they have type 2 diabetes. 
Participants will first engage in a brief exercise to ensure that they can properly hear the 
messages of interest and that they are paying attention.  
 
For this exercise, participants will listen to a brief introduction narrated by a person 
named Robert. After that, participants will answer a question about what Robert has said. 
If participants answer this question wrong, they are reminded to pay attention and listen 
carefully and cautioned that if they miss any other attention checks they will be 
terminated from the study without compensation. 
 
Participants will be then randomly assigned to one of the study’s six experimental 
conditions. The six experimental conditions consist of an audio message; they are all the 





patient who has decided not to take their medication as prescribed because he/she thought 
that the medication wasn’t necessary. As a result, the patient finds himself/herself in the 
emergency room. There, the doctor tells him/her that their chronic illness has worsened 
significantly. Depending upon the experimental condition, the story will end with one of 
the following statements: 1) I couldn’t help but think that if only I had taken my 
medication as prescribed, my condition wouldn’t have worsened! If only I had taken my 
medication as prescribed, my condition wouldn’t have worsened and I would not be in 
the hospital right now!; 2) I couldn’t help but think that it could have been worse and I 
could have died!; 3) 4), & 5) instructions to generate their own statements (see details 
below); 6) no statement (control condition). 
 
3) Instructions for condition 3: People often have thoughts like “if only . . .” after 
negative events, in that they can see how things may have turned out better. For example, 
an Albany woman who recently sustained minor injuries when she was hit by a car told 
reporters, “If only I had looked down the street a second time, I wouldn’t have been hit!”  
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think about how things could have been 
better if the character had taken their medication as prescribed. Please fill in the 
following statements with your thoughts.  
 
If only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have  ________ 
If only the character had taken the medication, he wouldn’t have  ________ 
 
4) Instructions for condition 4: People often have thoughts like “if only . . .” after 
negative events, in that they can see how things may have turned out better if they had 
done things differently. For example, an Albany woman who recently sustained minor 
injuries when she was hit by a car told reporters, “If only I had looked down the street a 
second time, I wouldn’t have been hit!”  
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think what the character in the story 
could have done differently to prevent his illness from getting worse. Please fill in the 
following statements with your thoughts.  
 
If only the character had ________, his illness wouldn’t have gotten worse. 
If only the character had ________, his illness wouldn’t have gotten worse. 
 
5) Instructions for condition 5: People often have thoughts like “it could have been worse 
and I could have…” after negative events, in that they can see how things may have 
turned out even worse. For example, an Albany woman who recently sustained minor 
injuries when she was hit by a car told reporters, “it could have been worse and I could 
have died!” 
 
Think about the story you just listened to. Then think about how the character’s situation 







The character could have ____ 
The character could have ____ 
 
Participants will be randomly assigned to listen to one these stories. After listening to one 
of these communications depending on their assigned experimental condition, 
participants will respond a battery of questions, as described below. 
 
Participants will report on the emotions they felt while reading the story, their self-
efficacy to take their medication as prescribed, their beliefs that the recommendation to 
take their medication is effective in managing their illness, and their intentions to take 
their medication as prescribed at the time of the study and in the future. Participants will 
also answer questions regarding the length of their disease, beliefs about their illness 
(e.g., illness severity, effectiveness of medication to manage their illness), their 
communication with their health care provider, the side effects of their medications, and 
demographic information. The study should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
 
Following Amazon Mechanical Turk guidelines, participants will receive $1 for their 
participation. The compensation will be handled through the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
system. 
 
Because participants on Mturk often do not pay attention to survey items, researchers 
include accuracy questions/attention checks to ensure that they obtain quality data. We 
have 3 such accuracy questions/attention checks: 
1) in the exercise in the beginning of the study (described above) 
2) after listening to the messages 
              When did the character in the story start feeling sick after not taking their 
medication? 
                         a) immediately 
                         b) after about one week  [correct answer] 
                         c) after about one month 
                         d) the character didn’t feel sick 
3) when measuring self-efficacy [the following item will be inserted among the self-
efficacy measures]: 
 
                   How confident are you that you are paying attention? Please select option ‘5’, 
this is      
                   an attention check. 
If participants miss the first attention check, they are given a free pass, cautioned to pay 
more attention, and allowed to continue. If participants miss the 2nd or the 3rd attention 
check, they are terminated from the survey immediately and the data collected up that 
point is automatically deleted by the survey software. Compensation is not provided in 
this case. Participants will be informed about this in the consent form. The attention 
checks/accuracy questions are positioned in the beginning of the survey, immediately 
after the study manipulation, and at about the mid-point of the survey (for the self-
efficacy item) to avoid terminating a participant from the study once the survey is almost 





participants have carefully listened to the main message in the study (failure to do so 
would render the study invalid); and 2) participants carefully answer the main variables 





There are no known risks from participating in this research study. However, participants 
might feel some discomfort due to reading a story about a person who shares their 
chronic illness. At the end of the survey, resources regarding the treatment of diabetes 





There are no direct benefits to participants. We are hoping that this study will add 
knowledge to how to effectively communicate to chronic illness patients about the 




The researchers will not have any direct way of linking participants’ responses to their 
identity, so the information they provide will be confidential. If the online survey system 
returns IP addresses or other identifying information, it will be immediately deleted. Only 
approved researchers will have access to the data collected. Data collected will be stored 
in a password-protected computer in a limited access space. The data will be retained for 
at least 5 years. 
 
19. Consent Process: 
 
The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not 
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. 
 
Participants will be presented an online consent form after they click the link of the 
survey via the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. 
 
This study needs a waiver of physical signed consent. Participants’ rights and welfare 
will not be violated by the waiver of consent. 
 
Participants will give their consent online by clicking a button saying, “I agree to 
participate in this study”. Participants will have the ability to print a copy of the consent 
form for their records. 
 





the alteration of consent. 
 
Participation in the study will be voluntary. If they withdraw or decline participation, 
they will not be penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the study. If they 
decide to participate, they may decline to answer any question and may choose to 
withdraw at any time. 
If participants have any questions or concerns about the study, participants may contact 
the principal investigator whose name and email address will be specified on the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk system and the consent form. 
 
20. Conflict of Interest: 
  
No conflict of interest. 
 












24. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 
 
Your Initial Application must include a completed Initial Application Part 1 
(On-Line Document), the information required in items 1-11 above, and all 
relevant supporting documents including: consent forms, letters sent to recruit 
participants, questionnaires completed by participants, and any other material that 
will be presented, viewed or read to human subject participants. 
 
For funded research, a copy of the Awarded Grant Application (minus the 
budgetary information) must be uploaded.  If the Grant has not been awarded at 
the time of submission of this Initial Application, a statement must be added to 
the Abstract Section stating that an Addendum will be submitted to include the 
Grant Application once it has been awarded. 
 
 
THE IRB OFFICE WILL NO LONGER STAMP CONSENT 





IRBNET PACKET MUST BE USED.  THESE ARE YOUR 







































 Communicating about treatment adherence for chronic illness. 






This research is being conducted by Irina Iles and Xiaoli Nan at 
the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you to 
participate in this research project because you have a chronic 
illness.  The purpose of this research project is to understand how 
individuals with chronic illness process and react to information 





The procedures involve a 15 minutes computer-based study. You will 
listen to a short story about a person who has a chronic illness like 
you. Then, you will provide basic demographic information and 
answer a few questions or rate items that assess your reactions to 
the story you heard. Sample questions/items include: 
• How confident are you that you can take the medication that the doctor 
prescribed to you for your chronic condition when you feel you do not 
need it? 
• I am concerned that I will gain weight if I take my medication. 
 
You will be compensated with $1 for your participation. The 
compensation will be provided to you via the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk System.  
Please note that there will be attention checks/accuracy questions 
throughout the survey to ensure that you have listened to the story 
carefully and that you pay attention to all the questions/items in the 
survey. If any of the attention checks/accuracy questions are missed, 
the survey software will immediately terminate your participation in 
the survey and the data you have provided up to the point you are 
terminated from the survey will automatically be deleted by the 
survey software. Compensation will not be provided in this situation. 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study. 
Specifically, the story you will read might make you feel some 
discomfort because it will depict a person who shares your chronic 
illness. At the end of the survey, a link where you can find more 
information about the information in the story will be provided.   
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits from participating in this research. 
However, we hope that, in the future, other people might benefit 
from this study through improved understanding of how to best 










Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing 
data in a password protected computer in a locked office. Hard 
copy materials will be stored in a locked office. For an online 
survey, we will immediately delete any identifying information like 
IP address after the data have been collected. 
Only approved researchers will have access to the data you provide.  
 
If we write a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your 
information may be shared with representatives of the University of 
Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or 
someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.  
Compensation 
 
You will receive $1.  You will be responsible for any taxes assessed 
on the compensation.   
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not 
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise 
qualify.  
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to 
the research, please contact the investigator:  
Irina Iles 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
0107 Skinner Building 
College Park, MD 20742-7635 
(301) 405-0775 
iirina@umd.edu 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 






Statement of Consent 
 
Your online consent by clicking the radio button below indicates that 
you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or 
have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your 
satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
study. You may print a copy of this consent form for your records. 
 
If you agree to participate, please choose the radio button “I agree 

































Exercise to ensure participants can hear the messages 
 
Trial before exposure to experimental condition 
 
In this study, you will listen to a brief story and then answer a few questions about that 
story. Please make sure the audio volume on your computer is working and turned on at 
an adequate volume. We’ll start with a test message to ensure that you can hear our 
messages properly. Please listen to the following test message carefully. You will be 
asked questions about it and you must answer them correctly to continue with the study!  
 
Click “play” to listen to the message. 
Hi! My name is Robert and I love sports. My favorite sport is tennis. I like 
playing tennis on Sunday afternoons with my brother. I also love wild animals. 




 What is Robert’s favorite animal? 
• Cats 
• Snakes 
• Tigers [correct answer] 
• Kangaroos 
If the participant answers this question wrong, the following message appears: 
 
Your answer is incorrect. Please make sure your audio is on and at an adequate 
volume and that you pay attention to the information you listen to. If you miss other 
accuracy questions asked throughout the survey, you will be terminated from the 
survey without compensation.  
 
We will move on to the main study. Please listen to the following story. The 
remaining questions in this study will relate to this story so it is important that you 
pay attention to it. Click “play” to begin the story. 
 
If the participant answers correctly, the following message appears: 
 
You did great! Now that we made sure you can hear our messages properly, we will 
move on to the main study. Please listen to the following story. The remaining 
questions in this study will relate to this story so it is important that you pay 
attention to it. Click “play” to begin the story. 
 
Pre-exposure behavior 
Are you currently taking your diabetes/hypertension medication consistently as 





• No, I stopped taking my medication 
• I take my medication inconsistently, most of the days I don’t take it 
• I take my medication inconsistently, but I do take it most days 
• Yes, I take my medication as prescribed every day.  
 
Risk for medication nonadherence 
Now please rate the following items on a scale from 1 -strongly disagree to 7 – strongly 
agree. 
• I think the severity of my diabetes is low. 
• I am concerned that I will gain weight if I take my diabetes medication. 
• I am concerned that my risk for cardiovascular illness my increase if I take my 
diabetes medication. 
• I think my diabetes medication is not effective. 
• I think that my diabetes medication is not necessary. 
• I don’t think it’s such a big deal if I don’t take my diabetes medication every day. 
 
Experimental manipulation  
[insert stimulus] 
 
Accuracy question about the message: 
When did the character in the story start feeling sick after not taking their 
medication? 
                         a) immediately 
                         b) after about one week [correct answer] 
                         c) after about one month 
                         d) the character didn’t feel sick 
 




Now, think about the story you just listened to as you answer the questions that 
follow. Please answer the questions based on what you really think and have 
experienced.  
Remember that this is an anonymous survey and that your answers will not be 
connected to your name or contact information. 






Please make sure to read every question. The questions are distinct, even if they 
may initially appear as the same, so it is important that you read all of them.  
Note that there will be no back button throughout the survey because we 
want to know your first impressions. 
1. Regret 
 
What were your feelings while listening to the story? 
 
1 – did not experience that emotion at all; 7 – experienced the emotion 






2. Self-efficacy   
Think about the story you just listened to and rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement with each of items below. The items are distinct, so make sure you 
read each of them carefully. 
1 – not at all confident to 7 – very confident. 
After listening to this story, how confident are you that…. 
• you can follow the medication treatment that your doctor 
prescribed to you for your chronic condition? 
• you can take the medication that the doctor prescribed to you for 
your chronic condition when you experience side effects? 
• you can take the medication that the doctor prescribed to you for 
your chronic condition when you feel you do not need it? 
• you are paying attention? Please select option ‘5’, this is an 
attention check. 
[if any option other than 5 is selected, the participant is terminated 
from the survey] 
• you can take the medication that the doctor prescribed to you for 
your chronic condition when you do not have symptoms? 
• you can take the medication that the doctor prescribed to you for 
your chronic condition when you are feeling well? 
• you can take the medication that the doctor prescribed to you for 
your chronic condition when you are afraid of becoming dependent 
on them? 







3. Response Efficacy and Outcome Expectations 
 
1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree 
 
• I believe that taking my medication as prescribed by my doctor will: 
▪ help me stay healthy 
▪ improve the quality of my life 
▪ improve my ability to function in day to day life 
▪ allow me to have a long life 
▪ allow me to lead a normal life 
▪ decrease my chronic illness-related symptoms 
▪ prevent hospitalization 
▪ allow me to enjoy life. 
▪ allow me to engage in activities that I enjoy.  
▪ allow me to live the life that I want. 
▪ make my family and friends happy. 
• I believe that if I take my medication as prescribed by my doctor, my 
family and friends will support me.  
• I believe that if I take my medication as prescribed by my doctor, my 
family and friends will like me more.  
• I believe that if I take my medication as prescribed by my doctor, my 




4. Behavioral intentions  
 
1 – not strong at all to 7 – very strong  
 
• Think about this moment. How strong is your intention to take your 
medication as advised by your doctor right now? 
• Think about tomorrow. How strong do you think your intention to take 
your medication as advised by your doctor will be tomorrow? 
• Think about one week from today. How strong do you think your 
intention to take your medication as advised by your doctor will be one 
week from today? 
• How strong do you think your intention to take your medication as 
prescribed by your doctor even if you experience side effects is? 
• How strong do you think your intention to take your medication as 






5. Manipulation check (for the stated CFT conditions + control) 
 
Think about the story you just listened to and rate the statements below on a scale 
from 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree. 
• The character in the story specifically mentioned what he could have done 
to avoid the negative situation he is now in.  
• The character in the story specifically mentioned how his situation could 




a. History of medical complications 
 
• Have you ever experienced health complications, such as chronic 
illness symptom aggravation, due to not taking your medications? 
(yes, one time; yes, more than once; no, never) 
• Have you ever been hospitalized because you did not take your 
medications? (yes, one time; yes, more than once; no, never).  
 
 
b. Experience of medication side effects  
 
1-not at all; 7 – very much 
 
• How much do you fear that your chronic illness medication 
will cause side effects? 
• Have you experienced any side effects caused by your chronic 
illness medication?  
 
c. Depressive symptoms 
In the past 2 weeks, how much did you experience any of the following:  
2- not at all; 7 – very much 
• Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
• Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
• Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge 
• Not being able to stop or control worrying 
 
d. Doctor-patient communication  
 
Think about your experience when you visit the doctor for your diabetes 







1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree 
 
• The physician gave me detailed information about the 
available treatment options. 
• The physician and I made all treatment decisions together. 
• The physician’s explanations were easy to understand. 
• The physician spoke to me in detail about the risks and side 
effects of the proposed treatment. 
• The doctor asked about how my illness affects my 
everyday life. 
• The doctor gave me enough time to talk about all my 
problems. 
• The physician respects that I may have a different opinion 
regarding treatment.  
• The physician gave me detailed information about my 
illness. 
 
e. Length of illness 
For how long have you been diagnosed with diabetes/hypertension? 
• less than a year 
• 2 years 
• 3 years 
• 4 years  
• 5 years 
• 6 years 
• more than 6 years 
 
7. Demographic information. Participants will be asked to report their gender, 
race/ethnicity, and age.  
a. Age: _________  
b. Gender:    Female      Male  Gender fluid 
c. Race/Ethnicity: 
  African-American/Black   Asian or Pacific Islander  
   Latino/Hispanic    Native-American  
  White /Caucasian    Unknown / Other _______________  
 
d. What is the highest level of school you completed? 
• Less than high school  





• High school graduate 
• Some college 
• College graduate   
• Post-college    
 
e. What is your household yearly income? 





o More than $100,000 
o I don’t know  
 
 











Table 1. Diabetes Message Evaluations Pilot Study 




























































































Table 2. Hypertension Message Evaluations Pilot Study 









































































































Table 3. Type 2 Diabetes sample characteristics 
Characteristic # participants Percentage 
Type 2 Diabetes 
Gender   
Woman 207 57.8 
Man 147 41.1 
Gender fluid 4 1.1 
Race   
White 248 69.3 
Black/African American 43 12.0 
Latino/Hispanic 22 6.1 
Asian/Pacific Islander 23 6.4 
Native American 10 2.8 
Mixed 12 3.4 
Education   
Some high school 6 1.7 
High school graduate 46 12.9 
Some college 135 37.8 
College graduate 135 37.8 
Post-college graduate 35 9.8 
Income   
Less than $15,000 31 8.7 
$15,001 - $25,000 44 12.3 
$25,001 - $45,000 97 27.1 
$45,001 - $65,000 98 27.4 
$65,001 - $100,000 64 17.9 
>$100,000 21 5.9 
Illness length   
Less than one year 103 28.8 
One year 58 16.2 
Two years 70 19.6 
Three years  51 14.2 
Four years  17 4.7 
Five years  19 5.3 
Six years  6 1.7 










Table 4. Hypertension sample characteristics 
Characteristic # participants Percentage 
Hypertension 
Gender   
Woman 238 61.0 
Man 149 38.2 
Gender fluid 3 0.8 
Race   
White 288 73.8 
Black/African American 44 11.3 
Latino/Hispanic 31 7.9 
Asian/Pacific Islander 16 4.1 
Native American 7 1.8 
Mixed 4 1.0 
Education   
Some high school 3 0.8 
High school graduate 46 11.8 
Some college 123 31.5 
College graduate 153 39.2 
Post-college graduate 65 16.7 
Income   
Less than $15,000 32 8.2 
$15,001 - $25,000 52 13.3 
$25,001 - $45,000 113 29.0 
$45,001 - $65,000 81 20.8 
$65,001 - $100,000 71 18.2 
>$100,000 36 9.2 
Illness length   
Less than one year  100 25.6 
One year  44 11.3 
Two years  58 14.9 
Three years  56 14.4 
Four years  32 8.2 
Five years  29 7.4 
Six years  5 1.3 


























Type 2 diabetes 
 
Regret 3 .89 3.84 (1.81) -0.16 (.13) -1.09 (.26)   
Self-efficacy 7 .92 5.31 (1.28) -0.47 (.13) -0.55 (.26)   
Response efficacy 10 .96 5.51 (1.20) -0.66 (.13) -0.31 (.26)   
Outcome expectancy 4 .74 4.76 (1.31) -0.25 (.13) -0.38 (.26)   
Behavioral 
intention* 
3 .93 5.87 (1.28) -1.00 (.13) 0.17 (.26) -0.63 (.13) -0.88 (.26) 
Depressive 
symptoms 
4 .92 3.55 (1.70) 0.09 (.13) -0.88 (.26)   
Side effects** 2 .56 4.59 (1.50) -0.39 (.13) -0.32 (.26)   
Doctor-patient 
comm 




Regret 3 .86 3.46 (1.69) 0.07 (.12) -1.03 (.25)   
Self-efficacy 7 .91 5.45 (1.27) -0.83 (.12) 0.56 (.25)   
Response efficacy*  10 .96 5.61 (1.24) -1.15 (.12) 1.61 (.25) -0.44 (.12) -0.64 (.25) 
Outcome expectancy 4 .79 4.55 (1.41) -0.26 (.12) -0.18 (.25)   
Behavioral 
intention* 







4 .91 3.56 (1.86) 0.12 (.12) -0.90 (.25)   
Side effects** 2 .63 4.22 (1.65) -0.21 (.12) -0.85 (.25)   
Doctor-patient 
comm 
8 .93 4.93 (1.51) -0.67 (.12) -0.34 (.25)   
Note: * This variable was squared. Means are specified for the untransformed variable. 





Table 6. Bivariate correlations among continuous measures in experiments 1 and 2 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Type 2 diabetes 
1. Regret 1 .062 .115* .234** .058 .203** .144** .064 
2. Self-efficacy  1 .738** .299** .736** -.031** -.189** .472** 
3. Response efficacy   1 .480** .771** -.083 -.243** .606** 
4. Outcome expectancy    1 .310** .074 -.047 .370** 
5. Behavioral intention     1 -.016 -.174** .488** 
6. Side effects      1 .318** -.015 
7. Depressive symptoms       1 -.229** 
8. Doctor-patient comm        1 
Hypertension 
1. Regret 1 -.008 .074 .233** .015 .113* .172** .145** 
2. Self-efficacy  1 .676** .271** .738** -.272** -.248** .424** 
3. Response efficacy   1 .480** .716** -.318** -.268** .448** 
4. Outcome expectancy    1 .302** -.071 -.111* .342** 
5. Behavioral intention     1 -.236** -.254** .439** 
6. Side effects      1 .298** -.145** 
7. Depressive symptoms       1 -.138** 
8. Doctor-patient comm        1 
Note: * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 







Table 7. Type 2 Diabetes sample experiments for experiment 3 
Characteristic # participants Percentage 
Type 2 Diabetes (experiment 3) 
Gender   
Woman 159 52.5 
Man 144 47.5 
Gender fluid 0 0 
Race   
White 206 68 
Black/African American 41 13.5 
Latino/Hispanic 24 7.9 
Asian/Pacific Islander 17 5.6 
Native American 9 3.0 
Mixed 5 1.7 
Education   
Some high school 9 3.0 
High school graduate 35 11.6 
Some college 100 33.0 
College graduate 127 41.9 
Post-college graduate 32 10.6 
Income   
Less than $15,000 23 7.6 
$15,001 - $25,000 37 12.2 
$25,001 - $45,000 68 22.4 
$45,001 - $65,000 84 27.7 
$65,001 - $100,000 59 19.5 





Illness length   
Less than one year  175 57.8 
Two years  49 16.2 
Three years  27 8.9 
Four years  19 6.3 
Five years  13 4.3 
Six years  2 0.7 


























Regret 3 .90 3.30 (1.28) 0.11 (.14) -0.05 (.28) 
Self-efficacy 7 .93 4.91 (0.98) 0.11 (.14) 0.15 (.28) 
Response efficacy 10 .94 4.91 (1.00) 0.10 (.14) -0.09 (.28) 
Outcome expectancy* 2 .87 4.32 (1.86) -0.37 (.14) -0.77 (.28) 
Behavioral intention 5 .92 4.68 (1.01) 0.29 (.14) 0.29 (.28) 
Depressive symptoms 4 .92 3.12 (1.76) 0.33 (.14) -0.99 (.28) 
Side effects* 2 .52 3.95 (1.54) -0.18 (.14) -0.60 (.28) 
Doctor-patient comm 8 .97 5.16 (1.38) -0.48 (.14) -0.37 (.28) 
Nonadherence risk 3 .78 3.06 (1.32) 0.21 (.14) -.66 (.28) 












Table 9. Bivariate correlations among continuous measures in experiment 3 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Type 2 diabetes  
1. Regret 
 
1 .228** .117** .170** .195** .148** .085* -.012 .150** 
2. Self-efficacy  1 .824** .137* .574** .001 -.121* .191** -.092 
3. Response efficacy   1 .144* .585** .011 -.111* .229** -.094 
4. Outcome expectancy    1 .164** .016 .051 .256** .112 
5. Behavioral intention     1 .045 -.104 .160** -.038 
6. Side effects      1 .461** -.319** .453** 
7. Depressive symptoms       1 -.359** .374** 
8. Doctor-patient comm  
 
      1 -.359** 
9. Nonadherence risk         1 
Note: * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 









Table 10. Summary of effects for stated upward CFT condition versus stated downward CFT condition 
Direct effects 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .53 .15 3.53 .001 0.23 0.83 
Condition > response efficacy .71 .14 5.10 .000 0.44 0.99 
Condition > outcome expectancy  -.11 .32 -0.34 .74 -0.75 0.53 
Condition > intention .17 .14 1.20 .23 -0.11 0.45 
Self-efficacy > intention .30 .11 2.67 .009 0.08 0.52 
Response efficacy > intention .32 .12 2.69 .008 0.08 0.56 
Outcome expectancy > intention .06 .04 1.45 .15 -0.02 0.14 
Indirect effects of experimental condition on behavioral intention 




Through self-efficacy .16 .07 0.06 0.34 
Through response efficacy .23 .10 0.06 0.46 
Through outcome expectancy -.01 .02 -0.07 0.02 
Moderation effects (regret) 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy -.33 .15 -2.13 .036 -0.64 -0.02 
Condition > response efficacy -.01 .15 -0.07 .94 -0.30 0.28 
Condition > outcome expectancy -.12 .34 -0.53 .72 -0.79 0.55 







Table 11. Summary of effects for self-generated outcomes upward CFT condition versus self-generated downward CFT condition 
Direct effects 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .77 .21 3.63 .001 0.35 1.20 
Condition > response efficacy .74 .22 3.30 .001 0.30 1.19 
Condition > outcome expectancy  .38 .38 0.98 .33 -0.38 1.13 
Condition > intention .79 .19 3.98 .000 0.40 1.19 
Self-efficacy > intention .23 .17 1.34 .18 -0.11 0.58 
Response efficacy > intention .10 .17 0.62 .54 -0.23 0.43 
Outcome expectancy > intention .05 .05 0.96 .34 -0.05 0.15 
Indirect effects of experimental condition on behavioral intention 




Through self-efficacy .18 .15 -0.05 0.56 
Through response efficacy .08 .12 -0.14 0.34 
Through outcome expectancy .02 .03 -0.02 0.14 
Moderation effects (regret) 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy -.42 .15 -2.74 .007 -0.73 -0.12 
Condition > response efficacy -.50 .16 3.012 .003 -0.82 -0.18 
Condition > outcome expectancy .15 .29 0.52 .60 -0.42 0.72 







Table 12. Summary of effects for self-generated behaviors upward CFT condition versus self-generated downward CFT condition 
Direct effects 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .91 .22 4.09 .000 0.47 1.35 
Condition > response efficacy .98 .23 4.17 .000 0.51 1.44 
Condition > outcome expectancy  .25 .39 0.62 .54 -0.54 1.03 
Condition > intention .63 .19 3.27 .002 0.25 1.01 
Self-efficacy > intention .11 .16 0.71 .48 -0.20 0.42 
Response efficacy > intention .44 .15 2.97 .004 0.14 0.73 
Outcome expectancy > intention .000 .05 0.02 .99 -0.10 0.10 
Indirect effects of experimental condition on behavioral intention 




Through self-efficacy .10 .14 -0.14 0.43 
Through response efficacy .43 .16 0.18 0.81 
Through outcome expectancy .000 .03 -0.05 0.06 
Moderation effects (regret) 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy -.15 .14 -1.08 .28 -0.44 0.13 
Condition > response efficacy -.25 .15 -1.63 .11 -0.55 0.06 
Condition > outcome expectancy -.10 .28 -0.35 .73 -0.64 0.45 







Table 13. Summary of effects for self-generated outcomes upward CFT condition versus stated upward CFT condition 
Direct effects 
 Coefficient Standard error t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .40 .14 2.77 .007 0.11 0.69 
Condition > response efficacy 
(with covariates) 
.27 .13 2.11 .037 0.02 0.53 
Condition > response efficacy 
(w/o covariates) 
.29 .12 2.36 .02 0.05 0.53 
Condition > outcome expectancy  .31 .31 1.01 .31 -0.30 0.93 
Condition > intention .36 .17 2.08 .04 0.02 0.69 
Self-efficacy > intention .22 .17 1.29 .20 -0.12 0.55 
Response efficacy > intention -.17 .18 -0.92 .36 -0.54 0.20 
Outcome expectancy > intention .03 .05 0.51 .61 -0.08 0.14 
Indirect effects of experimental condition on behavioral intention 
 Coefficient Bootstrapping 
standard error 
LLCI ULCI 
Through self-efficacy .09 .08 -0.02 0.29 
Through response efficacy -.05 .06 -0.22 0.03 
Through outcome expectancy .01 .02 -0.02 0.11 
Moderation effects (regret) 
 Coefficient Standard error t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .08 .14 0.54 .59 -0.21 0.36 
Condition > response efficacy -.09 .13 -0.70 .49 -0.35 0.17 
Condition > outcome expectancy .29 .31 0.96 .34 -0.31 0.90 







Table 14. Summary of effects for self-generated behaviors upward CFT condition versus stated upward CFT condition 
Direct effects 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .55 .15 3.60 .001 0.25 0.85 
Condition > response efficacy .46 .14 3.23 .002 0.18 0.75 
Condition > outcome expectancy  .38 .33 1.15 .26 -0.28 1.05 
Condition > intention .22 .18 1.25 .21 -0.13 0.57 
Self-efficacy > intention .15 .16 0.90 .37 -0.18 0.47 
Response efficacy > intention .41 .17 2.36 .02 0.06 0.75 
Outcome expectancy > intention .02 .05 0.39 .70 -0.08 0.12 
Indirect effects of experimental condition on behavioral intention 




Through self-efficacy .08 .09 -0.09 0.29 
Through response efficacy .19 .10 0.04 0.45 
Through outcome expectancy .01 .03 -0.03 0.11 
Moderation effects (regret) 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t p LLCI ULCI 
Condition > self-efficacy .33 .14 2.41 .02 0.06 0.61 
Condition > response efficacy .15 .14 1.13 .26 -0.12 0.42 
Condition > outcome expectancy .13 .32 0.39 .70 -0.52 0.77 





Table 15. Summary of findings across hypotheses and research questions in Experiment 3 
Comparison 
 
Direct effects Indirect effects Interaction effects Conditional 
indirect effect 
H1 H2 H3 RQ1 H4 H5 RQ2 H6 RQ3 RQ4 H7 H8 RQ5 RQ6 
Stated upward vs. 
stated downward 
ns ⁕ ⁕ no ⁕ ⁕ no ⁕ no no ns ⁕ no No 
Self-generated 
upward 1 vs. self-
generated downward 
⁕ ⁕ ⁕ no Ns ns no ⁕ yes no ns ns no No 
Self-generated 
upward 2 vs. self-
generated downward 
⁕ ⁕ ⁕ no Ns ⁕ no ns no no no ns no No 
Self-generated 
upward 1 vs. stated 
upward 
⁕ ⁕ ⁕ no Ns ns no ns no no no ns no No 
Self-generated 
upward 2 vs. stated 
upward 
ns ⁕ ⁕ no Ns ⁕ no ⁕ no no no ns no No 






























Figure 2. Comparison between stated upward CFT and stated downward CFT  






















Figure 3. Comparison between self-generated outcomes upward CFT and self-generated downward CFT  
















Figure 4. Comparison between self-generated behaviors upward CFT and self-generated downward CFT  
















Figure 5. Comparison between self-generated outcomes upward CFT and stated upward CFT.  















Figure 7. Regret moderates the effect of self-generated outcomes upward (versus 







Figure 8. Regret moderates the effect of self-generated outcomes upward (versus 




















Figure 9. Regret moderates the effect of self-generated behaviors upward (versus stated 
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